FOREIGN POLICY. DOMESTIC POLICY.
Geko 6800 ED-AA/HHBA Handbücher
Преступления и наказания на английском языке. Работа с лексикой. Английский язык, Презентации, 11 класс, Crimes. английский язык онлайн. Следовательно, должны быть выбраны такое наказания и такие способы нанесения их, которые произведут самые сильные и неизгладимые впечатления на умы других людей, с наименьшей мукой для преступника.
Стала известна возможная мера наказания английскому вандалу
criminal fine – уголовный штраф. Получайте свежие новости от «Коммерсантъ UK» по электронной почте. Англичанину, осквернившему памятник советскому футболисту Федору Черенкову, грозит административное наказание, сообщает ТАСС. В статье рассмотрен перевод 'наказание' на английский язык с примером использования и полезными ссылками на другую лексику. онлайн новости последнего часа Подбор самых актуальных новостей на сегодня.
Crime and Punishment - сочинение на английском языке
| PUNISHMENT | Breaking headlines and latest news from the US and the World. Exclusives, live updates, pictures, video and comment from The Sun. |
| Latest News headlines, exclusives and opinion | The Sun US | Бесплатный сервис Google позволяет мгновенно переводить слова, фразы и веб-страницы. Поддерживается более 100 языков. |
| Death Penalty - Essay Samples And Topic Ideas For Free | If the IRS rejected your request to remove a penalty, you may be able to request an Appeals conference or hearing. You have 30 days from the date of the rejection letter to file your request for an appeal. |
Срочно нужно 5 наказаний на английском языке?
| Capital Punishment - English for everyone | В статье рассмотрен перевод 'наказание' на английский язык с примером использования и полезными ссылками на другую лексику. |
| Греция вводит уголовное наказание за распространение ложной информации о коронавирусе | Translated in English by Constance Garnett. Роман «Преступление и наказание» на английском языке. |
| Штрафы английских игроков за скандальные высказывания в социальных сетях достигли 350 тысяч фунтов | Как переводится «наказание» с русского на английский: переводы с транскрипцией, произношением и примерами в онлайн-словаре. |
Russian Politics & Diplomacy
Преступления более действенно предотвратить, чем быть уверенным в строгости наказания. В той же мере как наказания становились более жестокими, сознание людей ставало более закаленными и бесчувственным. Вся жесткость является лишней и, следовательно, тиранической. Смертная казнь является пагубной для общества, она дает пример варварства. Если страсти, или необходимость войны, учит людей проливать кровь ближних, законы, которые призваны смягчить жестокость человечества, не должны увеличить его на примерах жестокости, тем более ужасно, что этот вид наказания, как правило, сопряжен с официальными зрелищами. Разве это не абсурдно, что законы, которые ненавидят и наказывают за убийство, должны, с тем чтобы предотвратить убийства, публично взять на себя убийство? Лучше не допускать совершения преступлений, чем наказывать их. Это и есть фундаментальный принцип хорошего законодательства.
Unfortunately women and children often become the victims of crime. Sometimes criminals kidnap rich people or their kids and ask for a ransom to be paid for them. Among them are tax evasion when people are accused of not paying taxes on purpose , bribery, identity theft when a criminal steals personal information of another person in order to use his credit cards or bank accounts, for example.
To crown it all, we must regret that today a great deal of crimes is committed by teenagers who want to become independent as soon as possible and to find a royal road to getting much money. Moreover, modern TV programs and films containing much violence and sex often have huge and negative influence on teenagers. In conclusion I should say that crime prevention in our society is an extremely difficult and complicated task because we should change our social and moral principles at large. Перевод Преступления в нашем современном обществе Преступления окружают нас многие столетия.
Каждый день, когда мы открываем газету или включаем телевизор, почти все, что мы читаем или слышим — это преступники и их противоправные действия.
Abolitionists find that the various attempted justifications of this intentionally burdensome condemnatory treatment fail, and thus that the practice is morally wrong — not merely in practice but in principle. For such accounts, a central question is how the state should respond to the types of conduct for which one currently would be subject to punishment. In this section we attend to three notable types of abolitionist theory and the alternatives to punishment that they endorse. But one might regard this as a false dichotomy see Allais 2011; Duff 2011a. A restorative process that is to be appropriate to crime must therefore be one that seeks an adequate recognition, by the offender and by others, of the wrong done—a recognition that must for the offender, if genuine, be repentant; and that seeks an appropriate apologetic reparation for that wrong from the offender. But those are also the aims of punishment as a species of secular penance, as sketched above. A system of criminal punishment, however improved it might be, is of course not well designed to bring about the kind of personal reconciliations and transformations that advocates of restorative justice sometimes seek; but it could be apt to secure the kind of formal, ritualised reconciliation that is the most that a liberal state should try to secure between its citizens. If we focus only on imprisonment, which is still often the preferred mode of punishment in many penal systems, this suggestion will appear laughable; but if we think instead of punishments such as Community Service Orders now part of what is called Community Payback or probation, it might seem more plausible. This argument does not, of course, support that account of punishment against its critics.
A similar issue is raised by the second kind of abolitionist theory that we should note here: the argument that we should replace punishment by a system of enforced restitution see e. For we need to ask what restitution can amount to, what it should involve, if it is to constitute restitution not merely for any harm that might have been caused, but for the wrong that was done; and it is tempting to answer that restitution for a wrong must involve the kind of apologetic moral reparation, expressing a remorseful recognition of the wrong, that communicative punishment on the view sketched above aims to become. More generally, advocates of restorative justice and of restitution are right to highlight the question of what offenders owe to those whom they have wronged — and to their fellow citizens see also Tadros 2011 for a focus on the duties that offenders incur. Some penal theorists, however, especially those who connect punishment to apology, will reply that what offenders owe precisely includes accepting, undertaking, or undergoing punishment. A third alternative approach that has gained some prominence in recent years is grounded in belief in free will scepticism, the view that human behaviour is a result not of free will but of determinism, luck, or chance, and thus that the notions of moral responsibility and desert on which many accounts of punishment especially retributivist theories depend are misguided see s. As an alternative to holding offenders responsible, or giving them their just deserts, some free will sceptics see Pereboom 2013; Caruso 2021 instead endorse incapacitating dangerous offenders on a model similar to that of public health quarantines. Just as it can arguably be justified to quarantine someone carrying a transmissible disease even if that person is not morally responsible for the threat they pose, proponents of the quarantine model contend that it can be justified to incapacitate dangerous offenders even if they are not morally responsible for what they have done or for the danger they present. One question is whether the quarantine model is best understood as an alternative to punishment or as an alternative form of punishment. Beyond questions of labelling, however, such views also face various lines of critique. In particular, because they discard the notions of moral responsibility and desert, they face objections, similar to those faced by pure consequentialist accounts see s.
International Criminal Law and Punishment Theoretical discussions of criminal punishment and its justification typically focus on criminal punishment in the context of domestic criminal law. But a theory of punishment must also have something to say about its rationale and justification in the context of international criminal law: about how we should understand, and whether and how we can justify, the punishments imposed by such tribunals as the International Criminal Court. For we cannot assume that a normative theory of domestic criminal punishment can simply be read across into the context of international criminal law see Drumbl 2007. Rather, the imposition of punishment in the international context raises distinctive conceptual and normative issues. Such international intervention is only justified, however, in cases of serious harm to the international community, or to humanity as a whole. Crimes harm humanity as a whole, on this account, when they are group-based either in the sense that they are based on group characteristics of the victims or are perpetrated by a state or another group agent. Such as account has been subject to challenge focused on its harm-based account of crime Renzo 2012 and its claim that group-based crimes harm humanity as a whole A. Altman 2006. We might think, by contrast, that the heinousness of a crime or the existence of fair legal procedures is not enough. We also need some relational account of why the international legal community — rather than this or that domestic legal entity — has standing to call perpetrators of genocide or crimes against humanity to account: that is, why the offenders are answerable to the international community see Duff 2010.
For claims of standing to be legitimate, they must be grounded in some shared normative community that includes the perpetrators themselves as well as those on behalf of whom the international legal community calls the perpetrators to account. For other discussions of jurisdiction to prosecute and punish international crimes, see W. Lee 2010; Wellman 2011; Giudice and Schaeffer 2012; Davidovic 2015. Another important question is how international institutions should assign responsibility for crimes such as genocide, which are perpetrated by groups rather than by individuals acting alone. Such questions arise in the domestic context as well, with respect to corporations, but the magnitude of crimes such as genocide makes the questions especially poignant at the international level. Several scholars in recent years have suggested, however, that rather than focusing only on prosecuting and punishing members of the groups responsible for mass atrocities, it may sometimes be preferable to prosecute and punish the entire group qua group. A worry for such proposals is that, because punishment characteristically involves the imposition of burdens, punishment of an entire group risks inflicting punitive burdens on innocent members of the group: those who were nonparticipants in the crime, or perhaps even worked against it or were among its victims. In response to this concern, defenders of the idea of collective punishment have suggested that it need not distribute among the members of the group see Erskine 2011; Pasternak 2011; Tanguagy-Renaud 2013; but see Hoskins 2014b , or that the benefits of such punishment may be valuable enough to override concerns about harm to innocents see Lang 2007: 255. Many coercive measures are imposed even on those who have not been convicted, such as the many kinds of restriction that may be imposed on people suspected of involvement in terrorism, or housing or job restrictions tied merely to arrests rather than convictions. The legal measures are relevant for punishment theorists for a number of reasons, but here we note just two: First, at least some of these restrictive measures may be best regarded as as additional forms of punishment see Lippke 2016: ch.
