Новости наказание на английском

Kick is the most rewarding gaming and livestreaming platform. Sign-up for our beta and join the fastest growing streaming community. Русско-английский словарь. Перевод «Наказание». на английский язык: «punishment». О сервисе Прессе Авторские права Связаться с нами Авторам Рекламодателям Разработчикам. Преступление и наказание в свежем выпуске BigAppleSchool Podcast. Ведущие пытаются выяснить, что толкает людей на совершение преступлений, спорят над темой реабилитации преступников в обществе, а также приводят аргументы за и против смертной казни. перевод на английский язык, синонимы, произношение, примеры предложений, антонимы, определение.

PUNISHMENT

They also tell you what your rights are. A law exists because a majority of the people in the country agrees with it. Laws are compulsory. They are backed up by punishment 4. A law exists because it promotes the health or safety of everyone in society seat belt Слайд 14 5.

Laws protect everybody. Without the protection of law each person could be under threat from everyone else in society. A law exists because it helps society to function more smoothly. Traffic lights are an example of this sort of law.

Люди, решившие отомстить бывшему партнеру и разославшие его интимные фото посторонним, рискуют оказаться в тюрьме на срок от 6 месяцев до 2 лет; такое же наказание ждет тех, кто рассылает собственные интимные фотографии в приложениях для знакомств или по AirDrop. Он разработан для защиты людей с эпилепсией, которые часто сталкиваются в сети с троллями, отправляющими мерцающие изображения. Подобные файлы могут спровоцировать эпилептические припадки и наносят людям серьезный физический и психологический ущерб. Закон получил такое название благодаря мальчику Заку, который в восьмилетнем возрасте в социальной сети X ранее Twitter начал кампанию по сбору средств для благотворительной организации Epilepsy Society.

Translated in English by Constance Garnett. Роман «Преступление и наказание» на английском языке. Автор Ф. Перевод: Констанция Гарнетт.

Общество и его проблемы Crime and Punishment - сочинение на английском языке If we look into history we shall find that laws, which are, or ought to be, conventions between men in a state of freedom, have been, for the most part the work of the passions of a few, or the consequences of a fortuitous or temporary necessity. Observe that by justice I understand nothing more than that bond which is necessary to keep the interest of individuals united, without which men would return to their original state of barbarity. All punishments which exceed the necessity of preserving this bond are in their nature unjust. The end of punishment, therefore, is no other than to prevent the criminal from doing further injury to society, and to prevent others from committing the like offence. Such punishments, therefore, and such a mode of inflicting them, ought to be chosen, as will make the strongest and most lasting impressions on the minds of others, with the least torment to the body of the criminal. The torture of a criminal during the course of his trial is a cruelty consecrated by custom in most nations. It is used with an intent either to make him confess his crime, or to explain some contradiction into which he had been led during his examination, or discover his accomplices, or for some kind of metaphysical and incomprehensible purgation of infamy, or, finally, in order to discover other crimes of which he is not accused, but of which he may be guilty. No man can be judged a criminal until he be found guilty; nor can society take from him the public protection until it have been proved that he has violated the conditions on which it was granted.

Греция вводит уголовное наказание за распространение ложной информации о коронавирусе

FOREIGN POLICY. DOMESTIC POLICY. Four major tech companies were accused of agreeing not to poach each other's employees in order to drive down wages. Статья подается в оригинале (на английском) и переводе (перевод не дословный). Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. английский испанский французский португальский русский турецкий.

Преступление и наказание. Лексика на английском.

В Британии анонсировали ужесточение наказания за нарушение закона о шпионаже — РТ на русском punishment, penalty, chastisement, judgment, discipline, penance, plague.
Criminal Law | Open Access Articles | Digital Commons Network™ Клингонский (pIqaD) азербайджанский албанский амхарский английский арабский армянский африкаанс баскский белорусский бенгальский бирманский болгарский боснийский валлийский венгерский вьетнамский гавайский галисийский греческий грузинский гуджарати датский зулу.
наказание - Английский - Русский Переводы и примеры Top stories in the U.S. and world news, politics, health, science, business, music, arts and culture. Nonprofit journalism with a mission. This is NPR.
Error — JavaScript not Loaded Следовательно, должны быть выбраны такое наказания и такие способы нанесения их, которые произведут самые сильные и неизгладимые впечатления на умы других людей, с наименьшей мукой для преступника.

