Does Scholz have the right to prohibit anyone from quoting Kant? Emmanuel Kant is a figure of world heritage, not a Scholtz pocket dog! Immanuel Kant, German philosopher who was one of the foremost thinkers of the Enlightenment and who inaugurated a new era of philosophical thought. His comprehensive and systematic work in. Полузащитник Н’Голо Канте после подписания контракта с саудовским клубом «Аль-Иттихад» приобрел профессиональный футбольный клуб в Бельгии. Об этом сообщает журналист Саша. Хиты и новинки в хорошем качестве. Чтобы скачать песни исполнителя Immanuel Kant, установите приложение Звук и слушайте бесплатно оффлайн и онлайн по подписке Прайм.
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Encounters with famous contemporaries? I met with Toynbee twice and told him something about my ideas. But he gave away nothing about himself And I never heard whether the conversation had any effect on him... I got to know Lowell, the famous astronomer, in my younger years - he was my sponsor when I received the doctorate I enjoy meeting people.
Kant and the educational benefits of immobility Kant is such an important name in so many areas of philosophy that one might forget that he was also interested in education.
One of his ideas concerns the importance of keeping still for children. Let us translate: through this window created by immobility and listening, and by the attention it allows, ideas can come to their senses. This idea obviously raises important questions and debates about the nature and role of authority in education. This is because the means discipline here seem to contradict the intended end freedom and autonomy.
But let us leave these questions aside and transpose what Kant said in the XVIIIe century in our time and to the infinite and so irresistible stimuli that cellphones and social networks constantly provoke. One can easily see in this an immense danger for the very practice of transmitting and understanding ideas and knowledge, and for the formation of work habits. A danger so great that the ban on cellphones in the classroom, especially for the youngest, can be considered a good idea. My fear is that we refuse to see these dangers even when they are documented.
Or that, noting them, because we can no longer deny them, we suggest, in order to counter them, to further increase what causes them.
Кант отвергает убеждение Ж. Руссо , будто в предшествующем цивилизации «естественном состоянии» отношения между индивидами носили мирный, идиллический характер: «Люди столь же кроткие, как овцы, которых они пасут, вряд ли сделали бы своё существование более достойным, чем существование домашних животных... Поэтому да будет благословенна природа за неуживчивость, за завистливо соперничающее тщеславие, за ненасытную жажду обладать и господствовать! Без них все превосходные природные задатки человечества остались бы навсегда неразвитыми. Главным направлением культурного прогресса является, по Канту, сближение народов, благодаря которому, вследствие действия того же «механизма природы», будет навсегда покончено с войнами и народы всей планеты объединятся в мирном союзе. Заключительной частью системы Канта является «Критика способности суждения».
Кант различает два вида способности суждения: определяющую и рефлектирующую размышляющую. В первом случае речь идёт о том, чтобы подвести особенное под уже известное общее. Во втором случае особенное должно быть подведено под общее, которое не дано, а должно быть найдено. В данном труде он исследует эту вторую, рефлектирующую способность суждения. Её основными формами являются телеологические и эстетические суждения. И те и другие выявляют целесообразность, присущую не только явлениям природы, например живым организмам, но и объектам суждений вкуса. В действительности, как считает Кант, целесообразность не присуща ни предметам природы, ни предметам суждений вкуса; она привносится в природу априорной рефлектирующей способностью суждения, которая не обогащает наших знаний о природе, но способствует их приведению в систему.
Необходимость телеологических суждений обусловлена тем, что рассудок оказывается неспособным объяснить естественными причинами наблюдаемые факты целесообразности в природе. Эстетические суждения, в отличие от телеологических, связаны с удовольствием или неудовольствием, вызываемыми представлением о предметах. Эстетическое удовольствие Кант характеризует как незаинтересованное в том смысле, что оно обусловлено исключительно восприятием прекрасного , к которому не примешиваются как-либо не связанные с этим восприятием интересы. Незаинтересованность эстетического суждения придаёт ему объективную значимость, несмотря на его субъективное содержание. Эстетическое суждение не относится к познавательной деятельности и не зависит от нравственного сознания. Идеалом красоты, согласно Канту, может быть только человек. Философия Канта оказала громадное воздействие на всё последующее развитие европейской мысли.
Он явился родоначальником немецкой классической философии, представленной системами И. Фихте , Ф. Шеллинга , Г. Гегеля , влияние его испытали Ф. Шиллер , А. Шопенгауэр , представители йенского романтизма.
Пабло Мучник является автором нескольких книг о Канте, он лауреат различных национальных и международных стипендий и наград, был вице-президентом и президентом Североамериканского общества Канта.
В Калининград профессор из США приехал впервые, признав, что очень ждал этого визита. Это моя Мекка. Калининград прекрасный город. В США очень много пропаганды по поводу России, однако, я был очень рад получить такую прекрасную возможность посетить город Канта.