For such measures, we must ask whether they are or can be made to be consistent with the principles and considerations we believe should govern impositions of punishment. Second, even if at least some measures are not best regarded as additional forms of punishment, we should ask what justifies the state in imposing additional coercive measures on those convicted of crimes outside the context of the punishment itself see Ashworth and Zedner 2011, 2012; Ramsay 2011; Ashworth, Zedner, and Tomlin 2013; Hoskins 2019: chs. For instance, if we regard punishment as the way in which offenders pay their debts to society, we can argue that it is at least presumptively unjustified for the state to impose additional burdensome measures on offenders once this debt has been paid. To say that certain measures are presumptively unjustified is not, of course, to establish that they are all-things-considered prohibited. Various collateral consequences — restrictions on employment or housing, for example — are often defended as public safety measures. We might argue see Hoskins 2019: ch. Public safety restrictions could only be justifiable, however, when there is a sufficiently compelling public safety interest, when the measures will be effective in serving that interest, when the measures will not do more harm than good, and when there are no less burdensome means of achieving the public safety aim. Even for public safety measures that meet these conditions, we should not lose sight of the worry that imposing such restrictions on people with criminal convictions but who have served their terms of punishment denies them the equal treatment to which they, having paid their debt, are entitled on this last worry, see, e. In addition to these formal legal consequences of a conviction, people with criminal records also face a range of informal collateral consequences, such as social stigma, family tensions, discrimination by employers and housing authorities, and financial challenges. These consequences are not imposed by positive law, but they may be permitted by formal legal provisions such as those that grant broad discretion to public housing authorities in the United States making admission decisions or facilitated by them such as when laws making criminal records widely accessible enable employers or landlords to discriminate against those with criminal histories.
There are also widely documented burdensome consequences of a conviction to the family members or loved ones of those who are convicted, and to their communities. These sorts of informal consequences of criminal convictions appear less likely than the formal legal consequences to constitute legal punishment, insofar as they are not intentionally imposed by the state but see Kolber 2012. Still, the informal collateral consequences of a conviction are arguably relevant to theorising about punishment, and we should examine when, if ever, such burdens are relevant to sentencing determinations on sentencing, see s. Further Issues A number of further important questions are relevant to theorising about punishment, which can only be noted here. First, there are questions about sentencing. Who should decide what kinds and what levels of sentence should be attached to different offences or kinds of offence: what should be the respective roles of legislatures, of sentencing councils or commissions, of appellate courts, of trial judges, of juries? What kinds of punishment should be available to sentencers, and how should they decide which mode of punishment is appropriate for the particular offence? Considerations of the meaning of different modes of punishment should be central to these questions see e. Second, there are questions about the relation between theory and practice — between the ideal, as portrayed by a normative theory of punishment, and the actualities of existing penal practice. Suppose we have come to believe, as a matter of normative theory, that a system of legal punishment could in principle be justified — that the abolitionist challenge can be met.
It is, to put it mildly, unlikely that our normative theory of justified punishment will justify our existing penal institutions and practices: it is far more likely that such a theory will show our existing practices to be radically imperfect — that legal punishment as it is now imposed is far from meaning or achieving what it should mean or achieve if it is to be adequately justified see Heffernan and Kleinig 2000. If our normative theorising is to be anything more than an empty intellectual exercise, if it is to engage with actual practice, we then face the question of what we can or should do about our current practices. The obvious answer is that we should strive so to reform them that they can be in practice justified, and that answer is certainly available to consequentialists, on the plausible assumption that maintaining our present practices, while also seeking their reform, is likely to do more good or less harm than abandoning them. But for retributivists who insist that punishment is justified only if it is just, and for communicative theorists who insist that punishment is just and justified only if it communicates an appropriate censure to those who deserve it, the matter is harder: for to maintain our present practices, even while seeking their radical reform, will be to maintain practices that perpetrate serious injustice see Murphy 1973; Duff 2001, ch. Finally, the relation between the ideal and the actual is especially problematic in the context of punishment partly because it involves the preconditions of just punishment. That is to say, what makes an actual system of punishment unjust ified might be not its own operations as such what punishment is or achieves within that system , but the absence of certain political, legal and moral conditions on which the whole system depends for its legitimacy see Duff 2001, ch. Recent scholarship on punishment has increasingly acknowledged that the justification of punishment depends on the justification of the criminal law more generally, and indeed the legitimacy of the state itself see s. For example, if the state passes laws criminalising conduct that is not justifiably prohibited, then this calls into question the justification of the punishment it imposes for violations of these laws. Similarly, if the procedures by which criminal justice officials apprehend, charge, and prosecute individuals are unjustified, then the subsequent inflictions of punishment will be unjustified as well see Ristroph 2015 and 2016; on specific aspects of criminal procedure, see, e. Bibliography Primoratz 1999, Honderich 2005, Ellis 2012, and Brooks 2013 are useful introductory books.
Duff and Garland 1994; Ashworth, von Hirsch; and Roberts 2009; and Tonry 2011 are useful collections of readings. Adelsberg, L. Guenther, and S. Adler, J. Alexander, L. Allais, L. Altman, A. Altman, M. Anderson, J. Ardal, P.
Ashworth, A. Roberts eds. Duff and S. Zedner, and P. Tomlin eds. Bagaric, M. Baker, B. Cragg ed. Barnett, R. Becker, L.
Bennett, C. Flanders and Z. Hoskins eds. Bentham, J. Berman, M. Green eds. Bianchi, H. Bickenbach, J. Boonin, D. Bottoms, A.
Ashworth and M. Wasik eds. Braithwaite, J. Tonry, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 241—367. Brettschneider, C. Brooks, T. Brown, J. Brownlee, K. Brudner, A. Burgh, R.
Caruso, G. Chau, P. Chiao, V. Christie, N. British Journal of Criminology, 17: 1—15. Ciocchetti, C. Cogley, Z. Timpe and C. Boyd eds. Cottingham, J.
Dagger, R. Laborde and J. Maynor eds. Daly, K. Davidovic, J.
That is cruel and unusual punishment.
Это очень жестокое и необычное наказание. Ты напрашиваешься на наказание. Это жестокое и необычное наказание. Just punishment is the best deterrent. Справедливое наказание — это наилучший способ сдерживания. This is cruel and unusual punishment.
Crucifixion was a Roman method of punishment. Распятие было римским методом наказания. Punishment and examinations are seen as threats. Наказание и экзамены считаются угрозами.
News is bad for you — Не смотрите новости. Статья на английском и русском
Недавно отбывал наказание в исправительной колонии Уолпол. Произношение Сообщить об ошибке Recently served a stint in Walpole Correctional. Когда молодой преступник совершает преступление, например, я не знаю, поджог, наказание заключается в общественных работах или в колонии для несовершеннолетних? Если это наказание, я хочу, чтобы ты знал, что я принимаю его и понимаю.
Если бы большее количество кусков информации приводило к экономическому успеху, то журналисты были бы на верху пирамиды. Но не в нашем случае. News is toxic to your body. It constantly triggers the limbic system.
Panicky stories spur the release of cascades of glucocorticoid cortisol. This deregulates your immune system and inhibits the release of growth hormones. In other words, your body finds itself in a state of chronic stress. High glucocorticoid levels cause impaired digestion, lack of growth cell, hair, bone , nervousness and susceptibility to infections. The other potential side-effects include fear, aggression, tunnel-vision and desensitisation. Новости токсичны для вашего организма Они постоянно действуют на лимбическую систему. Панические истории стимулируют образование глюкокортикоидов кортизола.
Это приводит в беспорядок вашу иммунную систему. Ваш организм оказывается в состоянии хронического стресса. Другие возможные побочные эффекты включают страх, агрессию и потерю чувствительности, проблемы с ростом клеток волос, костей, неустойчивость к инфекциям. News increases cognitive errors. News feeds the mother of all cognitive errors: confirmation bias. In the words of Warren Buffett: «What the human being is best at doing is interpreting all new information so that their prior conclusions remain intact. We become prone to overconfidence, take stupid risks and misjudge opportunities.
It also exacerbates another cognitive error: the story bias. Any journalist who writes, «The market moved because of X» or «the company went bankrupt because of Y» is an idiot. I am fed up with this cheap way of «explaining» the world. Новости искажают реальные факты усиливают ошибки восприятия Поток новостей — отец всех когнитивных ошибок: жажды подтверждения. Мы становимся излишне самоуверенными, глупо рискуем и недооцениваем возможности. Наш мозг жаждет историй, которые «имеют смысл», даже если они не соответствуют действительности. Любой журналист, который пишет, что «рынок существует благодаря X» или «компания обанкротилась из-за Y», — идиот.