В Британии ввели уголовное наказание за угрозы в интернете и издевательство над людьми с эпилепсией

Они похожи на вирусы, которые крадут ваше внимание для своих целей. Новости уменьшают количество думающих людей. Новости серьезно влияют на память. Так как новости нарушают концентрацию, они ослабляют понимание.

Есть два типа памяти. Долгосрочная память имеет практические неисчерпаемый объем. Но короткосрочная оперативная память ограничена определенным объемом поступающей информации.

ТО, что вы хотите понять и осознать, должно пройти путь в долгосрочную память из короткосрочной. Если фильтр забит, то по-настоящему важная информация не сможет через него пробиться. Новости снижают нашу концентрацию на важном.

Онлайн новости — и того хуже. Новости можно назвать международной системой разрушения внимания. News works like a drug.

As stories develop, we want to know how they continue. With hundreds of arbitrary storylines in our heads, this craving is increasingly compelling and hard to ignore. Scientists used to think that the dense connections formed among the 100 billion neurons inside our skulls were largely fixed by the time we reached adulthood.

Today we know that this is not the case. Nerve cells routinely break old connections and form new ones. The more news we consume, the more we exercise the neural circuits devoted to skimming and multitasking while ignoring those used for reading deeply and thinking with profound focus.

Most news consumers — even if they used to be avid book readers — have lost the ability to absorb lengthy articles or books. After four, five pages they get tired, their concentration vanishes, they become restless. Новости работают как наркотик Узнав о каком-либо происшествии, мы хотим узнать и чем оно закончится.

Помня о сотнях сюжетов из новостей, мы все меньше способны контролировать это стремление. Ученые привыкли думать, что плотные связи среди 100 миллиардов нейронов в наших головах уже окончательно сложились к тому моменту, когда мы достигаем зрелого возраста. Сегодня мы знаем, что это не так.

Нервные клетки регулярно разрывают старые связи и образуют новые. Чем больше новостей мы потребляем, тем больше мы тренируем нейронные цепи, отвечающие за поверхностное ознакомление и выполнение множественных задач, игнорируя те, которые отвечают за чтение и сосредоточенное мышление. Большинство потребителей новостей — даже если они раньше были заядлыми читателями книг — потеряли способность читать большие статьи или книги.

После четырех-пяти страниц они устают, концентрация исчезает, появляется беспокойство. Это не потому, что они стали старше или у них появилось много дел. Просто физическая структура мозга изменилась.

News wastes time. Information is no longer a scarce commodity. But attention is.

You are not that irresponsible with your money, reputation or health. Why give away your mind? Новости убивают время Если вы читаете новости по 15 минут утром, потом просматриваете их 15 минут в середине дня, 15 минут перед сном, еще по 5 минут на работе, теперь сосчитаем, сколько времени вы сфокусированы на новостях, то вы теряете как минимум пол дня еженедельно.

Новости — не столь ценный товар по сравнению с нашим вниманием. Мы уделяем внимание деньгам, репутации, здоровью. Почему же не заботимся о собственном сознании.

Всего штрафы были выписаны за 121 сообщение, преимущественно внимание обращалось на записи в социальной сети Twitter. Больше всего пришлось заплатить бывшему защитнику "Челси" Эшли Коулу, который в 2012 году получил взыскание на 90 тысяч фунтов за оскорбление Футбольной ассоциации Англии. Подписывайтесь на новости футбола от Rusfootball.

More examples below Наказание может ужесточаться при наличии отягощающих обстоятельств. The sanctions may be increased based on aggravated circumstances.

Наказание за несоблюдение правовых норм, регламентирующих. Penalty for non-observance of the legal rules governing. More examples below Наказание от недели блокировки чата и выше. Punishment from week of chat blocking and above. Умение« Наказание » приобретает эффекты всех рун.

Punish gains the effect of every rune.

