Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is the central figure in modern philosophy. He synthesized early modern rationalism and empiricism, set the terms for much of nineteenth and twentieth century philosophy. Иммануил Кант с младенчества, просто по праву рождения, был зачислен в гильдию шорников. Последние дни Иммануила Канта: Directed by Philippe Collin.
Последние дни Иммануила Канта (1994) Les derniers jours d Emmanuel Kant
Саморазвитие Большинство философов Просвещения считали, что лучший способ жить — как можно больше увеличивать счастье и сокращать страдания. Такой подход называется утилитаризмом. Это и сегодня самый распространённый взгляд. Кант смотрел на жизнь совершенно по-другому. Он считал так: если хочешь сделать мир лучше, начни с себя. Вот как он это объяснял. В большинстве случаев невозможно узнать, заслуживает человек счастья или страдания, потому что невозможно узнать его настоящие намерения и цели. Даже если стоит сделать кого-то счастливым, неизвестно, что именно для этого нужно. Вы не знаете чувств, ценностей и ожиданий другого человека.
Не знаете, как ваш поступок на нём скажется. К тому же неясно, из чего именно состоит счастье или страдание. Сегодня развод может причинять вам невыносимую боль, а через год вы будете считать это лучшим, что с вами происходило. Поэтому единственный логичный способ сделать мир лучше — это стать лучше самому. Ведь единственное, что вы знаете хоть сколько-то точно, — это вы сами. Кант определял саморазвитие как способность придерживаться категорических императивов. Он считал это долгом каждого. С его точки зрения, награда или наказание за невыполнение долга даётся не в раю или аду, а в той жизни, которую каждый создаёт для себя.
Следование моральным принципам делает жизнь лучше не только для вас, но и для всех вокруг. Точно так же нарушение этих принципов создаёт лишние страдания для вас и окружающих. Правило Канта запускает эффект домино. Став честнее с собой, вы станете честнее и с другими. Это, в свою очередь, вдохновит людей быть честнее с собой и внесёт позитивные изменения в их жизнь. Если бы правила Канта придерживалось достаточное количество людей, мир изменился бы к лучшему. Причём сильнее, чем от целенаправленных действий какой-то организации. Самоуважение Уважение к себе и уважение к окружающим взаимосвязаны.
Обращение с собственной психикой — это шаблон, который мы применяем для взаимодействия с другими людьми. Вы не добьётесь больших успехов с другими, пока не разберётесь с собой. Самоуважение не в том, чтобы лучше себя чувствовать. Это понимание своей ценности. Понимание, что каждый человек, кем бы он ни был, заслуживает базовых прав и уважения. С точки зрения Канта, говорить себе, что ты ничего не стоящий кусок дерьма, так же неэтично, как говорить это другому человеку. Причинять вред себе так же отвратительно, как причинять вред окружающим. Поэтому любовь к себе и забота о себе — это не то, чему можно научиться, и не то, что можно практиковать, как говорят сегодня.
Это то, что вы призваны культивировать в себе с точки зрения этики. Как это повлияло на меня и как может повлиять на вас Философия Канта, если глубоко в неё погрузиться, полна противоречий. Но его первоначальные идеи настолько сильны, что, несомненно, изменили мир. И изменили меня, когда я наткнулся на них год назад. Большую часть времени в промежутке от 20 до 30 лет я потратил на некоторые пункты из вышеперечисленного списка. Мне казалось, они сделают мою жизнь лучше. Но чем больше я к этому стремился, тем опустошённее себя чувствовал. Чтение Канта стало озарением.
Он открыл для меня удивительную вещь. Не так важно, что именно мы делаем, важна цель этих действий. Пока вы не нашли правильную цель, вы не найдёте ничего стоящего. Кант не всегда был помешанным на распорядке занудой. В молодости он тоже любил повеселиться. Он засиживался допоздна с друзьями за вином и картами. Он поздно вставал, слишком много ел и устраивал большие вечеринки. Только в 40 Кант забросил всё это и создал свой знаменитый распорядок.
По его словам, он осознал нравственные последствия своих действий и решил, что больше не позволит себе растрачивать драгоценное время и силы.