Мы сыты по горло этим дешевым способом «объяснения» мира. News inhibits thinking. Thinking requires concentration. Concentration requires uninterrupted time. News pieces are specifically engineered to interrupt you. They are like viruses that steal attention for their own purposes. News makes us shallow thinkers.
News severely affects memory. There are two types of memory. The path from short-term to long-term memory is a choke-point in the brain, but anything you want to understand must pass through it. If this passageway is disrupted, nothing gets through. Because news disrupts concentration, it weakens comprehension. Online news has an even worse impact. News is an intentional interruption system.
Новости подавляют мышление Мышление требует концентрации.
Перевод: Констанция Гарнетт. The book was written in 1865 — 1866. Читайте лучшие произведения русской и мировой литературы полностью онлайн бесплатно и без регистрации, без сокращений. Бесплатное чтение книг.
They will really receive punishment? Пол теперь сможет получить наказание, на которое он вправе рассчитывать. Эй, это задница просто получит наказание, для этого она и нужна. Мы проследим, чтобы он получил наказание. Он нарушил закон, а она получит наказание?
But he breaks the law, and she gets punished?
Death Penalty - Essay Samples And Topic Ideas For Free
| Преступление и наказание. Лексика на английском. | Штраф – Английское Словечко! 00:00:07 Lisan Lapa Soho. СМОТРЕТЬ. |
| World news - breaking news, video, headlines and opinion | CNN | Русско-английский и англо-русский юридический онлайн-словарь. |
| World news - breaking news, video, headlines and opinion | CNN | Live news, investigations, opinion, photos and video by the journalists of The New York Times from more than 150 countries around the world. Subscribe for coverage of U.S. and international news, politics, business, technology, science, health, arts, sports and more. |
Как будет "наказание" по-английски? Перевод слова "наказание"
What distinguishes punishment from other kinds of coercive imposition, such as taxation, is that punishment is precisely intended to …: but to what? Others would say that punishment is intended to cause harm to the offender — adding, if they are careful see Hanna 2014: s. It is safer to say that punishment must be intended to be burdensome, and that is how punishment will be understood in what follows. For running debate about this intentionality feature, see Wringe 2013, Hanna 2017, Wringe 2019, Hanna 2020. Penalties, such as parking tickets, might be imposed to deter the penalised conduct or to recoup some of the costs that it causes without being intended to express societal condemnation. But even if a primary purpose of punishment is deterrence see ss. These two features, that punishment is intentionally burdensome and condemnatory, make the practice especially normatively challenging. We should not assume, however, that there is only one question of justification, which can receive just one answer. As Hart famously pointed out Hart 1968: 1—27 , we must distinguish at least three justificatory issues. First, what compelling reason is there to create and maintain a system of punishment: what good can it achieve, what duty can it fulfil, what moral demand can it satisfy?
Second, who may properly be punished: what principles or aims should determine the allocations of punishments to individuals? Third, how should the appropriate amount of punishment be determined: how should sentencers go about deciding what sentence to impose? One dimension of this third question concerns the amount or severity of punishment; another, which is insufficiently discussed by philosophers, concerns the concrete modes of punishment that should be available, in general or for particular crimes. It might of course turn out that answers to all these questions will flow from a single theoretical foundation — for instance, from a unitary consequentialist principle specifying the good that punishment should achieve, or from some version of the retributivist principle that the sole proper aim of punishment is to impose on the guilty the punitive burdens they deserve. But matters might not be as simple as that: we might find that quite different and conflicting values are relevant to different issues about punishment, and that any complete normative account of punishment will have to find a place for these values and offer guidance in how to resolve tensions among them when they conflict see s. But it is an illegitimate assumption: normative theorists must be open to the possibility, startling and disturbing as it might be, that this pervasive human practice cannot be justified. We will attend to some abolitionist arguments in section 7. Even if those arguments can be met, even if legal punishment can be justified, at least in principle, the abolitionist challenge is one that must be met, rather than ignored; and it will help to remind us of the ways in which any practice of legal punishment is bound to be morally problematic. Punishment, Crime, and the State Legal punishment presupposes crime as that for which punishment is imposed, and a criminal law as that which defines crimes as crimes; a system of criminal law presupposes a state, which has the political authority to make and enforce the law and to impose punishments.
A normative account of legal punishment and its justification must thus at least presuppose, and should perhaps make explicit, a normative account of the criminal law why should we have a criminal law at all? See generally Duff 2018: ch. Recent scholarship has thus seen a growing interest in grounding analysis of the justification of punishment in a political theory of the state. Several others are based on versions of republicanism see Pettit 1997; Duff 2001; Dagger 2007 and 2011a; Yankah 2015; for other recent contributions showing the importance of political theory, see Brudner 2009; Brooks 2011; Sigler 2011; Markel 2012; Chiao 2016 and 2018. How far it matters, in this context, to make explicit a political theory of the state depends on how far different plausible political theories will generate different accounts of how punishment can be justified and should be used. We cannot pursue this question here for two sharply contrasting views on it, see Philips 1986; M. Davis 1989 , save to note one central point. For any political theory that takes seriously the idea of citizenship as full membership of the polity, the problem of punishment takes a particularly acute form, since we have now to ask how punishment can be consistent with citizenship how citizens can legitimately punish each other : if we are not to say that those who commit crimes thereby forfeit their status as citizens see s. Before we tackle such theories of punishment, however, we should look briefly at the concept of crime, since that is one focus of the abolitionist critique of punishment.
On a simple positivist view of law, crimes are kinds of conduct that are prohibited, on pain of threatened sanctions, by the law; and for positivists such as Bentham, who combine positivism with a normative consequentialism, the questions of whether we should maintain a criminal law at all, and of what kinds of conduct should be criminalised, are to be answered by trying to determine whether and when this method of controlling human conduct is likely to produce a net increase in good. For the criminal law portrays crime not merely as conduct which has been prohibited, but as a species of wrongdoing: whether our inquiry is analytical into the concept of crime or normative as to what kinds of conduct, if any, should be criminal , we must therefore focus on that notion of wrongdoing. Crimes are, at least, socially proscribed wrongs — kinds of conduct that are condemned as wrong by some purportedly authoritative social norm. Tort law, for instance, deals in part with wrongs that are non-private in that they are legally and socially declared as wrongs — with the wrong constituted by libel, for instance. She must decide to bring, or not to bring, a civil case against the person who wronged her; and although she can appeal to the law to protect her rights, the case is still between her and the defendant. Morris 1968: 477—80; Murphy 1973; Dagger 1993 and 2008 ; or they undermine the trust on which social life depends Dimock 1997. But such accounts distract our attention from the wrongs done to the individual victims that most crimes have, when it is those wrongs that should be our central concern: we should condemn the rapist or murderer, we should see the wrong he has done as our concern, because of what he has done to his victim. One can of course count a criminal conviction as a kind of punishment: but it does not entail the kind of materially burdensome punishment, imposed after conviction, with which penal theorists are primarily concerned. More plausibly, the abolitionist claim could be that rather than take wrongdoing as our focus, we should focus on the harm that has been done, and on how it can be repaired; we will return to this suggestion in section 7 below.
Now it is a familiar and disturbing truth that our existing criminal processes — both in their structure and in their actual operations — tend to preclude any effective participation by either victims or offenders, although an adequate response to the criminal wrong that was done should surely involve them both. Faced, for instance, by feuding neighbours who persistently accuse each other of more or less trivial wrongs, it might indeed be appropriate to suggest that they should forget about condemning each other and look for a way of resolving their conflict. So, we must turn now to the question of what could justify such a system of punishment. Consequentialist Accounts Many people, including those who do not take a consequentialist view of other matters, think that any adequate justification of punishment must be basically consequentialist. For we have here a practice that inflicts, indeed seeks to inflict, significant hardship or burdens: how else could we hope to justify it than by showing that it brings consequential benefits sufficiently large to outweigh, and thus to justify, those burdens? However, when we try to flesh out this simple consequentialist thought into something closer to a full normative account of punishment, problems begin to appear. A consequentialist must justify punishment if she is to justify it at all as a cost-effective means to certain independently identifiable goods for two simple examples of such theories, see Wilson 1983; Walker 1991. Whatever account she gives of the final good or goods at which all action ultimately aims, the most plausible immediate good that a system of punishment can bring is the reduction of crime. A rational consequentialist system of law will define as criminal only conduct that is in some way harmful; in reducing crime we will thus be reducing the harms that crime causes.