Ипохондрик, гений и городская звезда: 5 фактов об Иммануиле Канте
Эммануэль, но не Кант! Шольц для Путина является более весомой фигурой, который представляет интересы бизнеса Германии. Путин видит давление, которому подвергается. Иммануил Кант с младенчества, просто по праву рождения, был зачислен в гильдию шорников. President Emmanuel Macron, during a speech on Europe, in the amphitheater of the Sorbonne University, Paris, April 25, 2024.
Собрались с мыслями. 300 лет Иммануилу Канту. В чем причины русского "антикантианства"? 25.04.2024
| Кант, Иммануил — Википедия | Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze is credited with bringing Kant's contributions to racism to light in the 1990s among Western philosophers, who he believed often glossed over this part of his life and works.[210]. |
| Immanuel Kant | Просмотрите свежий пост @fakepontchartrain в Tumblr на тему "emmanuel kant". |
Я живу в Калининграде. Как мы отпраздновали День рождения Иммануила Канта? С вдохновением...
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Концепция Канта тесно связана с его же философией, поэтому анализ учения о праве, морали и государстве в целом представляется долгим, порой даже муторным и сложным в силу того, что его философские труды не читала, просто наслышана о некоторых максимах Канта.
Проект направлен на развитие научно-экспертного и общественного диалога между странами большого Балтийско-Скандинавского региона: странами ЕС — с одной стороны и Россией и Белоруссией — с другой, с привлечением экспертов из других стран и регионов мира. Главная цель — возобновление научно-экспертного диалога по «второму треку» по широкому перечню тематик между российскими и европейскими учеными: от социальных, экономических, экологических, культурных до проблем военной и невоенной безопасности. Комментарии 0.
Such a priori intellectual representations could well be figments of the brain that do not correspond to anything independent of the human mind. In any case, it is completely mysterious how there might come to be a correspondence between purely intellectual representations and an independent intelligible world. But the Critique gives a far more modest and yet revolutionary account of a priori knowledge. This turned out to be a dead end, and Kant never again maintained that we can have a priori knowledge about an intelligible world precisely because such a world would be entirely independent of us. The sensible world, or the world of appearances, is constructed by the human mind from a combination of sensory matter that we receive passively and a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties. We can have a priori knowledge only about aspects of the sensible world that reflect the a priori forms supplied by our cognitive faculties. So according to the Critique, a priori knowledge is possible only if and to the extent that the sensible world itself depends on the way the human mind structures its experience. Kant characterizes this new constructivist view of experience in the Critique through an analogy with the revolution wrought by Copernicus in astronomy: Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. Now in metaphysics we can try in a similar way regarding the intuition of objects. If intuition has to conform to the constitution of the objects, then I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object as an object of the senses conforms to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this possibility to myself. Yet because I cannot stop with these intuitions, if they are to become cognitions, but must refer them as representations to something as their object and determine this object through them, I can assume either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also conform to the objects, and then I am once again in the same difficulty about how I could know anything about them a priori, or else I assume that the objects, or what is the same thing, the experience in which alone they can be cognized as given objects conforms to those concepts, in which case I immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding, whose rule I have to presuppose in myself before any object is given to me, hence a priori, which rule is expressed in concepts a priori, to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree. Bxvi—xviii As this passage suggests, what Kant has changed in the Critique is primarily his view about the role and powers of the understanding, since he already held in the Inaugural Dissertation that sensibility contributes the forms of space and time — which he calls pure or a priori intuitions 2:397 — to our cognition of the sensible world. But the Critique claims that pure understanding too, rather than giving us insight into an intelligible world, is limited to providing forms — which he calls pure or a priori concepts — that structure our cognition of the sensible world. So now both sensibility and understanding work together to construct cognition of the sensible world, which therefore conforms to the a priori forms that are supplied by our cognitive faculties: the a priori intuitions of sensibility and the a priori concepts of the understanding. This account is analogous to the heliocentric revolution of Copernicus in astronomy because both require contributions from the observer to be factored into explanations of phenomena, although neither reduces phenomena to the contributions of observers alone. For Kant, analogously, the phenomena of human experience depend on both the sensory data that we receive passively through sensibility and the way our mind actively processes this data according to its own a priori rules. These rules supply the general framework in which the sensible world and all the objects or phenomena in it appear to us. So the sensible world and its phenomena are not entirely independent of the human mind, which contributes its basic structure. First, it gives Kant a new and ingenious way of placing modern science on an a priori foundation. In other words, the sensible world necessarily conforms to certain fundamental laws — such as that every event has a cause — because the human mind constructs it according to those laws. Moreover, we can identify those laws by reflecting on the conditions of possible experience, which reveals that it would be impossible for us to experience a world in which, for example, any given event fails to have a cause. From this Kant concludes that metaphysics is indeed possible in the sense that we can have a priori knowledge that the entire sensible world — not just our actual experience, but any possible human experience — necessarily conforms to certain laws. Kant calls this immanent metaphysics or the metaphysics of experience, because it deals with the essential principles that are immanent to human experience. In the Critique Kant thus rejects the insight into an intelligible world that he defended in the Inaugural Dissertation, and he now claims that rejecting knowledge about things in themselves is necessary for reconciling science with traditional morality and religion. This is because he claims that