Об этом 21 ноября 2018 года сообщила в Facebook пассажир одного из самолётов. Выходит, организаторы присвоения имени аэропорту Храброво столкнулись с трудностями написания имени немецкого философа. Несмотря на трудности в орфографии в самолётах, Кант по-прежнему лидирует, опережая даже самого резвого ближайшего конкурента - императрицу Елизавету Петровну. По состоянию на 21.
По информации источника, Канте лично ездил на базу команды, чтобы оценить инфраструктуру клуба. Бельгийская федерация уже проинформирована о процессе продажи, на данный момент сделка находится в процессе оформления документов. Клуб представляет бельгийскую провинцию Люксембург и проводит матчи на четырехтысячном стадионе «Иван Жорж». Клуб никогда не играл в высшем бельгийском дивизионе.
Through the progressive integration of the unconscious we have a reasonable chance to make experiences of an archetypal nature providing us with the feeling of continuity before and after our existence. The better we understand the archetype, the more we participate in its life and the more we realize its eternity or timelessness. Many come to me with concerns that I cannot or may not discuss with others. But if subsequently people are seized by an idea that they cannot drop or that leads to failure, it has nothing to do with me.
Главное правило жизни, которому учит философия Канта
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Голосование "Великие имена": в самолётах Канта уже называют "Эммануилом"
Лоран Канте родился в 1961 году в семье школьных учителей, киноискусство он изучал сначала в Марселе, а потом — в парижской Высшей школе кинематографистов. Биография немецкого философа Иммануила Канта: личная жизнь, присяга Российской империи, университет его имени, могила в Калининграде. Полузащитник Н’Голо Канте после подписания контракта с саудовским клубом «Аль-Иттихад» приобрел профессиональный футбольный клуб в Бельгии. Об этом сообщает журналист Саша. Ректор БФУ им. Иммануила Канта Александр Федоров отметил: философия не эксклюзивное занятие, ею, осмысляя действительность и место в ней, занимается каждый. Kant jettisoned traditional theistic proofs for God as utilized by natural theology, but sought to ground ethics, in part, in his concepts of categorical imperatives or universal maxims to guide morality. Последние дни Иммануила Канта: Directed by Philippe Collin.
Climate change and the environment take a back seat in Emmanuel Macron's speech on Europe
В США очень много пропаганды по поводу России, однако, я был очень рад получить такую прекрасную возможность посетить город Канта. Третий день Кантовского конгресса начался с пленарного доклада Эккарта Штайна д-р хабил. На конгрессе доктор Штайн представил доклад «Фундаментальная важность Канта для физики XXI века», который также вызвал большой интерес у участников дискуссии из разных стран. В молодости он изучал Ньютона и Лейбница. Так что он был знаком со всеми физическими понятиями, — рассказал доктор Штайн.
Steve Bissonnette and Christian Boyer reviewed research from eight countries on these questions. The decline in learning seems to be demonstrated for all clienteles, and even more strongly for children in primary schools from less fortunate families, less educated and for those who have learning difficulties or who are fragile in their learning.
This conclusion is consistent with what we observed about the virtual school before the pandemic and strongly suggests that, if there is no choice, as was the case with the pandemic, it can be. But if we have the choice … Can one-off innovations be desirable and welcome? Without a doubt. For example, I recently had a lot of fun learning in the scientific journal Physics Education September 2021 how, in physics class, we could, by different methods, measure the height of a building using only a cell phone and everyday objects. How many methods, you ask? With what effects on learning?
However, we should not forget other harmful effects of the use of social networks in general and cell phones in particular, effects which are increasingly well documented. Credible researchers take seriously the hypothesis that these are very likely to play a role in the increase observed in Generation Z in feelings of loneliness, depression and even suicides.
However, I silently passed over the further question of how a representation that refers to an object without being in any way affected by it can be possible….
And if such intellectual representations depend on our inner activity, whence comes the agreement that they are supposed to have with objects — objects that are nevertheless not possibly produced thereby? The position of the Inaugural Dissertation is that the intelligible world is independent of the human understanding and of the sensible world, both of which in different ways conform to the intelligible world. But, leaving aside questions about what it means for the sensible world to conform to an intelligible world, how is it possible for the human understanding to conform to or grasp an intelligible world?