Они также устояли перед мимолетным восстанием, возглавляемым Браяром розом, который был изгнан и преобразован в наказание. Произношение Скопировать текст Сообщить об ошибке They also withstood a flitling rebellion, led by Briar Rose who was banished and transformed as a punishment. В конечном счете наказание за агрессию , которая считается бесспорным международным преступлением, натолкнется на огромные препятствия. Произношение Скопировать текст Сообщить об ошибке That notwithstanding, the punishment of aggression, which was deemed to be an international crime par excellence would encounter tremendous obstacles.

(наказание)

Статья подается в оригинале (на английском) и переводе (перевод не дословный). Latest London news, business, sport, celebrity and entertainment from the London Evening Standard. We here at the Daily Stormer are opposed to violence. We seek revolution through the education of the masses. When the information is available to the people, systemic change will be inevitable and unavoidable. Anyone suggesting or promoting violence in the comments section will be immediately. 1. (noun) A lazy cowboy who neglects their duties on a farm or ranch. 2. (noun) A rural person in an urban environment, such as an office, who's mannersisms are notably different, less competitive, and often performed at a slower pace than the urbanites. The term may be used in either an endearing or. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Legal Punishment. First published Tue Jan 2, 2001; substantive revision Fri Dec 10, 2021. The question of whether, and how, legal punishment can be justified has long been a central concern of legal, moral, and political philosophy: what could justify a state in using the apparatus of the law to inflict.

Перевод текстов

Many translated example sentences containing "наказание" – English-Russian dictionary and search engine for English translations. Перевод слова НАКАЗАНИЕ на английский язык, смотреть в русско-английском словаре. Top stories in the U.S. and world news, politics, health, science, business, music, arts and culture. Nonprofit journalism with a mission. This is NPR. английский язык онлайн. Статья подается в оригинале (на английском) и переводе (перевод не дословный). наказание, предусмотрено различной степени тяжести, в соответствии с совершенным преступлением!

Штрафы английских игроков за скандальные высказывания в социальных сетях достигли 350 тысяч фунтов

Новости можно назвать международной системой разрушения внимания. News works like a drug. As stories develop, we want to know how they continue. With hundreds of arbitrary storylines in our heads, this craving is increasingly compelling and hard to ignore.

Scientists used to think that the dense connections formed among the 100 billion neurons inside our skulls were largely fixed by the time we reached adulthood. Today we know that this is not the case. Nerve cells routinely break old connections and form new ones.

The more news we consume, the more we exercise the neural circuits devoted to skimming and multitasking while ignoring those used for reading deeply and thinking with profound focus. Most news consumers — even if they used to be avid book readers — have lost the ability to absorb lengthy articles or books. After four, five pages they get tired, their concentration vanishes, they become restless.

Новости работают как наркотик Узнав о каком-либо происшествии, мы хотим узнать и чем оно закончится. Помня о сотнях сюжетов из новостей, мы все меньше способны контролировать это стремление. Ученые привыкли думать, что плотные связи среди 100 миллиардов нейронов в наших головах уже окончательно сложились к тому моменту, когда мы достигаем зрелого возраста.

Сегодня мы знаем, что это не так. Нервные клетки регулярно разрывают старые связи и образуют новые. Чем больше новостей мы потребляем, тем больше мы тренируем нейронные цепи, отвечающие за поверхностное ознакомление и выполнение множественных задач, игнорируя те, которые отвечают за чтение и сосредоточенное мышление.

Большинство потребителей новостей — даже если они раньше были заядлыми читателями книг — потеряли способность читать большие статьи или книги. После четырех-пяти страниц они устают, концентрация исчезает, появляется беспокойство. Это не потому, что они стали старше или у них появилось много дел.

Просто физическая структура мозга изменилась. News wastes time. Information is no longer a scarce commodity.

But attention is. You are not that irresponsible with your money, reputation or health. Why give away your mind?

Новости убивают время Если вы читаете новости по 15 минут утром, потом просматриваете их 15 минут в середине дня, 15 минут перед сном, еще по 5 минут на работе, теперь сосчитаем, сколько времени вы сфокусированы на новостях, то вы теряете как минимум пол дня еженедельно. Новости — не столь ценный товар по сравнению с нашим вниманием. Мы уделяем внимание деньгам, репутации, здоровью.