belief in God, freedom, and immortality have a strictly moral basis, and yet adopting these beliefs on moral grounds would be unjustified if we could know that they were false. Restricting knowledge to appearances and relegating God and the soul to an unknowable realm of things in themselves guarantees that it is impossible to disprove claims about God and the freedom or immortality of the soul, which moral arguments may therefore justify us in believing. Moreover, the determinism of modern science no longer threatens the freedom required by traditional morality, because science and therefore determinism apply only to appearances, and there is room for freedom in the realm of things in themselves, where the self or soul is located. We cannot know theoretically that we are free, because we cannot know anything about things in themselves. In this way, Kant replaces transcendent metaphysics with a new practical science that he calls the metaphysics of morals. Transcendental idealism Perhaps the central and most controversial thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason is that human beings experience only appearances, not things in themselves; and that space and time are only subjective forms of human intuition that would not subsist in themselves if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Kant calls this thesis transcendental idealism. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i. The former adheres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different. Space and time are not things in themselves, or determinations of things in themselves that would remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Space and time are nothing other than the subjective forms of human sensible intuition. Two general types of interpretation have been especially influential, however. This section provides an overview of these two interpretations, although it should be emphasized that much important scholarship on transcendental idealism does not fall neatly into either of these two camps. It has been a live interpretive option since then and remains so today, although it no longer enjoys the dominance that it once did. Another name for this view is the two-worlds interpretation, since it can also be expressed by saying that transcendental idealism essentially distinguishes between a world of appearances and another world of things in themselves. Things in themselves, on this interpretation, are absolutely real in the sense that they would exist and have whatever properties they have even if no human beings were around to perceive them. Appearances, on the other hand, are not absolutely real in that sense, because their existence and properties depend on human perceivers. Moreover, whenever appearances do exist, in some sense they exist in the mind of human perceivers. So appearances are mental entities or mental representations. This, coupled with the claim that we experience only appearances, makes transcendental idealism a form of phenomenalism on this interpretation, because it reduces the objects of experience to mental representations. All of our experiences — all of our perceptions of objects and events in space, even those objects and events themselves, and all non-spatial but still temporal thoughts and feelings — fall into the class of appearances that exist in the mind of human perceivers. These appearances cut us off entirely from the reality of things in themselves, which are non-spatial and non-temporal. In principle we cannot know how things in themselves affect our senses, because our experience and knowledge is limited to the world of appearances constructed by and in the mind. Things in themselves are therefore a sort of theoretical posit, whose existence and role are required by the theory but are not directly verifiable. The main problems with the two-objects interpretation are philosophical. Most readers of Kant who have interpreted his transcendental idealism in this way have been — often very — critical of it, for reasons such as the following: First, at best Kant is walking a fine line in claiming on the one hand that we can have no knowledge about things in themselves, but on the other hand that we know that things in themselves exist, that they affect our senses, and that they are non-spatial and non-temporal. At worst his theory depends on contradictory claims about what we can and cannot know about things in themselves. Some versions of this objection proceed from premises that Kant rejects. But Kant denies that appearances are unreal: they are just as real as things in themselves but are in a different metaphysical class. But just as Kant denies that things in themselves are the only or privileged reality, he also denies that correspondence with things in themselves is the only kind of truth. Empirical judgments are true just in case they correspond with their empirical objects in accordance with the a priori principles that structure all possible human experience. But the fact that Kant can appeal in this way to an objective criterion of empirical truth that is internal to our experience has not been enough to convince some critics that Kant is innocent of an unacceptable form of skepticism, mainly because of his insistence on our irreparable ignorance about things in themselves. The role of things in themselves, on the two-object interpretation, is to affect our senses and thereby to provide the sensory data from which our cognitive faculties construct appearances within the framework of our a priori intuitions of space and time and a priori concepts such as causality. But if there is no space, time, change, or causation in the realm of things in themselves, then how can things in themselves affect us? Transcendental affection seems to involve a causal relation between things in themselves and our sensibility. If this is simply the way we unavoidably think about transcendental affection, because we can give positive content to this thought only by employing the concept of a cause, while it is nevertheless strictly false that things in themselves affect us causally, then it seems not only that we are ignorant of how things in themselves really affect us. It seems, rather, to be incoherent that things in themselves could affect us at all if they are not in space or time. On this view, transcendental idealism does not distinguish between two classes of objects but rather between two different aspects of one and the same class of objects. That is, appearances are aspects of the same objects that also exist in themselves. So, on this reading, appearances are not mental representations, and transcendental idealism is not a form of phenomenalism. One version treats transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory according to which objects have two aspects in the sense that they have two sets of properties: one set of relational properties that appear to us and are spatial and temporal, and another set of intrinsic properties that do not appear to us and are not spatial or temporal Langton 1998. This property-dualist interpretation faces epistemological