Новости кант эммануэль

18+. Вы здесь. Главная» Эммануэль Макрон. Though Kant is as undeniably German as the Nord Stream pipeline, Putin (and anyone else anywhere) has a right to quote him morning, noon and. Биография немецкого философа Иммануила Канта: личная жизнь, присяга Российской империи, университет его имени, могила в Калининграде. Иммануи́л Кант — немецкий философ, один из центральных мыслителей эпохи Просвещения. Всесторонние и систематические работы Канта в области эпистемологии, метафизики. Chronicle of Normand Baillargeon: thinking about education with Emmanuel Kant.

Иммануил Кант

How is a perception of beauty possible? How are living creatures possible? These questions are transcending because their point is not to get an understanding of one definite being from other being; rather, it is an understanding of existence itself that each question seeks at the boundary of existence, from principles that do not belong to existence as objects of cognition.

Гости: Александр Федоров, ректор Балтийского федерального университета имени Иммануила Канта, и Алексей Козырев, исполняющий обязанности декана философского факультета Московского государственного университета имени М. Лаб: все выпуски.

Twenge is to ban cellphones in class, which would improve the quality of relationships between people. Kant would undoubtedly add that this would also facilitate learning and would say how. Kant and the educational benefits of immobility Kant is such an important name in so many areas of philosophy that one might forget that he was also interested in education. One of his ideas concerns the importance of keeping still for children. Let us translate: through this window created by immobility and listening, and by the attention it allows, ideas can come to their senses. This idea obviously raises important questions and debates about the nature and role of authority in education. This is because the means discipline here seem to contradict the intended end freedom and autonomy. But let us leave these questions aside and transpose what Kant said in the XVIIIe century in our time and to the infinite and so irresistible stimuli that cellphones and social networks constantly provoke. One can easily see in this an immense danger for the very practice of transmitting and understanding ideas and knowledge, and for the formation of work habits. A danger so great that the ban on cellphones in the classroom, especially for the youngest, can be considered a good idea.

В ходе мероприятия участники рассмотрели широкий спектр проблем теории и практики современных международных отношений и безопасности через призму политической и международно-правовой мысли выдающегося философа. В центре внимания не только наиболее острые проблемы развития современного политического миропорядка, глобальной и региональной безопасности, но и обстановка в Балтийско-Арктическом регионе, а также вопросы мирового социально-экономического и политического развития. В специальной сессии приняли участие ведущие специалисты в области международной политики из России, Финляндии, Германии, Индии и Республики Беларусь. Идея учреждения данной площадки была впервые высказана академиком А.

Собрались с мыслями. 300 лет Иммануилу Канту. В чем причины русского "антикантианства"? 25.04.2024

Retrouvez toute l’actualité de Emmanuel Kant. Suivez nos dernières informations, reportages, décryptages et analyses sur Le Point. Chronicle of Normand Baillargeon: thinking about education with Emmanuel Kant. An unrelated news platform with which you have had no contact builds a profile based on that viewing behaviour, marking space exploration as a topic of possible interest for other videos. Tag: Immanuel Kant. Chris Hedges: The Evil Within Us. March 22, 2021. Chronicle of Normand Baillargeon: thinking about education with Emmanuel Kant. Иммануил Кант с младенчества, просто по праву рождения, был зачислен в гильдию шорников.

I Kant Even: German Chancellor Triggered After Putin Quotes Legendary Philosopher

Macron said Europe also risks falling behind economically in a context where global free-trade rules are being challenged by major competitors, and he said it should aim to become a global leader in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, space, biotechnologies and renewable energy. Europe needs less fragmented markets for energy, telecoms and financial services, and must also cut red tape, he added. The French leader hopes his speech will have the same impact as a similar address at the Sorbonne he made seven years ago that prefigured some significant EU policy shifts.

We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i. The former adheres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different.

Space and time are not things in themselves, or determinations of things in themselves that would remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of human intuition. Space and time are nothing other than the subjective forms of human sensible intuition. Two general types of interpretation have been especially influential, however. This section provides an overview of these two interpretations, although it should be emphasized that much important scholarship on transcendental idealism does not fall neatly into either of these two camps. It has been a live interpretive option since then and remains so today, although it no longer enjoys the dominance that it once did. Another name for this view is the two-worlds interpretation, since it can also be expressed by saying that transcendental idealism essentially distinguishes between a world of appearances and another world of things in themselves.

Things in themselves, on this interpretation, are absolutely real in the sense that they would exist and have whatever properties they have even if no human beings were around to perceive them. Appearances, on the other hand, are not absolutely real in that sense, because their existence and properties depend on human perceivers. Moreover, whenever appearances do exist, in some sense they exist in the mind of human perceivers. So appearances are mental entities or mental representations. This, coupled with the claim that we experience only appearances, makes transcendental idealism a form of phenomenalism on this interpretation, because it reduces the objects of experience to mental representations. All of our experiences — all of our perceptions of objects and events in space, even those objects and events themselves, and all non-spatial but still temporal thoughts and feelings — fall into the class of appearances that exist in the mind of human perceivers.