Почему же не заботимся о собственном сознании. News makes us passive. News stories are overwhelmingly about things you cannot influence.

It grinds us down until we adopt a worldview that is pessimistic, desensitised, sarcastic and fatalistic. The scientific term is «learned helplessness». Новости делают нас пассивными Подавляющее большинство новостей рассказывают о вещах, на которые вы не можете повлиять.

Ежедневное повторение того, что мы бессильны делает нас пассивными. Они перемалывают нас, пока мы не смиримся с пессимистичным, бесчувственным, саркастическим и фаталистическим мировоззрением. Есть термин для этого явления — «заученная беспомощность».

Я не удивлюсь, если узнаю, что новости являются одной из причин распространяющейся массовой депрессии. News kills creativity. Finally, things we already know limit our creativity.

Греческие журналисты назвали данное решение Парламента попыткой ограничить свободу слова и контролировать личное мнение, так как обновленная статья УК касается любой информации, являющейся предметом общественного обсуждения. Таким образом, выражение персональных мнений публично или в Интернете также может быть классифицировано как ложные новости или слухи. Это же касается обсуждения обязательного характера вакцинации от коронавируса.

A consequentialist must justify punishment if she is to justify it at all as a cost-effective means to certain independently identifiable goods for two simple examples of such theories, see Wilson 1983; Walker 1991. Whatever account she gives of the final good or goods at which all action ultimately aims, the most plausible immediate good that a system of punishment can bring is the reduction of crime. A rational consequentialist system of law will define as criminal only conduct that is in some way harmful; in reducing crime we will thus be reducing the harms that crime causes. It is commonly suggested that punishment can help to reduce crime by deterring, incapacitating, or reforming potential offenders though for an argument that incapacitation is not a genuinely punitive aim, see Hoskins 2016: 260. There are of course other goods that a system of punishment can bring.

It can reassure those who fear crime that the state is taking steps to protect them—though this is a good that, in a well-informed society, will be achieved only insofar as the more immediate preventive goods are achieved. It can also bring satisfaction to those who want to see wrongdoers suffer — though to show that to be a genuine good, rather than merely a means of averting vigilantism and private revenge, we would need to show that it involves something more than mere vengeance, which would be to make sense of some version of retributivism. In consequentialist terms, punishment will be justified if it is an effective means of achieiving its aim, if its benefits outweigh its costs, and if there is no less burdensome means of achieving the same aim. It is a contingent question whether punishment can satisfy these conditions, and some objections to punishment rest on the empirical claim that it cannot — that there are more effective and less burdensome methods of crime reduction see Wootton 1963; Menninger 1968; Golash 2005: chs. Our focus here, however, will be on the moral objections to consequentialist accounts of punishment — objections, basically, that crime-reductive efficiency does not suffice to justify a system of punishment. The most familiar line of objection to consequentialist penal theories contends that consequentialists would be committed to regarding manifestly unjust punishments the punishment of those known to be innocent, for instance, or excessively harsh punishment of the guilty to be in principle justified if they would efficiently serve the aim of crime reduction: but such punishments would be wrong, because they would be unjust see e. There are some equally familiar consequentialist responses to this objection. Another is to argue that in the real world it is extremely unlikely that such punishments would ever be for the best, and even less likely that the agents involved could be trusted reliably to pick out those rare cases in which they would be: thus we, and especially our penal officials, will do best if we think and act as if such punishments are intrinsically wrong and unjustifiable see e.

Another objection to consequentialist accounts focuses not on potential wrongs done to the innocent but rather on the wrong allegedly done to the guilty. Consequentialist punishment, on this objection, fails to respect the person punished as an autonomous moral agent. In Kantian terms, such punishment treats those punished as mere means to achieving some social good, rather than respecting them as ends in themselves Kant 1797: 473; Murphy 1973. One might argue that if punishment is reserved for those who voluntarily break the law, it does not treat them merely as means. Indeed, Kant himself suggested that as long as we reserve punishment only for those found guilty of crimes, then it is permissible to punish with an eye toward potential benefits Kant 1797: 473. As we have seen, though, insofar as such an approach relies on endorsing prohibitions on punishment of the innocent or disproportionate punishment of the guilty, the challenge remains that such constraints appear to be merely contingent if grounded in consequentialist considerations. Conversely, if the constraints are more than merely contingent, it appears that they will be based on some deontological considerations, in which case the overall theory will no longer be purely consequentialist, but rather a mixed theory see s. The criminal law, and the institution of punishment, in a liberal society should treat offenders as still members of the polity who despite having violated its values could, and should, nonetheless re commit to these values.