It is commonly suggested that punishment can help to reduce crime by deterring, incapacitating, or reforming potential offenders though for an argument that incapacitation is not a genuinely punitive aim, see Hoskins 2016: 260. There are of course other goods that a system of punishment can bring. It can reassure those who fear crime that the state is taking steps to protect them—though this is a good that, in a well-informed society, will be achieved only insofar as the more immediate preventive goods are achieved. It can also bring satisfaction to those who want to see wrongdoers suffer — though to show that to be a genuine good, rather than merely a means of averting vigilantism and private revenge, we would need to show that it involves something more than mere vengeance, which would be to make sense of some version of retributivism. In consequentialist terms, punishment will be justified if it is an effective means of achieiving its aim, if its benefits outweigh its costs, and if there is no less burdensome means of achieving the same aim. It is a contingent question whether punishment can satisfy these conditions, and some objections to punishment rest on the empirical claim that it cannot — that there are more effective and less burdensome methods of crime reduction see Wootton 1963; Menninger 1968; Golash 2005: chs. Our focus here, however, will be on the moral objections to consequentialist accounts of punishment — objections, basically, that crime-reductive efficiency does not suffice to justify a system of punishment. The most familiar line of objection to consequentialist penal theories contends that consequentialists would be committed to regarding manifestly unjust punishments the punishment of those known to be innocent, for instance, or excessively harsh punishment of the guilty to be in principle justified if they would efficiently serve the aim of crime reduction: but such punishments would be wrong, because they would be unjust see e. There are some equally familiar consequentialist responses to this objection.
Another is to argue that in the real world it is extremely unlikely that such punishments would ever be for the best, and even less likely that the agents involved could be trusted reliably to pick out those rare cases in which they would be: thus we, and especially our penal officials, will do best if we think and act as if such punishments are intrinsically wrong and unjustifiable see e. Another objection to consequentialist accounts focuses not on potential wrongs done to the innocent but rather on the wrong allegedly done to the guilty. Consequentialist punishment, on this objection, fails to respect the person punished as an autonomous moral agent. In Kantian terms, such punishment treats those punished as mere means to achieving some social good, rather than respecting them as ends in themselves Kant 1797: 473; Murphy 1973. One might argue that if punishment is reserved for those who voluntarily break the law, it does not treat them merely as means. Indeed, Kant himself suggested that as long as we reserve punishment only for those found guilty of crimes, then it is permissible to punish with an eye toward potential benefits Kant 1797: 473. As we have seen, though, insofar as such an approach relies on endorsing prohibitions on punishment of the innocent or disproportionate punishment of the guilty, the challenge remains that such constraints appear to be merely contingent if grounded in consequentialist considerations. Conversely, if the constraints are more than merely contingent, it appears that they will be based on some deontological considerations, in which case the overall theory will no longer be purely consequentialist, but rather a mixed theory see s. The criminal law, and the institution of punishment, in a liberal society should treat offenders as still members of the polity who despite having violated its values could, and should, nonetheless re commit to these values.
A possible response is that a penal system aimed at crime reduction through deterrence need not be exclusionary, as it treats all community members equally, namely as potential offenders Hoskins 2011a: 379—81. Retributivist Accounts Whereas consequentialist accounts regard punishment as justified instrumentally, as a means to achieving some valuable goal typically crime reduction , retributivist accounts contend that punishment is justified as an intrinsically appropriate, because deserved, response to wrongdoing but see Berman 2011 for an argument that some recent versions of retributivism actually turn it into a consequentialist theory. Penal desert constitutes not just a necessary, but an in-principle sufficient reason for punishment only in principle, however, since there are good reasons — to do with the costs, both material and moral, of punishment — why we should not even try to punish all the guilty. Negative retributivism, by contrast, provides not a positive reason to punish, but rather a constraint on punishment: punishment should be imposed only on those who deserve it, and only in proportion with their desert. Because negative retributivism represents only a constraining principle, not a positive reason to punish, it has been employed in various mixed accounts of punishment, which endorse punishment for consequentialist reasons but only insofar as the punishment is no more than is deserved see s. A striking feature of penal theorising during the last three decades of the twentieth century was a revival of positive retributivism — of the idea that the positive justification of punishment is to be found in its intrinsic character as a deserved response to crime see H. Morris 1968; N. Morris 1974; Murphy 1973; von Hirsch 1976; two useful collections of contemporary papers on retributivism are White 2011 and Tonry 2012. Positive retributivism comes in very different forms Cottingham 1979.
All can be understood, however, as attempting to answer the two central questions faced by any retributivist theory of punishment. Davis 1972 — and what do they deserve to suffer see Ardal 1984; Honderich 2005, ch. Second, even if they deserve to suffer, or to be burdened in some distinctive way, why should it be for the state to inflict that suffering or that burden on them through a system of criminal punishment Murphy 1985; Husak 1992 and 2015; Shafer-Landau 1996; Wellman 2009? One retributivist answer to these questions is that crime involves taking an unfair advantage over the law-abiding, and that punishment removes that unfair advantage. The criminal law benefits all citizens by protecting them from certain kinds of harm: but this benefit depends upon citizens accepting the burden of self-restraint involved in obeying the law. The criminal takes the benefit of the self-restraint of others but refuses to accept that burden herself: she has gained an unfair advantage, which punishment removes by imposing some additional burden on her see H. Morris 1968; Murphy 1973; Sadurski 1985; Sher 1987, ch. This kind of account does indeed answer the two questions noted above. However, such accounts have internal difficulties: for instance, how are we to determine how great was the unfair advantage gained by a crime; how far are such measurements of unfair advantage likely to correlate with our judgements of the seriousness of crimes?
Davis 1992, 1996; for criticism, see Scheid 1990, 1995; von Hirsch 1990. Such accounts try to answer the first of the two questions noted above: crime deserves punishment in the sense that it makes appropriate certain emotions resentment, guilt which are satisfied by or expressed in punishment. Criminal wrongdoing should, we can agree, provoke certain kinds of emotion, such as self-directed guilt and other-directed indignation; and such emotions might typically involve a desire to make those at whom they are directed suffer. At the least we need to know more than we are told by these accounts about just what wrongdoers deserve to suffer, and why the infliction of suffering should be an appropriate way to express such proper emotions. For critical discussions of Murphy, see Murphy and Hampton 1988, ch. On Moore, see Dolinko 1991: 555—9; Knowles 1993; Murphy 1999. See also Murphy 2003, 2012. More recently, critics of emotion-based retributivist accounts have contended that the emotions on which retributive and other deontological intuitions are based have evolved as mechanisms to stabilise cooperation; given that we have retributive emotions only because of their evolutionary fitness, it would be merely a coincidence if intuitions based on these emotions happened to track moral truths about, e. A problem with such accounts is that they appear to prove too much: consequentialist accounts also rely on certain evaluation intuitions about what has value, or about the proper way to respond to that which we value ; insofar as such intuitions are naturally selected, then it would be no less coincidental if they tracked moral truths than if retributive intuitions did so.
Thus the consequentialist accounts that derive from these intuitions would be similarly undermined by this evolutionary argument see Kahane 2011; Mason 2011; but see Wiegman 2017. A third version of retributivism holds that when people commit a crime, they thereby incur a moral debt to their victims, and punishment is deserved as a way to pay this debt McDermott 2001. This moral debt differs from the material debt that an offender may incur, and thus payment of the material debt returning stolen money or property, etc. Punishment as Communication Perhaps the most influential version of retributivism in recent decades seeks the meaning and justification of punishment as a deserved response to crime in its expressive or communicative character. On the expressive dimension of punishment, see generally Feinberg 1970; Primoratz 1989; for critical discussion, see Hart 1963: 60—69; Skillen 1980; M. Davis 1996: 169—81; A. Lee 2019. Consequentialists can of course portray punishment as useful partly in virtue of its expressive character see Ewing 1927; Lacey 1988; Braithwaite and Pettit 1990 ; but a portrayal of punishment as a mode of deserved moral communication has been central to many recent versions of retributivism. The central meaning and purpose of punishment, on such accounts, is to convey the censure or condemnation that offenders deserve for their crimes.
On other such accounts, the primary intended audience of the condemnatory message is the offender himself, although the broader society may be a secondary audience see Duff 2001: secs. Once we recognise that punishment can serve this communicative purpose, we can see how such accounts begin to answer the two questions that retributivists face. First, there is an obviously intelligible justificatory relationship between wrongdoing and condemnation: whatever puzzles there might be about other attempts to explain the idea of penal desert, the idea that it is appropriate to condemn wrongdoing is surely unpuzzling. For other examples of communicative accounts, see especially von Hirsch 1993: ch. For critical discussion, see M. Davis 1991; Boonin 2008: 171—80; Hanna 2008; Matravers 2011a. Two crucial lines of objection face any such justification of punishment as a communicative enterprise. The first line of critique holds that, whether the primary intended audience is the offender or the community generally, condemnation of a crime can be communicated through a formal conviction in a criminal court; or it could be communicated by some further formal denunciation issued by a judge or some other representative of the legal community, or by a system of purely symbolic punishments which were burdensome only in virtue of their censorial meaning. Is it because they will make the communication more effective see Falls 1987; Primoratz 1989; Kleinig 1991?