objections similar to those faced by the two-objects interpretation, because we are in no better position to acquire knowledge about properties that do not appear to us than we are to acquire knowledge about objects that do not appear to us. Moreover, this interpretation also seems to imply that things in themselves are spatial and temporal, since appearances have spatial and temporal properties, and on this view appearances are the same objects as things in themselves. But Kant explicitly denies that space and time are properties of things in themselves. A second version of the two-aspects theory departs more radically from the traditional two-objects interpretation by denying that transcendental idealism is at bottom a metaphysical theory. Instead, it interprets transcendental idealism as a fundamentally epistemological theory that distinguishes between two standpoints on the objects of experience: the human standpoint, from which objects are viewed relative to epistemic conditions that are peculiar to human cognitive faculties namely, the a priori forms of our sensible intuition ; and the standpoint of an intuitive intellect, from which the same objects could be known in themselves and independently of any epistemic conditions Allison 2004. Human beings cannot really take up the latter standpoint but can form only an empty concept of things as they exist in themselves by abstracting from all the content of our experience and leaving only the purely formal thought of an object in general. So transcendental idealism, on this interpretation, is essentially the thesis that we are limited to the human standpoint, and the concept of a thing in itself plays the role of enabling us to chart the boundaries of the human standpoint by stepping beyond them in abstract but empty thought. One criticism of this epistemological version of the two-aspects theory is that it avoids the objections to other interpretations by attributing to Kant a more limited project than the text of the Critique warrants. There are passages that support this reading. The transcendental deduction The transcendental deduction is the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason and one of the most complex and difficult texts in the history of philosophy. Given its complexity, there are naturally many different ways of interpreting the deduction. The goal of the transcendental deduction is to show that we have a priori concepts or categories that are objectively valid, or that apply necessarily to all objects in the world that we experience. To show this, Kant argues that the categories are necessary conditions of experience, or that we could not have experience without the categories. For they then are related necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all. The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking. Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason. Here Kant claims, against the Lockean view, that self-consciousness arises from combining or synthesizing representations with one another regardless of their content. In short, Kant has a formal conception of self-consciousness rather than a material one. Since no particular content of my experience is invariable, self-consciousness must derive from my experience having an invariable form or structure, and consciousness of the identity of myself through all of my changing experiences must consist in awareness of the formal unity and law-governed regularity of my experience. The continuous form of my experience is the necessary correlate for my sense of a continuous self. There are at least two possible versions of the formal conception of self-consciousness: a realist and an idealist version. On the realist version, nature itself is law-governed and we become self-conscious by attending to its law-governed regularities, which also makes this an empiricist view of self-consciousness. The idea of an identical self that persists throughout all of our experience, on this view, arises from the law-governed regularity of nature, and our representations exhibit order and regularity because reality itself is ordered and regular. Kant rejects this realist view and embraces a conception of self-consciousness that is both formal and idealist. According to Kant, the formal structure of our experience, its unity and law-governed regularity, is an achievement of our cognitive faculties rather than a property of reality in itself.
«Эммануил Кант скачать все альбомы»: в социальных сетях шутят о философе
Emmanuel Kant. Emmanuel Kant. Follow new publications. не столько повествование о «последних днях» немецкого философа, сколько собрание любопытных фактов, легенд и баек об Though Kant is as undeniably German as the Nord Stream pipeline, Putin (and anyone else anywhere) has a right to quote him morning, noon and.
Doing Nothing with Emmanuel Kant
Иммануи́л Кант — немецкий философ, один из центральных мыслителей эпохи Просвещения. Всесторонние и систематические работы Канта в области эпистемологии, метафизики. Does Scholz have the right to prohibit anyone from quoting Kant? Emmanuel Kant is a figure of world heritage, not a Scholtz pocket dog! Новости компаний. Kant observed that men formed states to constrain their passions, but that each state sought to preserve its absolute freedom, even at the cost of “a lawless state of savagery.”. 3 monthly listeners.
Climate change and the environment take a back seat in Emmanuel Macron's speech on Europe
| Emmanuel Kant Duarte | Hi there, my name is Emmanuel Kant Duarte and welcome to my profile. Connect with me: Image of linkedin logo Image of Earth Planet Image of twitter bird Image of YouTube logo Image of codepen. |
| Emmanuel Kant — слушать онлайн бесплатно на Яндекс Музыке в хорошем качестве | С анимированным портретом 44-летнего Канта кисти Иоганна Готлиба Беккера теперь старается пообщаться почти каждый экскурсант Кафедрального собора. |
| ‘Nothing would survive’ Scientists warn dark energy could ‘END universe at any moment’ | Reform of institutions: Emmanuel Macron receives François Hollande at the Élysée. |
| Emmanuel Kant, no place to chance! | Полузащитник «Челси» Н'Голо Канте завершил медицинское обследование перед подписанием контракта с клубом «Аль-Иттихад» из Саудовской Аравии. Канте прошёл вторую часть. |
| Кант Иммануил. Большая российская энциклопедия | Эммануэль Кант, 07.08.2001. Доступны для просмотра фотографии, лайки, образование. |
Ипохондрик, гений и городская звезда: 5 фактов об Иммануиле Канте
Иммануил Кант с младенчества, просто по праву рождения, был зачислен в гильдию шорников. Chronicle of Normand Baillargeon: thinking about education with Emmanuel Kant. 18+. Вы здесь. Главная» Эммануэль Макрон. See an archive of all immanuel kant stories published on the New York Media network, which includes NYMag, The Cut, Vulture, and Grub Street. Сам Иммануил Кант был увлеченным своим делом ученым, талантливым преподавателем и эксцентричным, но при этом общительным человеком. Полузащитник «Челси» Н'Голо Канте дал предварительное согласие на переход в «Арсенал» по окончании сезона, сообщает Fichajes.