A possible response is that a penal system aimed at crime reduction through deterrence need not be exclusionary, as it treats all community members equally, namely as potential offenders Hoskins 2011a: 379—81. Retributivist Accounts Whereas consequentialist accounts regard punishment as justified instrumentally, as a means to achieving some valuable goal typically crime reduction , retributivist accounts contend that punishment is justified as an intrinsically appropriate, because deserved, response to wrongdoing but see Berman 2011 for an argument that some recent versions of retributivism actually turn it into a consequentialist theory. Penal desert constitutes not just a necessary, but an in-principle sufficient reason for punishment only in principle, however, since there are good reasons — to do with the costs, both material and moral, of punishment — why we should not even try to punish all the guilty. Negative retributivism, by contrast, provides not a positive reason to punish, but rather a constraint on punishment: punishment should be imposed only on those who deserve it, and only in proportion with their desert. Because negative retributivism represents only a constraining principle, not a positive reason to punish, it has been employed in various mixed accounts of punishment, which endorse punishment for consequentialist reasons but only insofar as the punishment is no more than is deserved see s. A striking feature of penal theorising during the last three decades of the twentieth century was a revival of positive retributivism — of the idea that the positive justification of punishment is to be found in its intrinsic character as a deserved response to crime see H. Morris 1968; N. Morris 1974; Murphy 1973; von Hirsch 1976; two useful collections of contemporary papers on retributivism are White 2011 and Tonry 2012.

Positive retributivism comes in very different forms Cottingham 1979. All can be understood, however, as attempting to answer the two central questions faced by any retributivist theory of punishment. Davis 1972 — and what do they deserve to suffer see Ardal 1984; Honderich 2005, ch. Second, even if they deserve to suffer, or to be burdened in some distinctive way, why should it be for the state to inflict that suffering or that burden on them through a system of criminal punishment Murphy 1985; Husak 1992 and 2015; Shafer-Landau 1996; Wellman 2009? One retributivist answer to these questions is that crime involves taking an unfair advantage over the law-abiding, and that punishment removes that unfair advantage. The criminal law benefits all citizens by protecting them from certain kinds of harm: but this benefit depends upon citizens accepting the burden of self-restraint involved in obeying the law. The criminal takes the benefit of the self-restraint of others but refuses to accept that burden herself: she has gained an unfair advantage, which punishment removes by imposing some additional burden on her see H. Morris 1968; Murphy 1973; Sadurski 1985; Sher 1987, ch.

This kind of account does indeed answer the two questions noted above. However, such accounts have internal difficulties: for instance, how are we to determine how great was the unfair advantage gained by a crime; how far are such measurements of unfair advantage likely to correlate with our judgements of the seriousness of crimes? Davis 1992, 1996; for criticism, see Scheid 1990, 1995; von Hirsch 1990. Such accounts try to answer the first of the two questions noted above: crime deserves punishment in the sense that it makes appropriate certain emotions resentment, guilt which are satisfied by or expressed in punishment. Criminal wrongdoing should, we can agree, provoke certain kinds of emotion, such as self-directed guilt and other-directed indignation; and such emotions might typically involve a desire to make those at whom they are directed suffer. At the least we need to know more than we are told by these accounts about just what wrongdoers deserve to suffer, and why the infliction of suffering should be an appropriate way to express such proper emotions. For critical discussions of Murphy, see Murphy and Hampton 1988, ch. On Moore, see Dolinko 1991: 555—9; Knowles 1993; Murphy 1999.