If the intelligible world is independent of our understanding, then it seems that we could grasp it only if we are passively affected by it in some way. So the only way we could grasp an intelligible world that is independent of us is through sensibility, which means that our knowledge of it could not be a priori. The pure understanding alone could at best enable us to form representations of an intelligible world.
Such a priori intellectual representations could well be figments of the brain that do not correspond to anything independent of the human mind. In any case, it is completely mysterious how there might come to be a correspondence between purely intellectual representations and an independent intelligible world. But the Critique gives a far more modest and yet revolutionary account of a priori knowledge.
This turned out to be a dead end, and Kant never again maintained that we can have a priori knowledge about an intelligible world precisely because such a world would be entirely independent of us. The sensible world, or the world of appearances, is constructed by the human mind from a combination of sensory matter that we receive passively and a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties. We can have a priori knowledge only about aspects of the sensible world that reflect the a priori forms supplied by our cognitive faculties.
So according to the Critique, a priori knowledge is possible only if and to the extent that the sensible world itself depends on the way the human mind structures its experience. Kant characterizes this new constructivist view of experience in the Critique through an analogy with the revolution wrought by Copernicus in astronomy: Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us.
This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuition of objects. If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object as an object of the senses conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself.
Yet because I cannot stop with these intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer them as representations to something as their object and determine this object through them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized as given objects conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. Bxvi—xviii As this passage suggests, what Kant has changed in the Critique is primarily his view about the role and powers of the understanding, since he already held in the Inaugural Dissertation that sensibility contributes the forms of space and time — which he calls pure or a priori intuitions 2:397 — to our cognition of the sensible world. But the Critique claims that pure understanding too, rather than giving us insight into an intelligible world, is limited to providing forms — which he calls pure or a priori concepts — that structure our cognition of the sensible world.
So now both sensibility and understanding work together to construct cognition of the sensible world, which therefore conforms to the a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties: the a priori intuitions of sensibility and the a priori concepts of the understanding. This account is analogous to the heliocentric revolution of Copernicus in astronomy because both require contributions from the observer to be factored into explanations of phenomena, although neither reduces phenomena to the contributions of observers alone. For Kant, analogously, the phenomena of human experience depend on both the sensory data that we receive passively through sensibility and the way our mind actively processes this data according to its own a priori rules.
These rules supply the general framework in which the sensible world and all the objects or phenomena in it appear to us. So the sensible world and its phenomena are not entirely independent of the human mind, which contributes its basic structure. First, it gives Kant a new and ingenious way of placing modern science on an a priori foundation.
In other words, the sensible world necessarily conforms to certain fundamental laws — such as that every event has a cause — because the human mind constructs it according to those laws. Moreover, we can identify those laws by reflecting on the conditions of possible experience, which reveals that it would be impossible for us to experience a world in which, for example, any given event fails to have a cause. From this Kant concludes that metaphysics is indeed possible in the sense that we can have a priori knowledge that the entire sensible world — not just our actual experience, but any possible human experience — necessarily conforms to certain laws.
Kant calls this immanent metaphysics or the metaphysics of experience, because it deals with the essential principles that are immanent to human experience. In the Critique Kant thus rejects the insight into an intelligible world that he defended in the Inaugural Dissertation, and he now claims that rejecting knowledge about things in themselves is necessary for reconciling science with traditional morality and religion. This is because he claims that belief in God, freedom, and immortality have a strictly moral basis, and yet adopting these beliefs on moral grounds would be unjustified if we could know that they were false.
Restricting knowledge to appearances and relegating God and the soul to an unknowable realm of things in themselves guarantees that it is impossible to disprove claims about God and the freedom or immortality of the soul, which moral arguments may therefore justify us in believing. Moreover, the determinism of modern science no longer threatens the freedom required by traditional morality, because science and therefore determinism apply only to appearances, and there is room for freedom in the realm of things in themselves, where the self or soul is located. We cannot know theoretically that we are free, because we cannot know anything about things in themselves.
In this way, Kant replaces transcendent metaphysics with a new practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. Transcendental idealism Perhaps the central and most controversial thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason is that human beings experience only appearances, not things in themselves; and that space and time are only subjective forms of human intuition that would not subsist in themselves if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Kant calls this thesis transcendental idealism.