These appearances cut us off entirely from the reality of things in themselves, which are non-spatial and non-temporal. In principle we cannot know how things in themselves affect our senses, because our experience and knowledge is limited to the world of appearances constructed by and in the mind. Things in themselves are therefore a sort of theoretical posit, whose existence and role are required by the theory but are not directly verifiable. The main problems with the two-objects interpretation are philosophical. Most readers of Kant who have interpreted his transcendental idealism in this way have been — often very — critical of it, for reasons such as the following: First, at best Kant is walking a fine line in claiming on the one hand that we can have no knowledge about things in themselves, but on the other hand that we know that things in themselves exist, that they affect our senses, and that they are non-spatial and non-temporal. At worst his theory depends on contradictory claims about what we can and cannot know about things in themselves.

Some versions of this objection proceed from premises that Kant rejects. But Kant denies that appearances are unreal: they are just as real as things in themselves but are in a different metaphysical class. But just as Kant denies that things in themselves are the only or privileged reality, he also denies that correspondence with things in themselves is the only kind of truth. Empirical judgments are true just in case they correspond with their empirical objects in accordance with the a priori principles that structure all possible human experience. But the fact that Kant can appeal in this way to an objective criterion of empirical truth that is internal to our experience has not been enough to convince some critics that Kant is innocent of an unacceptable form of skepticism, mainly because of his insistence on our irreparable ignorance about things in themselves. The role of things in themselves, on the two-object interpretation, is to affect our senses and thereby to provide the sensory data from which our cognitive faculties construct appearances within the framework of our a priori intuitions of space and time and a priori concepts such as causality.

But if there is no space, time, change, or causation in the realm of things in themselves, then how can things in themselves affect us? Transcendental affection seems to involve a causal relation between things in themselves and our sensibility. If this is simply the way we unavoidably think about transcendental affection, because we can give positive content to this thought only by employing the concept of a cause, while it is nevertheless strictly false that things in themselves affect us causally, then it seems not only that we are ignorant of how things in themselves really affect us. It seems, rather, to be incoherent that things in themselves could affect us at all if they are not in space or time. On this view, transcendental idealism does not distinguish between two classes of objects but rather between two different aspects of one and the same class of objects. That is, appearances are aspects of the same objects that also exist in themselves.

So, on this reading, appearances are not mental representations, and transcendental idealism is not a form of phenomenalism. One version treats transcendental idealism as a metaphysical theory according to which objects have two aspects in the sense that they have two sets of properties: one set of relational properties that appear to us and are spatial and temporal, and another set of intrinsic properties that do not appear to us and are not spatial or temporal Langton 1998. This property-dualist interpretation faces epistemological objections similar to those faced by the two-objects interpretation, because we are in no better position to acquire knowledge about properties that do not appear to us than we are to acquire knowledge about objects that do not appear to us. Moreover, this interpretation also seems to imply that things in themselves are spatial and temporal, since appearances have spatial and temporal properties, and on this view appearances are the same objects as things in themselves. But Kant explicitly denies that space and time are properties of things in themselves. A second version of the two-aspects theory departs more radically from the traditional two-objects interpretation by denying that transcendental idealism is at bottom a metaphysical theory.

Instead, it interprets transcendental idealism as a fundamentally epistemological theory that distinguishes between two standpoints on the objects of experience: the human standpoint, from which objects are viewed relative to epistemic conditions that are peculiar to human cognitive faculties namely, the a priori forms of our sensible intuition ; and the standpoint of an intuitive intellect, from which the same objects could be known in themselves and independently of any epistemic conditions Allison 2004. Human beings cannot really take up the latter standpoint but can form only an empty concept of things as they exist in themselves by abstracting from all the content of our experience and leaving only the purely formal thought of an object in general. So transcendental idealism, on this interpretation, is essentially the thesis that we are limited to the human standpoint, and the concept of a thing in itself plays the role of enabling us to chart the boundaries of the human standpoint by stepping beyond them in abstract but empty thought. One criticism of this epistemological version of the two-aspects theory is that it avoids the objections to other interpretations by attributing to Kant a more limited project than the text of the Critique warrants. There are passages that support this reading. The transcendental deduction The transcendental deduction is the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason and one of the most complex and difficult texts in the history of philosophy.

Given its complexity, there are naturally many different ways of interpreting the deduction. The goal of the transcendental deduction is to show that we have a priori concepts or categories that are objectively valid, or that apply necessarily to all objects in the world that we experience. To show this, Kant argues that the categories are necessary conditions of experience, or that we could not have experience without the categories. For they then are related necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all. The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking. Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason.

Here Kant claims, against the Lockean view, that self-consciousness arises from combining or synthesizing representations with one another regardless of their content. In short, Kant has a formal conception of self-consciousness rather than a material one. Since no particular content of my experience is invariable, self-consciousness must derive from my experience having an invariable form or structure, and consciousness of the identity of myself through all of my changing experiences must consist in awareness of the formal unity and law-governed regularity of my experience. The continuous form of my experience is the necessary correlate for my sense of a continuous self. There are at least two possible versions of the formal conception of self-consciousness: a realist and an idealist version. On the realist version, nature itself is law-governed and we become self-conscious by attending to its law-governed regularities, which also makes this an empiricist view of self-consciousness.