See also Murphy 2003, 2012. More recently, critics of emotion-based retributivist accounts have contended that the emotions on which retributive and other deontological intuitions are based have evolved as mechanisms to stabilise cooperation; given that we have retributive emotions only because of their evolutionary fitness, it would be merely a coincidence if intuitions based on these emotions happened to track moral truths about, e. A problem with such accounts is that they appear to prove too much: consequentialist accounts also rely on certain evaluation intuitions about what has value, or about the proper way to respond to that which we value ; insofar as such intuitions are naturally selected, then it would be no less coincidental if they tracked moral truths than if retributive intuitions did so. Thus the consequentialist accounts that derive from these intuitions would be similarly undermined by this evolutionary argument see Kahane 2011; Mason 2011; but see Wiegman 2017. A third version of retributivism holds that when people commit a crime, they thereby incur a moral debt to their victims, and punishment is deserved as a way to pay this debt McDermott 2001. This moral debt differs from the material debt that an offender may incur, and thus payment of the material debt returning stolen money or property, etc. Punishment as Communication Perhaps the most influential version of retributivism in recent decades seeks the meaning and justification of punishment as a deserved response to crime in its expressive or communicative character. On the expressive dimension of punishment, see generally Feinberg 1970; Primoratz 1989; for critical discussion, see Hart 1963: 60—69; Skillen 1980; M.

Davis 1996: 169—81; A. Lee 2019. Consequentialists can of course portray punishment as useful partly in virtue of its expressive character see Ewing 1927; Lacey 1988; Braithwaite and Pettit 1990 ; but a portrayal of punishment as a mode of deserved moral communication has been central to many recent versions of retributivism. The central meaning and purpose of punishment, on such accounts, is to convey the censure or condemnation that offenders deserve for their crimes. On other such accounts, the primary intended audience of the condemnatory message is the offender himself, although the broader society may be a secondary audience see Duff 2001: secs. Once we recognise that punishment can serve this communicative purpose, we can see how such accounts begin to answer the two questions that retributivists face. First, there is an obviously intelligible justificatory relationship between wrongdoing and condemnation: whatever puzzles there might be about other attempts to explain the idea of penal desert, the idea that it is appropriate to condemn wrongdoing is surely unpuzzling. For other examples of communicative accounts, see especially von Hirsch 1993: ch.

For critical discussion, see M. Davis 1991; Boonin 2008: 171—80; Hanna 2008; Matravers 2011a. Two crucial lines of objection face any such justification of punishment as a communicative enterprise. The first line of critique holds that, whether the primary intended audience is the offender or the community generally, condemnation of a crime can be communicated through a formal conviction in a criminal court; or it could be communicated by some further formal denunciation issued by a judge or some other representative of the legal community, or by a system of purely symbolic punishments which were burdensome only in virtue of their censorial meaning. Is it because they will make the communication more effective see Falls 1987; Primoratz 1989; Kleinig 1991? And anyway, one might worry that the hard treatment will conceal, rather than highlight, the moral censure it should communicate see Mathiesen 1990: 58—73. One sort of answer to this first line of critique explains penal hard treatment as an essential aspect of the enterprise of moral communication itself. Punishment, on this view, should aim not merely to communicate censure to the offender, but to persuade the offender to recognise and repent the wrong he has done, and so to recognise the need to reform himself and his future conduct, and to make apologetic reparation to those whom he wronged.

His punishment then constitutes a kind of secular penance that he is required to undergo for his crime: its hard treatment aspects, the burden it imposes on him, should serve both to assist the process of repentance and reform, by focusing his attention on his crime and its implications, and as a way of making the apologetic reparation that he owes see Duff 2001, 2011b; see also Garvey 1999, 2003; Tudor 2001; Brownless 2007; Hus 2015; for a sophisticated discussion see Tasioulas 2006. This type of account faces serious objections see Bickenbach 1988; Ten 1990; von Hirsch 1999; Bagaric and Amarasekara 2000; Ciocchetti 2004; von Hirsch and Ashworth 2005: ch. The second line of objection to communicative versions of retributivism — and indeed against retributivism generally — charges that the notions of desert and blame at the heart of retributivist accounts are misplaced and pernicious. One version of this objection is grounded in scepticism about free will. In response, retributivists may point out that only if punishment is grounded in desert can we provide more than contingent assurances against punishment of the innocent or disproportionate punishment of the guilty, or assurances against treating those punished as mere means to whatever desirable social ends see s. Another version of the objection is not grounded in free will scepticism: it allows that people may sometimes merit a judgement of blameworthiness. To this second version of the objection to retributivist blame, retributivists may respond that although emotions associated with retributive blame have no doubt contributed to various excesses in penal policy, this is not to say that the notion of deserved censure can have no appropriate place in a suitably reformed penal system. After all, when properly focused and proportionate, reactive attitudes such as anger may play an important role by focusing our attention on wrongdoing and motivating us to stand up to it; anger-tinged blame may also serve to convey how seriously we take the wrongdoing, and thus to demonstrate respect for its victims as well as its perpetrators see Cogley 2014; Hoskins 2020.