And anyway, one might worry that the hard treatment will conceal, rather than highlight, the moral censure it should communicate see Mathiesen 1990: 58—73. One sort of answer to this first line of critique explains penal hard treatment as an essential aspect of the enterprise of moral communication itself. Punishment, on this view, should aim not merely to communicate censure to the offender, but to persuade the offender to recognise and repent the wrong he has done, and so to recognise the need to reform himself and his future conduct, and to make apologetic reparation to those whom he wronged. His punishment then constitutes a kind of secular penance that he is required to undergo for his crime: its hard treatment aspects, the burden it imposes on him, should serve both to assist the process of repentance and reform, by focusing his attention on his crime and its implications, and as a way of making the apologetic reparation that he owes see Duff 2001, 2011b; see also Garvey 1999, 2003; Tudor 2001; Brownless 2007; Hus 2015; for a sophisticated discussion see Tasioulas 2006. This type of account faces serious objections see Bickenbach 1988; Ten 1990; von Hirsch 1999; Bagaric and Amarasekara 2000; Ciocchetti 2004; von Hirsch and Ashworth 2005: ch. The second line of objection to communicative versions of retributivism — and indeed against retributivism generally — charges that the notions of desert and blame at the heart of retributivist accounts are misplaced and pernicious. One version of this objection is grounded in scepticism about free will. In response, retributivists may point out that only if punishment is grounded in desert can we provide more than contingent assurances against punishment of the innocent or disproportionate punishment of the guilty, or assurances against treating those punished as mere means to whatever desirable social ends see s. Another version of the objection is not grounded in free will scepticism: it allows that people may sometimes merit a judgement of blameworthiness.
To this second version of the objection to retributivist blame, retributivists may respond that although emotions associated with retributive blame have no doubt contributed to various excesses in penal policy, this is not to say that the notion of deserved censure can have no appropriate place in a suitably reformed penal system. After all, when properly focused and proportionate, reactive attitudes such as anger may play an important role by focusing our attention on wrongdoing and motivating us to stand up to it; anger-tinged blame may also serve to convey how seriously we take the wrongdoing, and thus to demonstrate respect for its victims as well as its perpetrators see Cogley 2014; Hoskins 2020. In particular, Hart 1968: 9—10 pointed out that we may ask about punishment, as about any social institution, what compelling rationale there is to maintain the institution that is, what values or aims it fosters and also what considerations should govern the institution. The compelling rationale will itself entail certain constraints: e. See most famously Hart 1968, and Scheid 1997 for a sophisticated Hartian theory; on Hart, see Lacey 1988: 46—56; Morison 1988; Primoratz 1999: ch. For example, whereas Hart endorsed a consequentialist rationale for punishment and nonconsequentialist side-constraints, one might instead endorse a retributivist rationale constrained by consequentialist considerations punishment should not tend to exacerbate crime, or undermine offender reform, etc.
Новостях и Дзене. Все главные и интересные новости тут.
Leaving Razumikhin with his mother and sister, Raskolnikov returns to his own building. Raskolnikov tries to find out what he wants, but the artisan says only one word — "murderer", and walks off. Petrified, Raskolnikov returns to his room and falls into thought and then sleep. He wakens from an eerie nightmare about the murder of the old woman to find another complete stranger present, this time a man of aristocratic appearance.
The man politely introduces himself as Arkady Ivanovich Svidrigailov. He claims to no longer have any romantic interest in Dunya, but wants to stop her from marrying Luzhin, and offers her ten thousand roubles. Raskolnikov refuses the money on her behalf and refuses to facilitate a meeting. Svidrigailov also mentions that his wife, who defended Dunya at the time of the unpleasantness but died shortly afterwards, has left her 3000 rubles in her will.
The meeting with Luzhin that evening begins with talk of Svidrigailov—his depraved character, his presence in Petersburg, the unexpected death of his wife and the 3000 rubles left to Dunya. Luzhin takes offence when Dunya insists on resolving the issue with her brother, and when Raskolnikov draws attention to the slander in his letter, Luzhin becomes reckless, exposing his true character. Dunya tells him to leave and never come back. Now free and with significant capital, they excitedly begin to discuss plans for the future, but Raskolnikov suddenly gets up and leaves, telling them, to their great consternation, that it might be the last time he sees them.
He instructs the baffled Razumikhin to remain and always care for them. She is gratified that he is visiting her, but also frightened of his strange manner. He asks a series of merciless questions about her terrible situation and that of Katerina Ivanovna and the children. Raskolnikov begins to realize that Sonya is sustained only by her faith in God.
She reveals that she was a friend of the murdered Lizaveta. In fact, Lizaveta gave her a cross and a copy of the Gospels. She passionately reads to him the story of the raising of Lazarus from the Gospel of John. His fascination with her, which had begun at the time when her father spoke of her, increases and he decides that they must face the future together.
As he leaves he tells her that he will come back tomorrow and tell her who killed her friend Lizaveta. When Raskolnikov presents himself for his interview, Porfiry resumes and intensifies his insinuating, provocative, ironic chatter, without ever making a direct accusation. Back at his room Raskolnikov is horrified when the old artisan suddenly appears at his door. He had been one of those present when Raskolnikov returned to the scene of the murders, and had reported his behavior to Porfiry.
The atmosphere deteriorates as guests become drunk and the half-mad Katerina Ivanovna engages in a verbal attack on her German landlady. With chaos descending, everyone is surprised by the sudden and portentous appearance of Luzhin.
О соглашении между Pfizer и Министерством юстиции Соединенных Штатов было объявлено в сентябре. Это соглашение является крупнейшим за всю историю страны по судебному делу в связи с мошенничеством в области здравоохранения. Оно также включает крупнейший уголовный штраф среди любых судебных решений в Соединенных Штатах — более одного миллиарда долларов. Pfizer согласилась уплатить еще миллиард долларов за нарушение гражданского законодательства — Закона о фальсифицированных требованиях.
Pfizer, расположенная в Нью-Йорке, произвела в прошлом году продаж на сумму сорок восемь миллиардов долларов. Pfizer проталкивала то есть продвигала на рынок, стимулировала, рекламировала продажи Bextra для применения в некоторых случаях, не одобренных государственными органами в связи с угрозой безопасности. Оно также предлагалось для использования в неутвержденных дозах. Pfizer изъяла Bextra с рынка в 2005 году из-за связи с сердечными приступами и другими проблемами. Pfizer также столкнулась с гражданскими исками в связи с Bextra, а также с тремя другими лекарственными препаратами. Официальные лица заявили, что Pfizer платила поставщикам медицинских услуг за прописывание этих лекарственных препаратов для обстоятельств случаев иных, чем те, для которых они одобрены.
Это называется использованием лекарства с нарушением инструкции по применению. Врачам было разрешено пробовать использование с нарушением инструкции по применению для лечения своих пациентов. Смысл в том, что врач мог бы найти другие способы эффективного применения лекарственного препарата.
Тема "Преступления в нашем обществе" (Crime in our society)
Получайте свежие новости от «Коммерсантъ UK» по электронной почте. Open access academic research from top universities on the subject of Criminal Law. На этой странице находится вопрос Срочно нужно 5 наказаний на английском языке?. Здесь же – ответы на него, и похожие вопросы в категории Английский язык, которые можно найти с помощью простой в использовании поисковой системы. Штраф – Английское Словечко! 00:00:07 Lisan Lapa Soho. СМОТРЕТЬ. FOREIGN POLICY. DOMESTIC POLICY.
Штрафы английских игроков за скандальные высказывания в социальных сетях достигли 350 тысяч фунтов
Some states in America practice the death penalty, where some states […] The Controversy of Death Penalty Words: 1535 Pages: 5 6050 The death penalty is a very controversial topic in many states. Although the idea of the death penalty does sound terrifying, would you really want a murderer to be given food and shelter for free? Would you want a murderer to get out of jail and still end up killing another innocent person? Well, we do. We will write an essay sample crafted to your needs.
Words: 1093 Pages: 4 18527 The death penalty in America has been effective since 1608. Throughout the years following the first execution, criminal behaviors have begun to deteriorate. Capital punishment was first formed to deter crime and treason. As a result, it increased the rate of crime, according to researchers.
Punishing criminals by death does not effectively deter crime because criminals are not concerned with consequences, apprehension, and judges are not willing to pay the expenses. Words: 2382 Pages: 8 13564 The death penalty has been a controversial topic throughout the years and now more than ever, as we argue; Right or Wrong? Moral or Immoral? Constitutional or Unconstitutional?
The death penalty also known as capital punishment is a legal process where the state justice sentences an individual to be executed as punishment for a crime committed. The death penalty sentence strongly depends on the severity of the crime, in the US there are 41 crimes that can lead to being […] About Carlton Franklin Words: 2099 Pages: 7 4328 In most other situations, the long-unsolved Westfield Murder would have been a death penalty case. A 57-year-old legal secretary, Lena Triano, was found tied up, raped, beaten, and stabbed in her New Jersey home. However, fortunately enough for Franklin, he was not convicted until almost four decades after the murder and, in an unusual turn of events, was tried in juvenile court.