The idea of an identical self that persists throughout all of our experience, on this view, arises from the law-governed regularity of nature, and our representations exhibit order and regularity because reality itself is ordered and regular. Kant rejects this realist view and embraces a conception of self-consciousness that is both formal and idealist. According to Kant, the formal structure of our experience, its unity and law-governed regularity, is an achievement of our cognitive faculties rather than a property of reality in itself. Our experience has a constant form because our mind constructs experience in a law-governed way. In other words, even if reality in itself were law-governed, its laws could not simply migrate over to our mind or imprint themselves on us while our mind is entirely passive. We must exercise an active capacity to represent the world as combined or ordered in a law-governed way, because otherwise we could not represent the world as law-governed even if it were law-governed in itself.

Moreover, this capacity to represent the world as law-governed must be a priori because it is a condition of self-consciousness, and we would already have to be self-conscious in order to learn from our experience that there are law-governed regularities in the world. So it is necessary for self-consciousness that we exercise an a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed. But this would also be sufficient for self-consciousness if we could exercise our a priori capacity to represent the world as law-governed even if reality in itself were not law-governed. In that case, the realist and empiricist conception of self-consciousness would be false, and the formal idealist view would be true. Self-consciousness for Kant therefore involves a priori knowledge about the necessary and universal truth expressed in this principle of apperception, and a priori knowledge cannot be based on experience. The next condition is that self-consciousness requires me to represent an objective world distinct from my subjective representations — that is, distinct from my thoughts about and sensations of that objective world.

Kant uses this connection between self-consciousness and objectivity to insert the categories into his argument. In order to be self-conscious, I cannot be wholly absorbed in the contents of my perceptions but must distinguish myself from the rest of the world. But if self-consciousness is an achievement of the mind, then how does the mind achieve this sense that there is a distinction between the I that perceives and the contents of its perceptions? According to Kant, the mind achieves this sense by distinguishing representations that necessarily belong together from representations that are not necessarily connected but are merely associated in a contingent way. Imagine a house that is too large to fit into your visual field from your vantage point near its front door. Now imagine that you walk around the house, successively perceiving each of its sides.

Eventually you perceive the entire house, but not all at once, and you judge that each of your representations of the sides of the house necessarily belong together as sides of one house and that anyone who denied this would be mistaken. But now imagine that you grew up in this house and associate a feeling of nostalgia with it. You would not judge that representations of this house are necessarily connected with feelings of nostalgia. That is, you would not think that other people seeing the house for the first time would be mistaken if they denied that it is connected with nostalgia, because you recognize that this house is connected with nostalgia for you but not necessarily for everyone. The point here is not that we must successfully identify which representations necessarily belong together and which are merely associated contingently, but rather that to be self-conscious we must at least make this general distinction between objective and merely subjective connections of representations. That is the aim of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective.

Kant is speaking here about the mental act of judging that results in the formation of a judgment. We must represent an objective world in order to distinguish ourselves from it, and we represent an objective world by judging that some representations necessarily belong together. Moreover, recall from 4. It follows that objective connections in the world cannot simply imprint themselves on our mind. The understanding constructs experience by providing the a priori rules, or the framework of necessary laws, in accordance with which we judge representations to be objective. These rules are the pure concepts of the understanding or categories, which are therefore conditions of self-consciousness, since they are rules for judging about an objective world, and self-consciousness requires that we distinguish ourselves from an objective world.

Kant identifies the categories in what he calls the metaphysical deduction, which precedes the transcendental deduction. But since categories are not mere logical functions but instead are rules for making judgments about objects or an objective world, Kant arrives at his table of categories by considering how each logical function would structure judgments about objects within our spatio-temporal forms of intuition. For example, he claims that categorical judgments express a logical relation between subject and predicate that corresponds to the ontological relation between substance and accident; and the logical form of a hypothetical judgment expresses a relation that corresponds to cause and effect. Taken together with this argument, then, the transcendental deduction argues that we become self-conscious by representing an objective world of substances that interact according to causal laws. To see why this further condition is required, consider that so far we have seen why Kant holds that we must represent an objective world in order to be self-conscious, but we could represent an objective world even if it were not possible to relate all of our representations to this objective world. For all that has been said so far, we might still have unruly representations that we cannot relate in any way to the objective framework of our experience.

So I must be able to relate any given representation to an objective world in order for it to count as mine. On the other hand, self-consciousness would also be impossible if I represented multiple objective worlds, even if I could relate all of my representations to some objective world or other.

To miss this distinction would mean to commit the error of subreption , and, as he says in the last chapter of the dissertation, only in avoiding this error does metaphysics flourish. While it is true that Kant wrote his greatest works relatively late in life, there is a tendency to underestimate the value of his earlier works. Recent Kant scholarship has devoted more attention to these "pre-critical" writings and has recognized a degree of continuity with his mature work. In correspondence with his ex-student and friend Markus Herz , Kant admitted that, in the inaugural dissertation, he had failed to account for the relation between our sensible and intellectual faculties.