In particular, Hart 1968: 9—10 pointed out that we may ask about punishment, as about any social institution, what compelling rationale there is to maintain the institution that is, what values or aims it fosters and also what considerations should govern the institution. The compelling rationale will itself entail certain constraints: e. See most famously Hart 1968, and Scheid 1997 for a sophisticated Hartian theory; on Hart, see Lacey 1988: 46—56; Morison 1988; Primoratz 1999: ch. For example, whereas Hart endorsed a consequentialist rationale for punishment and nonconsequentialist side-constraints, one might instead endorse a retributivist rationale constrained by consequentialist considerations punishment should not tend to exacerbate crime, or undermine offender reform, etc. Alternatively, one might endorse an account on which both consequentialist and retributivist considerations features as rationales but for different branches of the law: on such an account, the legislature determines crimes and establishes sentencing ranges with the aim of crime reduction, but the judiciary makes sentencing decisions based on retributivist considerations of desert M. Critics have charged that hybrid accounts are ad hoc or internally inconsistent see Kaufman 2008: 45—49. In addition, retributivists argue that hybrid views that integrate consequentialist rationales with retributivist side-constraints thereby relegate retributivism to a merely subsidiary role, when in fact giving offenders their just deserts is a or the central rationale for punishment see Wood 2002: 303. Also, because hybrid accounts incorporate consequentialist and retributivist elements, they may be subject to some of the same objections raised against pure versions of consequentialism or retributivism.

For example, insofar as they endorse retributivist constraints on punishment, they face the thorny problem of explaining the retributivist notion of desert see s. Even if such side-constraints can be securely grounded, however, consequentialist theories of punishment face the broadly Kantian line of objection discussed earlier s. Some have contended that punishment with a consequentialist rationale does not treat those punished merely as means as long as it is constrained by the retributivist prohibitions on punishment of the innocent and disproportionate punishment of the guilty see Walker 1980: 80—85; Hoskins 2011a. Still, a critic may argue that if we are to treat another with the respect due to her as a rational and responsible agent, we must seek to modify her conduct only by offering her good and relevant reasons to modify it for herself. Punishment aimed at deterrence, incapacitation, or offender reform, however, does not satisfy that demand. A reformative system treats those subjected to it not as rational, self-determining agents, but as objects to be re-formed by whatever efficient and humane techniques we can find. An incapacitative system does not leave those subjected to it free, as responsible agents should be left free, to determine their own future conduct, but seeks to preempt their future choices by incapacitating them. One strategy for dealing with them is to posit a two-step justification of punishment.

The first step, which typically appeals to nonconsequentialist values, shows how the commission of a crime renders the offender eligible for, or liable to, the kinds of coercive treatment that punishment involves: such treatment, which is normally inconsistent with the respect due to us as rational agents or as citizens, and inconsistent with the Kantian means principle, is rendered permissible by the commission of the offence. The second step is then to offer positive consequentialist reasons for imposing punishment on those who are eligible for it or liable to it: we should punish if and because this can be expected to produce sufficient consequential benefits to outweigh its undoubted costs. Further nonconsequentialist constraints might also be placed on the severity and modes of punishment that can be permitted: constraints either flowing from an account of just what offenders render themselves liable to, or from other values external to the system of punishment. We must ask, however, whether we should be so quick to exclude fellow citizens from the rights and status of citizenship, or whether we should not look for an account of punishment if it is to be justified at all on which punishment can still be claimed to treat those punished as full citizens. The common practice of denying imprisoned offenders the right to vote while they are in prison, and perhaps even after they leave prison, is symbolically significant in this context: those who would argue that punishment should be consistent with recognised citizenship should also oppose such practices; see Lippke 2001b; Journal of Applied Philosophy 2005; see also generally s. The consent view holds that when a person voluntarily commits a crime while knowing the consequences of doing so, she thereby consents to these consequences. This is not to say that she explicitly consents to being punished, but rather than by her voluntary action she tacitly consents to be subject to what she knows are the consequences. Notice that, like the forfeiture view, the consent view is agnostic regarding the positive aim of punishment: it purports to tell us only that punishing the person does not wrong her, as she has effectively waived her right against such treatment.