Franklin was fifteen […] Have no time to work on your essay? The use of the death penalty was for punishing people for committing relentless crimes. The severity of the punishment were much more inferior in comparison to modern day. These inferior punishments included boiling live bodies, burning at the stake, hanging, and extensive use of the guillotine to decapitate criminals.
Do you really learn not to be violent from that or instead do you learn how it is okay for moms or dads to hit their children in order to teach them something? This is exactly how the death penalty works. The death penalty has been a form of punishment for decades. What do those who are victimized personally or have suffered from a tragic event involving a loved-one or someone near and dear to their heart, expect from the government?
Convicted felons of this nature and degree of unlawfulness should be sentenced to death.
В конечном счете наказание за агрессию , которая считается бесспорным международным преступлением, натолкнется на огромные препятствия. Произношение Скопировать текст Сообщить об ошибке That notwithstanding, the punishment of aggression, which was deemed to be an international crime par excellence would encounter tremendous obstacles. Следовало бы его иметь! Наказание не носило характера мрачного возмездия.
At one time capital punishment was used for many crimes offences. The Bible, for example, prescribed death for at least 30 crimes. During the Middle Ages capital punishment was especially popular. Burning alive, hanging, beheading, stoning to death, drawing and quartering were quite common in those dark years. People disagree about whether capital punishment is moral or effective in preventing crime. The fear of death is more effective than the fear of prison. If we put them in prison, they can escape and commit another crime. It is cruel and inhumane. People have been sentenced to death and later it was discovered that they were completely innocent. The poor and defenceless are more likely to be executed than the rich and powerful. And what do you think about it?
Whatever account she gives of the final good or goods at which all action ultimately aims, the most plausible immediate good that a system of punishment can bring is the reduction of crime. A rational consequentialist system of law will define as criminal only conduct that is in some way harmful; in reducing crime we will thus be reducing the harms that crime causes. It is commonly suggested that punishment can help to reduce crime by deterring, incapacitating, or reforming potential offenders though for an argument that incapacitation is not a genuinely punitive aim, see Hoskins 2016: 260. There are of course other goods that a system of punishment can bring. It can reassure those who fear crime that the state is taking steps to protect them—though this is a good that, in a well-informed society, will be achieved only insofar as the more immediate preventive goods are achieved. It can also bring satisfaction to those who want to see wrongdoers suffer — though to show that to be a genuine good, rather than merely a means of averting vigilantism and private revenge, we would need to show that it involves something more than mere vengeance, which would be to make sense of some version of retributivism. In consequentialist terms, punishment will be justified if it is an effective means of achieiving its aim, if its benefits outweigh its costs, and if there is no less burdensome means of achieving the same aim. It is a contingent question whether punishment can satisfy these conditions, and some objections to punishment rest on the empirical claim that it cannot — that there are more effective and less burdensome methods of crime reduction see Wootton 1963; Menninger 1968; Golash 2005: chs. Our focus here, however, will be on the moral objections to consequentialist accounts of punishment — objections, basically, that crime-reductive efficiency does not suffice to justify a system of punishment. The most familiar line of objection to consequentialist penal theories contends that consequentialists would be committed to regarding manifestly unjust punishments the punishment of those known to be innocent, for instance, or excessively harsh punishment of the guilty to be in principle justified if they would efficiently serve the aim of crime reduction: but such punishments would be wrong, because they would be unjust see e. There are some equally familiar consequentialist responses to this objection. Another is to argue that in the real world it is extremely unlikely that such punishments would ever be for the best, and even less likely that the agents involved could be trusted reliably to pick out those rare cases in which they would be: thus we, and especially our penal officials, will do best if we think and act as if such punishments are intrinsically wrong and unjustifiable see e. Another objection to consequentialist accounts focuses not on potential wrongs done to the innocent but rather on the wrong allegedly done to the guilty. Consequentialist punishment, on this objection, fails to respect the person punished as an autonomous moral agent. In Kantian terms, such punishment treats those punished as mere means to achieving some social good, rather than respecting them as ends in themselves Kant 1797: 473; Murphy 1973. One might argue that if punishment is reserved for those who voluntarily break the law, it does not treat them merely as means. Indeed, Kant himself suggested that as long as we reserve punishment only for those found guilty of crimes, then it is permissible to punish with an eye toward potential benefits Kant 1797: 473. As we have seen, though, insofar as such an approach relies on endorsing prohibitions on punishment of the innocent or disproportionate punishment of the guilty, the challenge remains that such constraints appear to be merely contingent if grounded in consequentialist considerations. Conversely, if the constraints are more than merely contingent, it appears that they will be based on some deontological considerations, in which case the overall theory will no longer be purely consequentialist, but rather a mixed theory see s. The criminal law, and the institution of punishment, in a liberal society should treat offenders as still members of the polity who despite having violated its values could, and should, nonetheless re commit to these values. A possible response is that a penal system aimed at crime reduction through deterrence need not be exclusionary, as it treats all community members equally, namely as potential offenders Hoskins 2011a: 379—81. Retributivist Accounts Whereas consequentialist accounts regard punishment as justified instrumentally, as a means to achieving some valuable goal typically crime reduction , retributivist accounts contend that punishment is justified as an intrinsically appropriate, because deserved, response to wrongdoing but see Berman 2011 for an argument that some recent versions of retributivism actually turn it into a consequentialist theory. Penal desert constitutes not just a necessary, but an in-principle sufficient reason for punishment only in principle, however, since there are good reasons — to do with the costs, both material and moral, of punishment — why we should not even try to punish all the guilty. Negative retributivism, by contrast, provides not a positive reason to punish, but rather a constraint on punishment: punishment should be imposed only on those who deserve it, and only in proportion with their desert. Because negative retributivism represents only a constraining principle, not a positive reason to punish, it has been employed in various mixed accounts of punishment, which endorse punishment for consequentialist reasons but only insofar as the punishment is no more than is deserved see s. A striking feature of penal theorising during the last three decades of the twentieth century was a revival of positive retributivism — of the idea that the positive justification of punishment is to be found in its intrinsic character as a deserved response to crime see H. Morris 1968; N. Morris 1974; Murphy 1973; von Hirsch 1976; two useful collections of contemporary papers on retributivism are White 2011 and Tonry 2012. Positive retributivism comes in very different forms Cottingham 1979. All can be understood, however, as attempting to answer the two central questions faced by any retributivist theory of punishment. Davis 1972 — and what do they deserve to suffer see Ardal 1984; Honderich 2005, ch. Second, even if they deserve to suffer, or to be burdened in some distinctive way, why should it be for the state to inflict that suffering or that burden on them through a system of criminal punishment Murphy 1985; Husak 1992 and 2015; Shafer-Landau 1996; Wellman 2009? One retributivist answer to these questions is that crime involves taking an unfair advantage over the law-abiding, and that punishment removes that unfair advantage. The criminal law benefits all citizens by protecting them from certain kinds of harm: but this benefit depends upon citizens accepting the burden of self-restraint involved in obeying the law. The criminal takes the benefit of the self-restraint of others but refuses to accept that burden herself: she has gained an unfair advantage, which punishment removes by imposing some additional burden on her see H. Morris 1968; Murphy 1973; Sadurski 1985; Sher 1987, ch. This kind of account does indeed answer the two questions noted above. However, such accounts have internal difficulties: for instance, how are we to determine how great was the unfair advantage gained by a crime; how far are such measurements of unfair advantage likely to correlate with our judgements of the seriousness of crimes? Davis 1992, 1996; for criticism, see Scheid 1990, 1995; von Hirsch 1990. Such accounts try to answer the first of the two questions noted above: crime deserves punishment in the sense that it makes appropriate certain emotions resentment, guilt which are satisfied by or expressed in punishment. Criminal wrongdoing should, we can agree, provoke certain kinds of emotion, such as self-directed guilt and other-directed indignation; and such emotions might typically involve a desire to make those at whom they are directed suffer. At the least we need to know more than we are told by these accounts about just what wrongdoers deserve to suffer, and why the infliction of suffering should be an appropriate way to express such proper emotions. For critical discussions of Murphy, see Murphy and Hampton 1988, ch. On Moore, see Dolinko 1991: 555—9; Knowles 1993; Murphy 1999. See also Murphy 2003, 2012. More recently, critics of emotion-based retributivist accounts have contended that the emotions on which retributive and other deontological intuitions are based have evolved as mechanisms to stabilise cooperation; given that we have retributive emotions only because of their evolutionary fitness, it would be merely a coincidence if intuitions based on these emotions happened to track moral truths about, e. A problem with such accounts is that they appear to prove too much: consequentialist accounts also rely on certain evaluation intuitions about what has value, or about the proper way to respond to that which we value ; insofar as such intuitions are naturally selected, then it would be no less coincidental if they tracked moral truths than if retributive intuitions did so. Thus the consequentialist accounts that derive from these intuitions would be