Kant also credited David Hume with awakening him from a "dogmatic slumber" in which he had unquestioningly accepted the tenets of both religion and natural philosophy. Ideas such as causality , morality , and objects are not evident in experience, so their reality may be questioned. Kant felt that reason could remove this skepticism, and he set himself to solving these problems. Kant was quite upset with its reception. Recognizing the need to clarify the original treatise, Kant wrote the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics in 1783 as a summary of its main views. In 1786, Karl Leonhard Reinhold published a series of public letters on Kantian philosophy.

Friedrich Jacobi had accused the recently deceased Gotthold Ephraim Lessing a distinguished dramatist and philosophical essayist of Spinozism. The controversy gradually escalated into a debate about the values of the Enlightenment and the value of reason. Most of his subsequent work focused on other areas of philosophy. The 1790 Critique of the Power of Judgment the third Critique applied the Kantian system to aesthetics and teleology. There were several journals devoted solely to defending and criticizing Kantian philosophy. Despite his success, philosophical trends were moving in another direction.

In what was one of his final acts expounding a stance on philosophical questions, Kant opposed these developments and publicly denounced Fichte in an open letter in 1799. Kant always cut a curious figure in his lifetime for his modest, rigorously scheduled habits, which have been referred to as clocklike. Heinrich Heine observed the magnitude of "his destructive, world-crushing thoughts" and considered him a sort of philosophical "executioner", comparing him to Robespierre with the observation that both men "represented in the highest the type of provincial bourgeois. Nature had destined them to weigh coffee and sugar, but Fate determined that they should weigh other things and placed on the scales of the one a king, on the scales of the other a god. Originally, Kant was buried inside the cathedral, but in 1880 his remains were moved to a neo-Gothic chapel adjoining the northeast corner of the cathedral. Over the years, the chapel became dilapidated and was demolished to make way for the mausoleum, which was built on the same location.

The tomb and its mausoleum are among the few artifacts of German times preserved by the Soviets after they captured the city. This new evidence of the power of human reason, called into question for many the traditional authority of politics and religion. In particular, the modern mechanistic view of the world called into question the very possibility of morality; for, if there is no agency, there cannot be any responsibility. What should I do? What may I hope? It argues that even though we cannot, strictly know that we are free, we can—and for practical purposes, must—think of ourselves as free.

In brief, Kant argues that the mind itself necessarily makes a constitutive contribution to knowledge , that this contribution is transcendental rather than psychological, and that to act autonomously is to act according to rational moral principles. First, Kant makes a distinction in terms of the source of the content of knowledge: Cognitions a priori: "cognition independent of all experience and even of all the impressions of the senses". Cognitions a posteriori: cognitions that have their sources in experience—that is, which are empirical. These can also be called "judgments of clarification".

Любые действия без согласия между двумя людьми в какой-то степени неуважительны. Всё это звучит несколько старомодно, но проблема согласия затрагивает любые человеческие отношения, и её последствия огромны. Другая проблематичная сфера — продажи и реклама. Почти все маркетинговые стратегии строятся на отношении к людям как к средству для получения денег. Кант назвал бы это неэтичным.

Он с сомнением относился к капитализму, считая, что невозможно накопить состояние, не прибегая к каким-то манипуляциям и принуждению. Он не был антикапиталистом коммунизма тогда ещё не существовало , но ошеломляющее экономическое неравенство его беспокоило. По его мнению, моральный долг каждого, кто накопил значительное состояние, — раздать большую часть нуждающимся. Предубеждения У многих мыслителей эпохи Просвещения были расистские взгляды, в то время это было распространено. Хотя Кант тоже высказывал их в начале карьеры, позднее он сменил мнение. Он понял, что ни у одной расы нет права порабощать другую, ведь это классический пример отношения к людям как к средству для достижения цели. Кант стал яростным противником колониальной политики. Он говорил, что жестокость и угнетение, необходимые для порабощения народа, разрушают человечность людей независимо от их расы. Для того времени это была настолько радикальная идея, что многие называли её абсурдной.

Но Кант считал, что единственный способ предотвратить войны и угнетение — это международное правительство, объединяющее государства. Несколько веков спустя на основе этого была создана Организация Объединённых Наций. Саморазвитие Большинство философов Просвещения считали, что лучший способ жить — как можно больше увеличивать счастье и сокращать страдания. Такой подход называется утилитаризмом. Это и сегодня самый распространённый взгляд. Кант смотрел на жизнь совершенно по-другому. Он считал так: если хочешь сделать мир лучше, начни с себя. Вот как он это объяснял. В большинстве случаев невозможно узнать, заслуживает человек счастья или страдания, потому что невозможно узнать его настоящие намерения и цели.