Daily Mail: Канте хочет перейти в «Интер»
Though he is as undeniably German as the Nord Stream pipeline, Putin and anyone else anywhere has a right to quote him morning, noon and night. Though Kant is as German as Tolstoy, who regarded himself as a philosopher and not a writer, is Russian, their brilliance belongs to the world. Scholz, in other words, is free to quote Tolstoy, once, of course, he first learns to read. Putin, as it happens, spent much of his working life in Germany and he speaks the language of Kant, Schiller and Goethe at least as fluently as Scholz which is, admittedly, a low bar. Not only that but Putin has been praising and quoting Kant for decades and has even gone so far as saying that the philosopher should be made an official symbol of Kaliningrad Region.
Catherine the Great , who was actually born in Prussia, and the German speaking and Kant admiring Putin have carried on those links into more modern times. Scholz, who fancies himself as something of a bar room philosopher, is having none of that.
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Кант высказал предположение, что за Сатурном скрываются другие планеты, что было подтверждено через много лет [65]. Этот труд Канта не был математически точным, однако был опубликован по просьбам знакомых, которые полагали, что таким образом можно привлечь внимание короля и получить финансирование на подтверждение этой гипотезы, поэтому работа была посвящена Фридриху II. Произведение не вызвало ажиотажа: большая часть тиража была либо уничтожена ввиду банкротства издателя, либо продана лишь в 60-е годы. Вряд ли Фридрих II видел эту работу [63]. Уже после публикации произведения, в 1761 и 1796 годах, гипотеза Канта была независимо от первоисточника воспроизведена учёными Пьер-Симоном Лапласом и Иоганном Генрихом Ламбертом , не знавшими о своём предшественнике [66]. Преподавание[ править править код ] В 1755 году Кант становится преподавателем Кёнигсбергского университета, но не получает заработной платы. Он довольствуется гонорарами, получаемыми от студентов, посещающих его курсы. Таким образом, доход преподавателя определялся количеством студентов, записанных на лекции [67]. Свою первую публичную лекцию Кант дал в переполненном студентами доме профессора Кипке, где он в то время жил [68]. Занятия проводились в отдельных лекционных залах, которыми преподаватели либо владели, либо арендовали. Каждый преподаватель должен был строго следовать учебным пособиям, прилагаемым к университетской программе, однако сам Кант лишь соблюдал порядок тем, намеченных в учебниках, в то время как на лекциях давал студентам свой собственный материал. На лекциях философ часто демонстрировал так называемый «сухой юмор». Его редко видели улыбающимся, даже во время смеха аудитории от его собственных шуток. Людвиг Боровски, ученик и биограф Канта, отмечал, что Кант вёл свои занятия «свободно и остроумно», часто шутил, но «не позволял себе шуток с сексуальным подтекстом, которыми пользовались другие преподаватели». Своим ученикам преподаватель советовал «систематизировать свои знания у себя в голове под разными рубриками». С самого начала своей преподавательской деятельности Кант был весьма популярным лектором — его аудитории всегда были заполнены. В этот период Иммануил Кант интересовался этикой Фрэнсиса Хатчесона и философскими исследованиями Давида Юма , что во многом было продиктовано временем. Оба мыслителя были известны в те времена в столице. Со времён выпуска из гимназии богословие в его спектр интересов практически не попадало. Чтобы заработать на жизнь, Канту приходилось брать изнурительное количество занятий. Он преподавал математику и логику, физику и метафизику. В 1756 году он также добавил и географию, а следующем году — этику [ком. Университетские учебники имели пустые страницы, на которых Кант писал собственные заметки. Эти книги сохранились, что позволило исследователям лучше понимать генеалогию философии Канта. Он также носил с собой блокнот для записей. Первые два-три года преподавания были тяжелы для Канта. Он имел запас денег на крайний случай, но предпочитал при нужде продавать свои книги. Носил одежду до тех пор, пока она окончательно не обветшает. Позже его дела значительно улучшились, как признавался сам Кант, он зарабатывал «более, чем достаточно». Имел двухкомнатную квартиру, мог позволить себе хорошую еду, а также нанять прислугу, но его работа всегда была шаткой и его благосостояние зависело от его успешности как лектора. В 1756 году его место преподавателя логики и метафизики было занято Кнутценом. Не желая терять место, Кант даже написал письмо королю, в котором сообщил, что «философия является наиболее важной областью его интересов», однако не получил никакого ответа. Чтобы улучшить своё положение, он попытался устроиться в местную школу, однако вакантное место занял Вильгельм Канерт, являвшийся ярым пиетистом [ком. Скорее всего, Кант был отвергнут по религиозным причинам; впрочем, у его конкурента на должность имелся больший опыт преподавания. В конце 1750-х годов в Пруссии бушевала Семилетняя война. После сражения при Гросс-Егерсдорфе прусским войскам пришлось сдать город Кёнигсберг. В самом городе боевых действий не велось. Русские войска вошли в город 22 января 1758 года под командованием Виллима Фермора. Кёнигсберг был возвращён Пруссии в 1762 году по Петербургскому мирному договору , а до этого с самого начала присоединения к Российской империи российские офицеры посещали лекции в университете; Кант не сторонился их общества и даже проводил для них частные занятия. Всё это шло на пользу финансовому благополучию Канта. Также русские часто приглашали преподавателя на обед. Кант с удовольствием посещал встречи дворянских офицеров, богатых купцов и прочей знати, на которые его звали. В это же время он стал частым гостем у Кейзерлингов. Графиня была увлечена философией, что послужило причиной её тёплых отношений с Кантом. За обеденным столом Кант почти всегда занимал почётное место рядом с графиней. Канту приходилось заботиться о своём внешнем виде прилежнее прошлого, он тщательно подбирал одежду, носил пальто с золотой каймой и даже использовал в качестве украшения церемониальный меч. Кант никогда не был женат и, возможно, до конца жизни оставался девственен. Это не свидетельствует, тем не менее, что он держался на расстоянии от женщин или был женоненавистником. Кроме графини, он испытывал симпатию к другим женщинам, что отмечается его биографами, однако