similarly undermined by this evolutionary argument see Kahane 2011; Mason 2011; but see Wiegman 2017. A third version of retributivism holds that when people commit a crime, they thereby incur a moral debt to their victims, and punishment is deserved as a way to pay this debt McDermott 2001. This moral debt differs from the material debt that an offender may incur, and thus payment of the material debt returning stolen money or property, etc. Punishment as Communication Perhaps the most influential version of retributivism in recent decades seeks the meaning and justification of punishment as a deserved response to crime in its expressive or communicative character. On the expressive dimension of punishment, see generally Feinberg 1970; Primoratz 1989; for critical discussion, see Hart 1963: 60—69; Skillen 1980; M. Davis 1996: 169—81; A. Lee 2019. Consequentialists can of course portray punishment as useful partly in virtue of its expressive character see Ewing 1927; Lacey 1988; Braithwaite and Pettit 1990 ; but a portrayal of punishment as a mode of deserved moral communication has been central to many recent versions of retributivism. The central meaning and purpose of punishment, on such accounts, is to convey the censure or condemnation that offenders deserve for their crimes. On other such accounts, the primary intended audience of the condemnatory message is the offender himself, although the broader society may be a secondary audience see Duff 2001: secs. Once we recognise that punishment can serve this communicative purpose, we can see how such accounts begin to answer the two questions that retributivists face. First, there is an obviously intelligible justificatory relationship between wrongdoing and condemnation: whatever puzzles there might be about other attempts to explain the idea of penal desert, the idea that it is appropriate to condemn wrongdoing is surely unpuzzling. For other examples of communicative accounts, see especially von Hirsch 1993: ch. For critical discussion, see M. Davis 1991; Boonin 2008: 171—80; Hanna 2008; Matravers 2011a. Two crucial lines of objection face any such justification of punishment as a communicative enterprise. The first line of critique holds that, whether the primary intended audience is the offender or the community generally, condemnation of a crime can be communicated through a formal conviction in a criminal court; or it could be communicated by some further formal denunciation issued by a judge or some other representative of the legal community, or by a system of purely symbolic punishments which were burdensome only in virtue of their censorial meaning. Is it because they will make the communication more effective see Falls 1987; Primoratz 1989; Kleinig 1991? And anyway, one might worry that the hard treatment will conceal, rather than highlight, the moral censure it should communicate see Mathiesen 1990: 58—73. One sort of answer to this first line of critique explains penal hard treatment as an essential aspect of the enterprise of moral communication itself. Punishment, on this view, should aim not merely to communicate censure to the offender, but to persuade the offender to recognise and repent the wrong he has done, and so to recognise the need to reform himself and his future conduct, and to make apologetic reparation to those whom he wronged. His punishment then constitutes a kind of secular penance that he is required to undergo for his crime: its hard treatment aspects, the burden it imposes on him, should serve both to assist the process of repentance and reform, by focusing his attention on his crime and its implications, and as a way of making the apologetic reparation that he owes see Duff 2001, 2011b; see also Garvey 1999, 2003; Tudor 2001; Brownless 2007; Hus 2015; for a sophisticated discussion see Tasioulas 2006. This type of account faces serious objections see Bickenbach 1988; Ten 1990; von Hirsch 1999; Bagaric and Amarasekara 2000; Ciocchetti 2004; von Hirsch and Ashworth 2005: ch. The second line of objection to communicative versions of retributivism — and indeed against retributivism generally — charges that the notions of desert and blame at the heart of retributivist accounts are misplaced and pernicious. One version of this objection is grounded in scepticism about free will. In response, retributivists may point out that only if punishment is grounded in desert can we provide more than contingent assurances against punishment of the innocent or disproportionate punishment of the guilty, or assurances against treating those punished as mere means to whatever desirable social ends see s. Another version of the objection is not grounded in free will scepticism: it allows that people may sometimes merit a judgement of blameworthiness. To this second version of the objection to retributivist blame, retributivists may respond that although emotions associated with retributive blame have no doubt contributed to various excesses in penal policy, this is not to say that the notion of deserved censure can have no appropriate place in a suitably reformed penal system. After all, when properly focused and proportionate, reactive attitudes such as anger may play an important role by focusing our attention on wrongdoing and motivating us to stand up to it; anger-tinged blame may also serve to convey how seriously we take the wrongdoing, and thus to demonstrate respect for its victims as well as its perpetrators see Cogley 2014; Hoskins 2020. In particular, Hart 1968: 9—10 pointed out that we may ask about punishment, as about any social institution, what compelling rationale there is to maintain the institution that is, what values or aims it fosters and also what considerations should govern the institution. The compelling rationale will itself entail certain constraints: e. See most famously Hart 1968, and Scheid 1997 for a sophisticated Hartian theory; on Hart, see Lacey 1988: 46—56; Morison 1988; Primoratz 1999: ch. For example, whereas Hart endorsed a consequentialist rationale for punishment and nonconsequentialist side-constraints, one might instead endorse a retributivist rationale constrained by consequentialist considerations punishment should not tend to exacerbate crime, or undermine offender reform, etc. Alternatively, one might endorse an account on which both consequentialist and retributivist considerations features as rationales but for different branches of the law: on such an account, the legislature determines crimes and establishes sentencing ranges with the aim of crime reduction, but the judiciary makes sentencing decisions based on retributivist considerations of desert M. Critics have charged that hybrid accounts are ad hoc or internally inconsistent see Kaufman 2008: 45—49. In addition, retributivists argue that hybrid views that integrate consequentialist rationales with retributivist side-constraints thereby relegate retributivism to a merely subsidiary role, when in fact giving offenders their just deserts is a or the central rationale for punishment see Wood 2002: 303. Also, because hybrid accounts incorporate consequentialist and retributivist elements, they may be subject to some of the same objections raised against pure versions of consequentialism or retributivism. For example, insofar as they endorse retributivist constraints on punishment, they face the thorny problem of explaining the retributivist notion of desert see s. Even if such side-constraints can be securely grounded, however, consequentialist theories of punishment face the broadly Kantian line of objection discussed earlier s. Some have contended that punishment with a consequentialist rationale does not treat those punished merely as means as long as it is constrained by the retributivist prohibitions on punishment of the innocent and disproportionate punishment of the guilty see Walker 1980: 80—85; Hoskins 2011a. Still, a critic may argue that if we are to treat another with the respect due to her as a rational and responsible agent, we must seek to modify her conduct only by offering her good and relevant reasons to modify it for herself. Punishment aimed at deterrence, incapacitation, or offender reform, however, does not satisfy that demand. A reformative system treats those subjected to it not as rational, self-determining agents, but as objects to be re-formed by whatever efficient and humane techniques we can find. An incapacitative system does not leave those subjected to it free, as responsible agents should be left free, to determine their own future conduct, but seeks to preempt their future choices by incapacitating them. One strategy for dealing with them is to posit a two-step justification of punishment. The first step, which typically appeals to nonconsequentialist values, shows how the commission of a crime renders the offender eligible for, or liable to, the kinds of coercive treatment that punishment involves: such treatment, which is normally inconsistent with the respect due to us as rational agents or as citizens, and inconsistent with the Kantian means principle, is rendered permissible by the commission of the offence. The second step is then to offer positive consequentialist reasons for imposing punishment on those who are eligible for it or liable to it: we should punish if and because this can be expected to produce sufficient consequential benefits to outweigh its undoubted costs. Further nonconsequentialist constraints might also be placed on the severity and modes of punishment that can be permitted: constraints either flowing from an account of just what offenders render themselves liable to, or from other values external to the system of punishment. We must ask, however, whether we should be so quick to exclude fellow citizens from the rights and status of citizenship, or whether we should not look for an account of punishment if it is to be justified at all on which punishment can still be claimed to treat those punished as full citizens. The common practice of denying imprisoned offenders the right to vote while they are in prison, and perhaps even after they leave prison, is symbolically significant in this context: those who would argue that punishment should be consistent with recognised citizenship should also oppose such practices; see Lippke 2001b; Journal of Applied Philosophy 2005; see also generally s. The consent view holds that when a person voluntarily commits a crime while knowing the consequences of doing so, she thereby consents to these consequences. This is not to say that she explicitly consents to being punished, but rather than by her voluntary action she tacitly consents to be subject to what she knows are the consequences. Notice that, like the forfeiture view, the consent view is agnostic regarding the positive aim of punishment: it purports to tell us only that punishing the person does not wrong her, as she has effectively waived her right against such treatment. The consent view faces formidable objections, however. First, it appears unable to ground prohibitions on excessively harsh sentences: if such sentences are implemented, then anyone who subsequently violates the corresponding laws will have apparently tacitly consented to the punishment Alexander 1986. A second objection is that most offenders do not in fact consent, even tacitly, to their sentences, because they are unaware either that their acts are subject to punishment or of the severity of the punishment to which they may be liable. For someone to have consented to be subject to certain