Даже если стоит сделать кого-то счастливым, неизвестно, что именно для этого нужно. Вы не знаете чувств, ценностей и ожиданий другого человека. Не знаете, как ваш поступок на нём скажется. К тому же неясно, из чего именно состоит счастье или страдание. Сегодня развод может причинять вам невыносимую боль, а через год вы будете считать это лучшим, что с вами происходило. Поэтому единственный логичный способ сделать мир лучше — это стать лучше самому. Ведь единственное, что вы знаете хоть сколько-то точно, — это вы сами. Кант определял саморазвитие как способность придерживаться категорических императивов. Он считал это долгом каждого.

С его точки зрения, награда или наказание за невыполнение долга даётся не в раю или аду, а в той жизни, которую каждый создаёт для себя. Следование моральным принципам делает жизнь лучше не только для вас, но и для всех вокруг. Точно так же нарушение этих принципов создаёт лишние страдания для вас и окружающих. Правило Канта запускает эффект домино. Став честнее с собой, вы станете честнее и с другими. Это, в свою очередь, вдохновит людей быть честнее с собой и внесёт позитивные изменения в их жизнь. Если бы правила Канта придерживалось достаточное количество людей, мир изменился бы к лучшему. Причём сильнее, чем от целенаправленных действий какой-то организации. Самоуважение Уважение к себе и уважение к окружающим взаимосвязаны.

Обращение с собственной психикой — это шаблон, который мы применяем для взаимодействия с другими людьми. Вы не добьётесь больших успехов с другими, пока не разберётесь с собой. Самоуважение не в том, чтобы лучше себя чувствовать. Это понимание своей ценности. Понимание, что каждый человек, кем бы он ни был, заслуживает базовых прав и уважения. С точки зрения Канта, говорить себе, что ты ничего не стоящий кусок дерьма, так же неэтично, как говорить это другому человеку. Причинять вред себе так же отвратительно, как причинять вред окружающим. Поэтому любовь к себе и забота о себе — это не то, чему можно научиться, и не то, что можно практиковать, как говорят сегодня. Это то, что вы призваны культивировать в себе с точки зрения этики.

Ведущие ученые мира выступили с докладами на Международном Кантовском конгрессе

If only my noumenal self is free, and freedom is required for moral responsibility, then my phenomenal self is not morally responsible. But how are my noumenal and phenomenal selves related, and why is punishment inflicted on phenomenal selves? We do not have theoretical knowledge that we are free or about anything beyond the limits of possible experience, but we are morally justified in believing that we are free in this sense. On the other hand, Kant also uses stronger language than this when discussing freedom. Our practical knowledge of freedom is based instead on the moral law. So, on his view, the fact of reason is the practical basis for our belief or practical knowledge that we are free. Every human being has a conscience, a common sense grasp of morality, and a firm conviction that he or she is morally accountable. We may arrive at different conclusions about what morality requires in specific situations.

And we may violate our own sense of duty. But we all have a conscience, and an unshakeable belief that morality applies to us. It is just a ground-level fact about human beings that we hold ourselves morally accountable. But Kant is making a normative claim here as well: it is also a fact, which cannot and does not need to be justified, that we are morally accountable, that morality does have authority over us. Kant holds that philosophy should be in the business of defending this common sense moral belief, and that in any case we could never prove or disprove it 4:459. Kant may hold that the fact of reason, or our consciousness of moral obligation, implies that we are free on the grounds that ought implies can. In other words, Kant may believe that it follows from the fact that we ought morally to do something that we can or are able to do it.

This is a hypothetical example of an action not yet carried out. On this view, to act morally is to exercise freedom, and the only way to fully exercise freedom is to act morally. First, it follows from the basic idea of having a will that to act at all is to act on some principle, or what Kant calls a maxim. A maxim is a subjective rule or policy of action: it says what you are doing and why. We may be unaware of our maxims, we may not act consistently on the same maxims, and our maxims may not be consistent with one another. But Kant holds that since we are rational beings our actions always aim at some sort of end or goal, which our maxim expresses. The goal of an action may be something as basic as gratifying a desire, or it may be something more complex such as becoming a doctor or a lawyer.

If I act to gratify some desire, then I choose to act on a maxim that specifies the gratification of that desire as the goal of my action. For example, if I desire some coffee, then I may act on the maxim to go to a cafe and buy some coffee in order to gratify that desire. Second, Kant distinguishes between two basic kinds of principles or rules that we can act on: what he calls material and formal principles. To act in order to satisfy some desire, as when I act on the maxim to go for coffee at a cafe, is to act on a material principle 5:21ff. Here the desire for coffee fixes the goal, which Kant calls the object or matter of the action, and the principle says how to achieve that goal go to a cafe. A hypothetical imperative is a principle of rationality that says I should act in a certain way if I choose to satisfy some desire. If maxims in general are rules that describe how one does act, then imperatives in general prescribe how one should act.