неоднократно не решался сделать предложение брака, боясь, что не сможет содержать супругу. В какой-то момент Кант перестал испытывать потребность в браке, даже когда его финансы позволяли содержать семью. Тем временем в 1758 году должности преподавателя логики и метафизики стали вакантными. Кант подал на них заявление, но безуспешно [71]. За время, когда Восточная Пруссия принадлежала Российской империи, у Канта был временный творческий кризис, который закончился после возвращения Кёнигсберга Петром III. Возможно, это было связано с политической обстановкой: сохранилась запись разговора за обедом 16 декабря 1788 года то есть через четверть века , на котором Кант, согласно записавшему разговор, заявлял, что «русские — наши главные враги» [72]. С 1756 по 1762 год были изданы лишь три буклета для рекламы его лекций и небольшое эссе «Мысли, вызванные безвременной кончиной высокоблагородного господина Иоганна Фридриха фон Функа» [73]. На пути к «Критике» 1762 [ править править код ] Портрет Эммануила Сведенборга, около 1766 Перед тем как вступить на дорогу изучения метафизики в критическом периоде, внимание Канта было устремлено на проблемы метафизики и формальной логики , которой он посвящает вышедший в 1762 году труд «Ложное мудрствование в четырёх фигурах силлогизма», где ставит под сомнение силлогизмы в логике, и вышедший в следующем году «Опыт введения в философию понятия отрицательных величин», где продолжает своё рассуждение. В «Опыте введения» Кант размышляет о противоположностях.
Two general types of interpretation have been especially influential, however. This section provides an overview of these two interpretations, although it should be emphasized that much important scholarship on transcendental idealism does not fall neatly into either of these two camps. It has been a live interpretive option since then and remains so today, although it no longer enjoys the dominance that it once did. Another name for this view is the two-worlds interpretation, since it can also be expressed by saying that transcendental idealism essentially distinguishes between a world of appearances and another world of things in themselves. Things in themselves, on this interpretation, are absolutely real in the sense that they would exist and have whatever properties they have even if no human beings were around to perceive them. Appearances, on the other hand, are not absolutely real in that sense, because their existence and properties depend on human perceivers. Moreover, whenever appearances do exist, in some sense they exist in the mind of human perceivers. So appearances are mental entities or mental representations. This, coupled with the claim that we experience only appearances, makes transcendental idealism a form of phenomenalism on this interpretation, because it reduces the objects of experience to mental representations. All of our experiences — all of our perceptions of objects and events in space, even those objects and events themselves, and all non-spatial but still temporal thoughts and feelings — fall into the class of appearances that exist in the mind of human perceivers. These appearances cut us off entirely from the reality of things in themselves, which are non-spatial and non-temporal. In principle we cannot know how things in themselves affect our senses, because our experience and knowledge is limited to the world of appearances constructed by and in the mind. Things in themselves are therefore a sort of theoretical posit, whose existence and role are required by the theory but are not directly verifiable. The main problems with the two-objects interpretation are philosophical. Most readers of Kant who have interpreted his transcendental idealism in this way have been — often very — critical of it, for reasons such as the following: First, at best Kant is walking a fine line in claiming on the one hand that we can have no knowledge about things in themselves, but on the other hand that we know that things in themselves exist, that they affect our senses, and that they are non-spatial and non-temporal. At worst his theory depends on contradictory claims about what we can and cannot know about things in themselves. Some versions of this objection proceed from premises that Kant rejects. But Kant denies that appearances are unreal: they are just as real as things in themselves but are in a different metaphysical class. But just as Kant denies that things in themselves are the only or privileged reality, he also denies that correspondence with things in themselves is the only kind of truth. Empirical judgments are true just in case they correspond with their empirical objects in accordance with the a priori principles that structure all possible human experience. But the fact that Kant can appeal in this way to an objective criterion of empirical truth that is internal to our experience has not been enough to convince some critics that Kant is innocent of an unacceptable form of skepticism, mainly because of his insistence on our irreparable ignorance about things in themselves. The role of things in themselves, on the two-object interpretation, is to affect our senses and thereby to provide the sensory data from which our cognitive faculties construct appearances within the framework of our a priori intuitions of space and time and a priori concepts such as causality. But if there is no space, time, change, or causation in the realm of things in themselves, then how can things in themselves affect us? Transcendental affection seems to involve a causal relation between things in themselves and our sensibility. If this is simply the way we unavoidably think about transcendental affection, because we can give positive content to this thought only by employing the concept of a cause, while it is nevertheless strictly false that things in themselves affect us causally, then it seems not only that we are ignorant of how things in themselves really affect us. It seems, rather, to be incoherent that things in themselves could affect us at all if they are not in space or time. On this view, transcendental idealism does not distinguish between two classes of objects but rather between two different aspects of one and the same class of objects. That is, appearances are aspects of the same objects that also exist in themselves. So, on this reading, appearances are not mental representations, and transcendental idealism is not