consequences of an act, she must know of these consequences see Boonin 2008: 161—64. A third objection is that, because tacit consent can be overridden by explicit denial of consent, it appears that explicitly nonconsenting offenders could not be justifiably punished on this view ibid. Others offer contractualist or contractarian justifications of punishment, grounded in an account not of what treatment offenders have in fact tacitly consented to, but rather of what rational agents or reasonable citizens would endorse. The punishment of those who commit crimes is then, it is argued, rendered permissible by the fact that the offender himself would, as a rational agent or reasonable citizen, have consented to a system of law that provided for such punishments see e. For versions of this kind of argument, see Alexander 1980; Quinn 1985; Farrell 1985, 1995; Montague 1995; Ellis 2003 and 2012. For criticism, see Boonin 2008: 192—207. For a particularly intricate development of this line of thought, grounding the justification of punishment in the duties that we incur by committing wrongs, see Tadros 2011; for critical responses, see the special issue of Law and Philosophy, 2013. One might argue that the Hegelian objection to a system of deterrent punishment overstates the tension between the types of reasons, moral or prudential, that such a system may offer. Punishment may communicate both a prudential and a moral message to members of the community. Even before a crime is committed, the threat of punishment communicates societal condemnation of an offense. This moral message may help to dissuade potential offenders, but those who are unpersuaded by this moral message may still be prudentially deterred by the prospect of punishment. Similarly, those who actually do commit crimes may be dissuaded from reoffending by the moral censure conveyed by their punishment, or else by the prudential desire to avoid another round of hard treatment. Through its criminal statutes, a community declares certain acts to be wrong and makes a moral appeal to community members to comply, whereas trials and convictions can communicate a message of deserved censure to the offender. Thus even if a system of deterrent punishment is itself regarded as communicating solely in prudential terms, it seems that the criminal law more generally can still communicate a moral message to those subject to it see Hoskins 2011a. A somewhat different attempt to accommodate prudential as well as moral reasons in an account of punishment begins with the retributivist notion that punishment is justified as a form of deserved censure, but then contends that we should communicate censure through penal hard treatment because this will give those who are insufficiently impressed by the moral appeal of censure prudential reason to refrain from crime; because, that is, the prospect of such punishment might deter those who are not susceptible to moral persuasion. See Lipkin 1988, Baker 1992. For a sophisticated revision of this idea, which makes deterrence firmly secondary to censure, see von Hirsch 1993, ch. For critical discussion, see Bottoms 1998; Duff 2001, ch. For another subtle version of this kind of account, see Matravers 2000. It might be objected that on this account the law, in speaking to those who are not persuaded by its moral appeal, is still abandoning the attempt at moral communication in favour of the language of threats, and thus ceasing to address its citizens as responsible moral agents: to which it might be replied, first, that the law is addressing us, appropriately, as fallible moral agents who know that we need the additional spur of prudential deterrence to persuade us to act as we should; and second, that we cannot clearly separate the merely deterrent from the morally communicative dimensions of punishment — that the dissuasive efficacy of legitimate punishment still depends crucially on the moral meaning that the hard treatment is understood to convey. One more mixed view worth noting holds that punishment is justified as a means of teaching a moral lesson to those who commit crimes, and perhaps to community members more generally the seminal articulations of this view are H.
Преступление и наказание. Лексика на английском.
It is even more horrible that this punishment is usually attended with formal pageantry. It is better to prevent crimes than to punish them. This should be the fundamental principle of any good legislation. Под справедливостью мы понимаем узы, которые необходимо сохраняют интересы людей объединенными, без которых люди вернутся в первоначальное состояние варварства. Все наказания, которые превышают необходимость сохранения этой связи, являются по своей природе несправедливыми. Конечной целью наказания является не что иное, как предотвращение нанесения преступником нового вреда обществу, и препятствование подобных преступлений. Следовательно, должны быть выбраны такое наказания и такие способы нанесения их, которые произведут самые сильные и неизгладимые впечатления на умы других людей, с наименьшей мукой для преступника. Пытки преступника в ходе судебного процесса над ним являются жестоким освященным обычаем в большинстве стран.
Они используются с намерением либо заставить его сознаться в своем преступлении, или объяснить какое-то противоречие, в ходе его рассмотрения, или открыть его сообщников, или для какого-то метафизического и непонятного очищения от позора, или, наконец, для того, чтобы обнаружить и другие преступления, по которым его не обвиняли, но в которых он может быть виновным.
It also pushed for use in unapproved amounts. Pfizer withdrew Bextra from the market in two thousand five because of links to heart attacks and other problems. Pfizer also faced civil charges over Bextra as well as three other drugs. Officials said Pfizer paid health care providers to prescribe these medicines for conditions other than the ones for which they are approved. This is called «off-label» use of a drug.
Doctors are permitted to try off-label uses to treat their patients. The idea is that a doctor might find other ways that a drug is effective. But federal law bars drug companies from marketing their products for unapproved uses. Kathleen Sebelius is the secretary of health and human services. She said the settlement includes the most comprehensive corporate integrity agreement that a drug company has ever signed in the United States. Under the agreement, doctors will have a way to report abuses by Pfizer sales representatives.
And officials said Pfizer will have to make «detailed disclosures» on its Web site. Pfizer announced a plan in February to publicly disclose its financial relationships with doctors, medical organizations and patient groups.
Греция вводит уголовное наказание за распространение ложной информации о коронавирусе 13 ноября 2021, 13:57 Смотри новости и проекты телеканала ОНТ на YouTube Парламент Греции одобрил введение уголовного наказания за распространение фейковых новостей о коронавирусе, передает РИА «Новости». В поправках к существующей в УК Греции статье уточняется, что уголовное преследование предусмотрено за публикацию ложных новостей «способных вызвать беспокойство или страх у граждан или поколебать доверие общества к национальной экономике, обороноспособности страны или общественному здравоохранению». Согласно новой формулировке, распространение фейков наказывается лишением свободы на срок не менее трех месяцев и крупным штрафом.
So I was going to ask. What about..? Petty theft. Petty theft or... Some misdemeanors can be stronger than others. So it just depends on state by state with that. Of course, in America, you have the federal level and the state level, and it depends what crime you commit. Whereas if you commit a crime on the territory of a state, yeah. And then the crimes, the criminals would be treated differently depending on the state. Or even we have privatized prisons where someone actually owns prison. Same in England. Which people can make money off from criminals. This company called G4S. But then there are things that are not on the law books yet. Or not standardized. Domestic violence, animal abuse. I mean, a lot of women did not speak out against their husbands because there was no law. So there are kind of. But but then through activism, we could change laws. And the job of the police, of course, is to enforce the law. Enforce means to make sure that the laws are followed and to apply punishments if required. Of course. But I mean, to detain, excuse me, to detain someone, not to punish people. Yeah, to detain people if required. So, Ugur, what in Turkey? Do you have, like a similar system to America whereby you have misdemeanor crimes and felony crimes? Plus we have constitutional crimes. And you need to be just, you need to be in a state that you have to take the constitutional law and court house. Kind of felony. So, same thing. Like a similar thing. Well, even the different levels of murder we would have, what is a first degree murder... Second degree. If you really had a plan to do it. Yeah, premeditated. That would be the highest. The passion and a be lesser degree. Wife kills the husband. Under the influence, the passion. Because there is certain... Oh, affect that sounds like, yeah, alcohol. So in this, well, in Russian, for example, we have this sort of, okay, help me out with the term. So there is mitigating, you know, some sort of conditions which make the punishment harder. What is the opposite to that something that makes the punishment less severe? Well, mitigating circumstances. Oh, mitigating is something that helps you to get... Without an action you mean. Those are mitigating circumstances. Under influence, kind of things. But under influence of what? So in this case, you were not under influence of alcohol or drugs. Nothing like that. You were just in shock. Oh, okay. So maybe like some kind of mental. Mental breakdown. So when we give our definitions. Double check them on Google because you have English and then you have legal English, which is kind of different things. And also laws change as well. And definitions as well can change sometimes. So you said you have constitution. So Turkey has a constitution that is written and... And if you are against that, you will be punished according to that. For example, like burning the flag. It is a crime in the US as well.
News is bad for you — Не смотрите новости. Статья на английском и русском
Статья подается в оригинале (на английском) и переводе (перевод не дословный). Дидактический материал для оформления доски на английском языке. Breaking News, Latest News and Current News from Breaking news and video. Latest Current News: U.S., World, Entertainment, Health, Business, Technology, Politics, Sports.
Текст на английском с переводом для универа
"Deuspi" is a silent film without any language spoken, so we will be exploiting the visuals in this lesson by getting students to create their original sentences in English to describe what they. Парламент Греции одобрил введение уголовного наказания за распространение фейковых новостей о коронавирусе, передает РИА «Новости». В поправках к существующей в УК Греции статье уточняется, что уголовное преследование предусмотрено за публикацию ложных. 1. (noun) A lazy cowboy who neglects their duties on a farm or ranch. 2. (noun) A rural person in an urban environment, such as an office, who's mannersisms are notably different, less competitive, and often performed at a slower pace than the urbanites. The term may be used in either an endearing or.