An imperative is hypothetical if it says how I should act only if I choose to pursue some goal in order to gratify a desire 5:20. This, for example, is a hypothetical imperative: if you want coffee, then go to the cafe. This hypothetical imperative applies to you only if you desire coffee and choose to gratify that desire. In contrast to material principles, formal principles describe how one acts without making reference to any desires. This is easiest to understand through the corresponding kind of imperative, which Kant calls a categorical imperative. A categorical imperative commands unconditionally that I should act in some way. So while hypothetical imperatives apply to me only on the condition that I have and set the goal of satisfying the desires that they tell me how to satisfy, categorical imperatives apply to me no matter what my goals and desires may be.

Kant regards moral laws as categorical imperatives, which apply to everyone unconditionally. For example, the moral requirement to help others in need does not apply to me only if I desire to help others in need, and the duty not to steal is not suspended if I have some desire that I could satisfy by stealing. Moral laws do not have such conditions but rather apply unconditionally. That is why they apply to everyone in the same way. Third, insofar as I act only on material principles or hypothetical imperatives, I do not act freely, but rather I act only to satisfy some desire s that I have, and what I desire is not ultimately within my control. To some limited extent we are capable of rationally shaping our desires, but insofar as we choose to act in order to satisfy desires we are choosing to let nature govern us rather than governing ourselves 5:118. We are always free in the sense that we always have the capacity to govern ourselves rationally instead of letting our desires set our ends for us.

But we may freely fail to exercise that capacity. Moreover, since Kant holds that desires never cause us to act, but rather we always choose to act on a maxim even when that maxim specifies the satisfaction of a desire as the goal of our action, it also follows that we are always free in the sense that we freely choose our maxims. Nevertheless, our actions are not free in the sense of being autonomous if we choose to act only on material principles, because in that case we do not give the law to ourselves, but instead we choose to allow nature in us our desires to determine the law for our actions. Finally, the only way to act freely in the full sense of exercising autonomy is therefore to act on formal principles or categorical imperatives, which is also to act morally. Kant does not mean that acting autonomously requires that we take no account of our desires, which would be impossible 5:25, 61. This immediate consciousness of the moral law takes the following form: I have, for example, made it my maxim to increase my wealth by every safe means. Now I have a deposit in my hands, the owner of which has died and left no record of it.

This is, naturally, a case for my maxim. Now I want only to know whether that maxim could also hold as a universal practical law. I therefore apply the maxim to the present case and ask whether it could indeed take the form of a law, and consequently whether I could through my maxim at the same time give such a law as this: that everyone may deny a deposit which no one can prove has been made. I at once become aware that such a principle, as a law, would annihilate itself since it would bring it about that there would be no deposits at all. The issue is not whether it would be good if everyone acted on my maxim, or whether I would like it, but only whether it would be possible for my maxim to be willed as a universal law. This gets at the form, not the matter or content, of the maxim. A maxim has morally permissible form, for Kant, only if it could be willed as a universal law.

If my maxim fails this test, as this one does, then it is morally impermissible for me to act on it. If my maxim passes the universal law test, then it is morally permissible for me to act on it, but I fully exercise my autonomy only if my fundamental reason for acting on this maxim is that it is morally permissible or required that I do so. Imagine that I am moved by a feeling of sympathy to formulate the maxim to help someone in need. In this case, my original reason for formulating this maxim is that a certain feeling moved me. Such feelings are not entirely within my control and may not be present when someone actually needs my help. So it would not be wrong to act on this maxim when the feeling of sympathy so moves me. But helping others in need would not fully exercise my autonomy unless my fundamental reason for doing so is not that I have some feeling or desire, but rather that it would be right or at least permissible to do so.

Only when such a purely formal principle supplies the fundamental motive for my action do I act autonomously. Even when my maxims are originally suggested by my feelings and desires, if I act only on morally permissible or required maxims because they are morally permissible or required , then my actions will be autonomous. And the reverse is true as well: for Kant this is the only way to act autonomously. The highest good and practical postulates Kant holds that reason unavoidably produces not only consciousness of the moral law but also the idea of a world in which there is both complete virtue and complete happiness, which he calls the highest good. Furthermore, we can believe that the highest good is possible only if we also believe in the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, according to Kant. On this basis, he claims that it is morally necessary to believe in the immortality of the soul and the existence of God, which he calls postulates of pure practical reason. Moreover, our fundamental reason for choosing to act on such maxims should be that they have this lawgiving form, rather than that acting on them would achieve some end or goal that would satisfy a desire 5:27.

For example, I should help others in need not, at bottom, because doing so would make me feel good, even if it would, but rather because it is right; and it is right or permissible to help others in need because this maxim can be willed as a universal law. Although Kant holds that the morality of an action depends on the form of its maxim rather than its end or goal, he nevertheless claims both that every human action has an end and that we are unavoidably concerned with the consequences of our actions 4:437; 5:34; 6:5—7, 385. This is not a moral requirement but simply part of what it means to be a rational being. Moreover, Kant also holds the stronger view that it is an unavoidable feature of human reason that we form ideas not only about the immediate and near-term consequences of our actions, but also about ultimate consequences. But neither of these ideas by itself expresses our unconditionally complete end, as human reason demands in its practical use. And happiness by itself would not be unconditionally good, because moral virtue is a condition of worthiness to be happy 5:111. So our unconditionally complete end must combine both virtue and happiness.