a form of phenomenalism. One version treats transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory according to which objects have two aspects in the sense that they have two sets of properties: one set of relational properties that appear to us and are spatial and temporal, and another set of intrinsic properties that do not appear to us and are not spatial or temporal Langton 1998. This property-dualist interpretation faces epistemological objections similar to those faced by the two-objects interpretation, because we are in no better position to acquire knowledge about properties that do not appear to us than we are to acquire knowledge about objects that do not appear to us. Moreover, this interpretation also seems to imply that things in themselves are spatial and temporal, since appearances have spatial and temporal properties, and on this view appearances are the same objects as things in themselves. But Kant explicitly denies that space and time are properties of things in themselves. A second version of the two-aspects theory departs more radically from the traditional two-objects interpretation by denying that transcendental idealism is at bottom a metaphysical theory. Instead, it interprets transcendental idealism as a fundamentally epistemological theory that distinguishes between two standpoints on the objects of experience: the human standpoint, from which objects are viewed relative to epistemic conditions that are peculiar to human cognitive faculties namely, the a priori forms of our sensible intuition ; and the standpoint of an intuitive intellect, from which the same objects could be known in themselves and independently of any epistemic conditions Allison 2004. Human beings cannot really take up the latter standpoint but can form only an empty concept of things as they exist in themselves by abstracting from all the content of our experience and leaving only the purely formal thought of an object in general. So transcendental idealism, on this interpretation, is essentially the thesis that we are limited to the human standpoint, and the concept of a thing in itself plays the role of enabling us to chart the boundaries of the human standpoint by stepping beyond them in abstract but empty thought. One criticism of this epistemological version of the two-aspects theory is that it avoids the objections to other interpretations by attributing to Kant a more limited project than the text of the Critique warrants. There are passages that support this reading. The transcendental deduction The transcendental deduction is the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason and one of the most complex and difficult texts in the history of philosophy. Given its complexity, there are naturally many different ways of interpreting the deduction. The goal of the transcendental deduction is to show that we have a priori concepts or categories that are objectively valid, or that apply necessarily to all objects in the world that we experience. To show this, Kant argues that the categories are necessary conditions of experience, or that we could not have experience without the categories. For they then are related necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all. The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking. Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason. Here Kant claims, against the Lockean view, that self-consciousness arises from combining or synthesizing representations with one another regardless of their content. In short, Kant has a formal conception of self-consciousness rather than a material one. Since no particular content of my experience is invariable, self-consciousness must derive from my experience having an invariable form or structure, and consciousness of the identity of myself through all of my changing experiences must consist in awareness of the formal unity and law-governed regularity of my experience. The continuous form of my experience is the necessary correlate for my sense of a continuous self. There are at least two possible versions of the formal conception of self-consciousness: a realist and an idealist version. On the realist version, nature itself is law-governed and we become self-conscious by attending to its law-governed regularities, which also makes this an empiricist view of self-consciousness. The idea of an identical self that persists throughout all of our experience, on this view, arises from the law-governed regularity of nature, and our representations exhibit order and regularity because reality itself is ordered and regular. Kant rejects this realist view and embraces a conception of self-consciousness that is both formal and idealist. According to Kant, the formal structure of our experience, its unity and law-governed regularity, is an achievement of our cognitive faculties rather than a property of reality in itself. Our experience has a constant form because our mind constructs experience in a law-governed way. In other words, even if reality in itself were law-governed, its laws could not simply migrate over to our mind or imprint themselves on us while our mind is entirely passive. We must exercise an active capacity to represent the world as combined or ordered in a law-governed way, because otherwise we could not represent the world as law-governed even if it were law-governed in itself. Moreover, this capacity to represent the world as law-governed must be a priori because it is a condition of self-consciousness, and we would already have to be self-conscious in order to learn from our experience that there are law-governed regularities in the world. So it is necessary for self-consciousness that we exercise an a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed. But this would also be sufficient for self-consciousness if we could exercise our a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed even if reality in itself were not law-governed. In that case, the realist and empiricist conception of self-consciousness would be false, and the formal idealist view would be true. Self-consciousness for Kant therefore involves a priori knowledge about the necessary and universal truth expressed in this principle of apperception, and a priori knowledge cannot be based on experience. The next condition is that self-consciousness requires me to represent an objective world distinct from my subjective representations — that is, distinct from my thoughts about and sensations of that objective world. Kant uses this connection between self-consciousness and objectivity to insert the categories into his argument. In order to be self-conscious, I cannot be wholly absorbed in the contents of my perceptions but must distinguish myself from the rest of the world. But if self-consciousness is an achievement of the mind, then how does the mind achieve this sense that there is a distinction between the I that perceives and the contents of its perceptions? According to Kant, the mind achieves this sense by distinguishing representations that necessarily belong together from representations that are not necessarily connected but are merely associated in a contingent way. Imagine a house that is too large to fit into your visual field from your vantage point near its front door. Now imagine that you walk around the house, successively perceiving each of its sides. Eventually you perceive the entire house, but not all at once, and you judge that each of your representations of the sides of the house necessarily belong together as sides of one house and that anyone who denied this would be mistaken. But now imagine that you grew up in this house and associate a feeling of nostalgia with it. You would not judge that representations of this house are necessarily connected with feelings of nostalgia. That is, you would not think that other people seeing the house for the first time would be mistaken if they denied that it is connected with nostalgia, because you recognize that this house is connected with nostalgia for you but not necessarily for everyone. The point here is not that we must successfully identify which representations necessarily belong together and which are merely associated contingently, but rather that to be self-conscious we must at least make this general distinction between objective and merely subjective connections of representations. That is the aim of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. Kant is speaking here about the mental act of judging that results in the formation of a judgment. We must represent an objective world in order to distinguish ourselves from it, and we represent an objective world by judging that some representations necessarily belong together. Moreover, recall from 4. It follows that objective connections in the world cannot simply imprint themselves on our mind. The understanding constructs experience by providing the a priori rules, or the framework of necessary laws, in accordance with which we judge representations to be objective. These rules are the pure concepts of the understanding or categories, which are therefore conditions of self-consciousness, since they are rules for judging about an objective world, and self-consciousness requires that we distinguish ourselves from an objective world. Kant identifies the categories in what he calls the metaphysical deduction, which precedes the transcendental deduction. But since categories are not mere logical functions but instead are rules for making judgments about objects or an objective world, Kant arrives at his table of categories by considering how each logical function would structure judgments about objects within our spatio-temporal forms of intuition. For example, he claims that categorical judgments express a logical relation between subject and predicate that corresponds to the ontological relation between substance and accident; and the logical form of a hypothetical judgment expresses a relation that corresponds to cause and effect. Taken together with this argument, then, the transcendental deduction argues that we become self-conscious by representing an objective world of substances that interact according to causal laws. To see why this further condition is required, consider that so far we have seen why Kant holds that we must represent an objective world in order to be self-conscious, but we could represent an objective world even if it were not possible to relate all of our representations to this objective world. For all that has been said so far, we might still have unruly representations that we cannot relate in any way to the objective framework of our experience. So I must be able to relate any given representation to an objective world in order for it to count as mine. On the other hand, self-consciousness would also be impossible if I represented multiple objective worlds, even if I could relate all of my representations to some objective world or other. In that case, I could not become conscious of an identical self that has, say, representation 1 in space-time A and representation 2 in space-time B. It may be possible to imagine disjointed spaces and times, but it is not possible to represent them as objectively real. So self-consciousness requires that I can relate all of my representations to a single objective world. The reason why I must represent this one objective world by means of a unified and unbounded space-time is that, as Kant argued in the Transcendental Aesthetic, space and time are the pure forms of human intuition. If we had different forms of intuition, then our experience would still have to constitute a unified whole in order for us to be self-conscious, but this would not be a spatio-temporal whole. So Kant distinguishes between space and time as pure forms of intuition, which belong solely to sensibility; and the formal intuitions of space and time or space-time , which are unified by the understanding B160—161.
Лауреат Каннского кинофестиваля, французский режиссёр Лоран Канте умер в 63 года
3 monthly listeners. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze is credited with bringing Kant's contributions to racism to light in the 1990s among Western philosophers, who he believed often glossed over this part of his life and works.[210]. подкасты – радио sputnik, эммануэль макрон, нато, евросоюз, мулен руж, вторая мировая война (1939-1945), европа, польша, россия, анджей дуда, политика – радио sputnik, боевые действия. В рамках международного Кантовского конгресса в Калининграде инициаторы развития «Балтийской платформы» – ИМЭМО РАН, МГИМО МИД России, БФУ имени И. Канта при. Когда принималось решение широко отметить 300-летие немецкого философа Иммануила Канта, необходимость интеграции отечественной гуманитарной науки с мировой еще не.
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