What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are concerned solely with this.
Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i. The former adheres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different.
Space and time are not things in themselves, or determinations of things in themselves that would remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Space and time are nothing other than the subjective forms of human sensible intuition. Two general types of interpretation have been especially influential, however.
This section provides an overview of these two interpretations, although it should be emphasized that much important scholarship on transcendental idealism does not fall neatly into either of these two camps. It has been a live interpretive option since then and remains so today, although it no longer enjoys the dominance that it once did. Another name for this view is the two-worlds interpretation, since it can also be expressed by saying that transcendental idealism essentially distinguishes between a world of appearances and another world of things in themselves.
Things in themselves, on this interpretation, are absolutely real in the sense that they would exist and have whatever properties they have even if no human beings were around to perceive them. Appearances, on the other hand, are not absolutely real in that sense, because their existence and properties depend on human perceivers. Moreover, whenever appearances do exist, in some sense they exist in the mind of human perceivers.
So appearances are mental entities or mental representations. This, coupled with the claim that we experience only appearances, makes transcendental idealism a form of phenomenalism on this interpretation, because it reduces the objects of experience to mental representations. All of our experiences — all of our perceptions of objects and events in space, even those objects and events themselves, and all non-spatial but still temporal thoughts and feelings — fall into the class of appearances that exist in the mind of human perceivers.
These appearances cut us off entirely from the reality of things in themselves, which are non-spatial and non-temporal. In principle we cannot know how things in themselves affect our senses, because our experience and knowledge is limited to the world of appearances constructed by and in the mind. Things in themselves are therefore a sort of theoretical posit, whose existence and role are required by the theory but are not directly verifiable.
The main problems with the two-objects interpretation are philosophical. Most readers of Kant who have interpreted his transcendental idealism in this way have been — often very — critical of it, for reasons such as the following: First, at best Kant is walking a fine line in claiming on the one hand that we can have no knowledge about things in themselves, but on the other hand that we know that things in themselves exist, that they affect our senses, and that they are non-spatial and non-temporal. At worst his theory depends on contradictory claims about what we can and cannot know about things in themselves.
Some versions of this objection proceed from premises that Kant rejects. But Kant denies that appearances are unreal: they are just as real as things in themselves but are in a different metaphysical class. But just as Kant denies that things in themselves are the only or privileged reality, he also denies that correspondence with things in themselves is the only kind of truth.
Empirical judgments are true just in case they correspond with their empirical objects in accordance with the a priori principles that structure all possible human experience. But the fact that Kant can appeal in this way to an objective criterion of empirical truth that is internal to our experience has not been enough to convince some critics that Kant is innocent of an unacceptable form of skepticism, mainly because of his insistence on our irreparable ignorance about things in themselves. The role of things in themselves, on the two-object interpretation, is to affect our senses and thereby to provide the sensory data from which our cognitive faculties construct appearances within the framework of our a priori intuitions of space and time and a priori concepts such as causality.
But if there is no space, time, change, or causation in the realm of things in themselves, then how can things in themselves affect us? Transcendental affection seems to involve a causal relation between things in themselves and our sensibility. If this is simply the way we unavoidably think about transcendental affection, because we can give positive content to this thought only by employing the concept of a cause, while it is nevertheless strictly false that things in themselves affect us causally, then it seems not only that we are ignorant of how things in themselves really affect us.
It seems, rather, to be incoherent that things in themselves could affect us at all if they are not in space or time. On this view, transcendental idealism does not distinguish between two classes of objects but rather between two different aspects of one and the same class of objects. That is, appearances are aspects of the same objects that also exist in themselves.
So, on this reading, appearances are not mental representations, and transcendental idealism is not a form of phenomenalism. One version treats transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory according to which objects have two aspects in the sense that they have two sets of properties: one set of relational properties that appear to us and are spatial and temporal, and another set of intrinsic properties that do not appear to us and are not spatial or temporal Langton 1998. This property-dualist interpretation faces epistemological objections similar to those faced by the two-objects interpretation, because we are in no better position to acquire knowledge about properties that do not appear to us than we are to acquire knowledge about objects that do not appear to us.