It is this ideal world combining complete virtue with complete happiness that Kant normally has in mind when he discusses the highest good. Kant says that we have a duty to promote the highest good, taken in this sense 5:125. He does not mean, however, to be identifying some new duty that is not derived from the moral law, in addition to all the particular duties we have that are derived from the moral law. Rather, as we have seen, Kant holds that it is an unavoidable feature of human reasoning, instead of a moral requirement, that we represent all particular duties as leading toward the promotion of the highest good. Nor does Kant mean that anyone has a duty to realize or actually bring about the highest good through their own power, although his language sometimes suggests this 5:113, 122. Here Kant does not mean that we unavoidably represent the highest good as possible, since his view is that we must represent it as possible only if we are to fulfill our duty of promoting it, and yet we may fail at doing our duty. Rather, we have a choice about whether to conceive of the highest good as possible, to regard it as impossible, or to remain noncommittal 5:144—145.

But we can fulfill our duty of promoting the highest good only by choosing to conceive of the highest good as possible, because we cannot promote any end without believing that it is possible to achieve that end 5:122. This is because to comply with that duty we must believe that the highest good is possible, and yet to believe that the highest good is possible we must believe that the soul is immortal and that God exists, according to Kant. The highest good, as we have seen, would be a world of complete morality and happiness. This does not mean that we can substitute endless progress toward complete conformity with the moral law for holiness in the concept of the highest good, but rather that we must represent that complete conformity as an infinite progress toward the limit of holiness. Rather, his view is that we must represent holiness as continual progress toward complete conformity of our dispositions with the moral law that begins in this life and extends into infinity. Kant holds that virtue and happiness are not just combined but necessarily combined in the idea of the highest good, because only possessing virtue makes one worthy of happiness — a claim that Kant seems to regard as part of the content of the moral law 4:393; 5:110, 124. But we can represent virtue and happiness as necessarily combined only by representing virtue as the efficient cause of happiness.

This means that we must represent the highest good not simply as a state of affairs in which everyone is both happy and virtuous, but rather as one in which everyone is happy because they are virtuous 5:113—114, 124. However, it is beyond the power of human beings, both individually and collectively, to guarantee that happiness results from virtue, and we do not know any law of nature that guarantees this either. This cause of nature would have to be God since it must have both understanding and will. Kant probably does not conceive of God as the efficient cause of a happiness that is rewarded in a future life to those who are virtuous in this one.

Императив, например. Генрих Гейне про Канта писал, что невозможно ничего написать про жизнь Канта, поскольку и не было у него жизни.

Не было, неужели? Так что знаем мы? Кроме того, что в городе Калининграде бывшем Кенинсберге какой-то отморозок на стене написал корявыми буквами: «Кант — лох». Мои мысли — мои скакуны 18 век, 1724 год, прусский город Кенигсберг. Шорник — это мастер такой, который изготавливает упряжь для лошадей. Уздечки, седла, шоры те же самые… Шорник был довольно успешен, женат на дочери другого шорника, которая родила ему множество детей, быстро и болезненно покинувших этот мир.

Иммануил Кант с младенчества, просто по праву рождения, был зачислен в гильдию шорников. Людей, которые готовят все, что обуздывает лошадей. Так что мысли-скакуны у Канта были очень упорядочены в дальнейшем. Следи за собой, будь осторожен Семья беднела медленно, но верно. В какой-то момент дом Канта официально был признан бедным отец старел, мать умерла, еще пожар был, был и новый дом. Зачислили в реестр бедных ремесленников, помогали дровами, снизили налоговую ставку.

Потом мальчик получил шанс поступить в престижную гимназию. Он ненавидел ее, но изучил латынь, немного французского, основы английского языка. Одна из причин ненависти была такая: ученики этой гимназии должны были ежедневно вести дневник. В дневнике надо было вести «учет души». И фиксировать. Для Канта эта постоянная слежка за собой была неприемлема.

Его университеты Университет был один — в Кенигсберге. Там была свобода, которой он не очень пользовался. Он просто ее ощущал. Никаких пирушек и резвой жизни. Только учеба.

Jung said "Annihilation" and not "Annexation. Through the progressive integration of the unconscious we have a reasonable chance to make experiences of an archetypal nature providing us with the feeling of continuity before and after our existence.

The better we understand the archetype, the more we participate in its life and the more we realize its eternity or timelessness. Many come to me with concerns that I cannot or may not discuss with others.

Начал писать свою первую работу в 20 лет Один из главных трудов Канта — «Критика чистого разума» — вышел в 1781 году, когда автору было уже 57 лет. А вот свою первую работу мыслитель начал еще в 1744-м. Она называлась «Мысли об истинной оценке живых сил», и в ней Кант вступил в полемику с Декартом и Лейбницем. Научное сообщество встретило этот труд прохладно и раскритиковало автора за излишнюю многословность и поверхностные познания в области механики. И все-таки Иммануил Кант добился своей цели — на него обратили внимание. Правда, впоследствии он испытывал неловкость, когда вспоминал о своей пробе пера.