The consent view faces formidable objections, however. First, it appears unable to ground prohibitions on excessively harsh sentences: if such sentences are implemented, then anyone who subsequently violates the corresponding laws will have apparently tacitly consented to the punishment Alexander 1986. A second objection is that most offenders do not in fact consent, even tacitly, to their sentences, because they are unaware either that their acts are subject to punishment or of the severity of the punishment to which they may be liable. For someone to have consented to be subject to certain consequences of an act, she must know of these consequences see Boonin 2008: 161—64. A third objection is that, because tacit consent can be overridden by explicit denial of consent, it appears that explicitly nonconsenting offenders could not be justifiably punished on this view ibid. Others offer contractualist or contractarian justifications of punishment, grounded in an account not of what treatment offenders have in fact tacitly consented to, but rather of what rational agents or reasonable citizens would endorse. The punishment of those who commit crimes is then, it is argued, rendered permissible by the fact that the offender himself would, as a rational agent or reasonable citizen, have consented to a system of law that provided for such punishments see e. For versions of this kind of argument, see Alexander 1980; Quinn 1985; Farrell 1985, 1995; Montague 1995; Ellis 2003 and 2012.

For criticism, see Boonin 2008: 192—207. For a particularly intricate development of this line of thought, grounding the justification of punishment in the duties that we incur by committing wrongs, see Tadros 2011; for critical responses, see the special issue of Law and Philosophy, 2013. One might argue that the Hegelian objection to a system of deterrent punishment overstates the tension between the types of reasons, moral or prudential, that such a system may offer. Punishment may communicate both a prudential and a moral message to members of the community. Even before a crime is committed, the threat of punishment communicates societal condemnation of an offense. This moral message may help to dissuade potential offenders, but those who are unpersuaded by this moral message may still be prudentially deterred by the prospect of punishment. Similarly, those who actually do commit crimes may be dissuaded from reoffending by the moral censure conveyed by their punishment, or else by the prudential desire to avoid another round of hard treatment. Through its criminal statutes, a community declares certain acts to be wrong and makes a moral appeal to community members to comply, whereas trials and convictions can communicate a message of deserved censure to the offender.

Thus even if a system of deterrent punishment is itself regarded as communicating solely in prudential terms, it seems that the criminal law more generally can still communicate a moral message to those subject to it see Hoskins 2011a. A somewhat different attempt to accommodate prudential as well as moral reasons in an account of punishment begins with the retributivist notion that punishment is justified as a form of deserved censure, but then contends that we should communicate censure through penal hard treatment because this will give those who are insufficiently impressed by the moral appeal of censure prudential reason to refrain from crime; because, that is, the prospect of such punishment might deter those who are not susceptible to moral persuasion. See Lipkin 1988, Baker 1992. For a sophisticated revision of this idea, which makes deterrence firmly secondary to censure, see von Hirsch 1993, ch. For critical discussion, see Bottoms 1998; Duff 2001, ch. For another subtle version of this kind of account, see Matravers 2000. It might be objected that on this account the law, in speaking to those who are not persuaded by its moral appeal, is still abandoning the attempt at moral communication in favour of the language of threats, and thus ceasing to address its citizens as responsible moral agents: to which it might be replied, first, that the law is addressing us, appropriately, as fallible moral agents who know that we need the additional spur of prudential deterrence to persuade us to act as we should; and second, that we cannot clearly separate the merely deterrent from the morally communicative dimensions of punishment — that the dissuasive efficacy of legitimate punishment still depends crucially on the moral meaning that the hard treatment is understood to convey.

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