Moreover, this interpretation also seems to imply that things in themselves are spatial and temporal, since appearances have spatial and temporal properties, and on this view appearances are the same objects as things in themselves. But Kant explicitly denies that space and time are properties of things in themselves. A second version of the two-aspects theory departs more radically from the traditional two-objects interpretation by denying that transcendental idealism is at bottom a metaphysical theory.
Instead, it interprets transcendental idealism as a fundamentally epistemological theory that distinguishes between two standpoints on the objects of experience: the human standpoint, from which objects are viewed relative to epistemic conditions that are peculiar to human cognitive faculties namely, the a priori forms of our sensible intuition ; and the standpoint of an intuitive intellect, from which the same objects could be known in themselves and independently of any epistemic conditions Allison 2004. Human beings cannot really take up the latter standpoint but can form only an empty concept of things as they exist in themselves by abstracting from all the content of our experience and leaving only the purely formal thought of an object in general. So transcendental idealism, on this interpretation, is essentially the thesis that we are limited to the human standpoint, and the concept of a thing in itself plays the role of enabling us to chart the boundaries of the human standpoint by stepping beyond them in abstract but empty thought.
One criticism of this epistemological version of the two-aspects theory is that it avoids the objections to other interpretations by attributing to Kant a more limited project than the text of the Critique warrants. There are passages that support this reading. The transcendental deduction The transcendental deduction is the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason and one of the most complex and difficult texts in the history of philosophy.
Given its complexity, there are naturally many different ways of interpreting the deduction. The goal of the transcendental deduction is to show that we have a priori concepts or categories that are objectively valid, or that apply necessarily to all objects in the world that we experience. To show this, Kant argues that the categories are necessary conditions of experience, or that we could not have experience without the categories.
For they then are related necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all. The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking. Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason.
Here Kant claims, against the Lockean view, that self-consciousness arises from combining or synthesizing representations with one another regardless of their content. In short, Kant has a formal conception of self-consciousness rather than a material one.
Праздник народного волеизъявления продолжится до 30 ноября 2018 года. Как голосуют за Канта В голосовании по проекту «Великие имена России» калининградцы проявляют большую, чем в среднем активность при сравнении с другими регионами страны. Проголосовать за одно из предложенных имён для аэропорта Храброво можно здесь.
Immanuel Kant
| Immanuel Kant - Wikipedia | Эммануэль Кант, 07.08.2001. Доступны для просмотра фотографии, лайки, образование. |
| Искусственный интеллект «оживил» Иммануила Канта в Калининграде | Emmanuel Kant. 39 лет, Павлодар. |
| Лауреат Каннского кинофестиваля, французский режиссёр Лоран Канте умер в 63 года | Emmanuel Kant. 39 лет, Павлодар. |
| Биография Иммануила Кант – читайте об авторе на Литрес | Does Scholz have the right to prohibit anyone from quoting Kant? Emmanuel Kant is a figure of world heritage, not a Scholtz pocket dog! |
| Кант Иммануил | We will see it from an example of the thought of Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) on education. Let us start by recalling some of these digital issues that current events force us to consider. |
Последние дни Иммануила Канта (1996)
Reform of institutions: Emmanuel Macron receives François Hollande at the Élysée. Posts about Emmanuel Kant written by Jack Marshall. Et l'activité mentale, Filosofia, Kant (Emmanuel). Etudes. Читайте последние новости на тему в ленте новостей на сайте РИА Новости. 18+. Вы здесь. Главная» Эммануэль Макрон.
Последние дни Иммануила Канта (1996)
| Кант Иммануил | Kant observed that men formed states to constrain their passions, but that each state sought to preserve its absolute freedom, even at the cost of “a lawless state of savagery.”. |
| Искусственный интеллект «оживил» Иммануила Канта в Калининграде // Новости НТВ | suggesting in 2013 that he should be made an official symbol of the Kaliningrad Region. |
Иммануил Кант
suggesting in 2013 that he should be made an official symbol of the Kaliningrad Region. Биография немецкого философа Иммануила Канта: личная жизнь, присяга Российской империи, университет его имени, могила в Калининграде. Читайте последние новости на тему в ленте новостей на сайте РИА Новости. О сервисе Прессе Авторские права Связаться с нами Авторам Рекламодателям Разработчикам.