Был ипохондриком и строго следовал расписанию Еще в детстве будущий философ читал труды по медицине и находил симптомы описанных болезней у себя. Его ипохондрия с возрастом только усилилась и привела к появлению еще одной его особенности. Будучи уверенным, что на врачей и лекарства того времени полагаться нельзя, Иммануил Кант придумал строгий распорядок дня, который должен был укрепить его тело и разум. Первые часы после пробуждения он посвящал собственным работам, далее отправлялся в университет читать лекции. Затем следовал единственный прием пищи за сутки — плотный обед в час дня. Обедал Кант всегда в компании друзей, среди которых были представители кенигсбергской знати и купечества. Чтобы беседа за столом была оживленной и интересной, философ даже придумал собственное правило: число гостей должно быть больше количества граций, но не превышать количество муз. А еще на обедах его доме говорили о чем угодно, но не о философии.

Канте купил клуб в Бельгии после подписания контракта «Аль-Иттихадом»

Кант Иммануил (Immanuel Kant) (22.4.1724, Кёнигсберг, ныне Калининград – 12.2.1804, там же), немецкий философ, создатель «трансцендентального идеализма». Emmanuel Kant is Lupa's first experience with Polski Theatre in Wroclaw, though the leading part is played by the protagonist of his first productions in Jelenia Gora, Wojciech Ziemianski. 18+. Вы здесь. Главная» Эммануэль Макрон. Слушайте Doing Nothing with Emmanuel Kant от ParisPiano на Deezer. Благодаря потоковой трансляции музыки на Deezer вы можете слушать более 120 млн треков.

Chronicle of Normand Baillargeon: thinking about education with Emmanuel Kant

We will see it from an example of the thought of Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) on education. Let us start by recalling some of these digital issues that current events force us to consider. The Life, Work and Legacy of Carl Jung. Category: Emmanuel Kant. Источник: РИА "Новости". Хиты и новинки в хорошем качестве. Чтобы скачать песни исполнителя Immanuel Kant, установите приложение Звук и слушайте бесплатно оффлайн и онлайн по подписке Прайм. Emmanuel Kant, Gravure sur bois, publiée en 1881.

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Ведущие ученые мира выступили с докладами на Международном Кантовском конгрессе

Иммануил Кант — самый русский из европейских и самый европейский из русских философов. Он родился и всю жизнь работал в Кенигсберге — сегодня это Калининград, несколько лет. Chronicle of Normand Baillargeon: thinking about education with Emmanuel Kant. 3 monthly listeners. Emmanuel Kant (@kant_authentic) sur TikTok |66.4K j'aime.23.8K e la dernière vidéo de Emmanuel Kant (@kant_authentic). О сервисе Прессе Авторские права Связаться с нами Авторам Рекламодателям Разработчикам.

Ипохондрик, гений и городская звезда: 5 фактов об Иммануиле Канте

Not only that but Putin has been praising and quoting Kant for decades and has even gone so far as saying that the philosopher should be made an official symbol of Kaliningrad Region. Catherine the Great , who was actually born in Prussia, and the German speaking and Kant admiring Putin have carried on those links into more modern times. Scholz, who fancies himself as something of a bar room philosopher, is having none of that. But Kant was a philosopher, not a statesman and he wrote that thesis in 1795, just when the French Revolutionary Wars and a certain Napoleon Bonaparte were getting into their stride.

Thanks to Germany reneging on the Minsk Accords, colluding in blowing up Nordstream and tooling up the Nazi regime in Kiev to the hilt, other wars are now picking up pace and, at the time of writing, it is uncertain if all of us will come out safe on the other side of Armageddon, which is increasingly being talked about. But talk, like philosophy, gets us so far and no further. But what he cannot and should not do is encourage the Nazi regime in Estonia to attack their Orthodox Christian monasteries because they will not break with the Moscow Patriarchy.

The most obvious form of synthetic proposition is a simple empirical observation. This is because, unlike a posteriori cognition, a priori cognition has "true or strict... It is the twofold aim of the Critique both to prove and to explain the possibility of this knowledge. In general terms, the former is a non-discursive representation of a particular object, and the latter is a discursive or mediate representation of a general type of object. Knowledge generated on this basis, under certain conditions, can be synthetic a priori. In this "transcendental dialectic", Kant argues that many of the claims of traditional rationalist metaphysics violate the criteria he claims to establish in the first, "constructive" part of his book.

Something is "transcendental" if it is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience, and "idealism" denotes some form of mind-dependence that must be further specified. It argues that all genuine knowledge requires a sensory component, and thus that metaphysical claims that transcend the possibility of sensory confirmation can never amount to knowledge. On this particular view, the thing-in-itself is not numerically identical the phenomenal empirical object. Kant also spoke of the thing in itself or transcendent object as a product of the human understanding as it attempts to conceive of objects in abstraction from the conditions of sensibility. Following this line of thought, some interpreters argue that the thing in itself does not represent a separate ontological domain but simply a way of considering objects by means of the understanding alone; this is known as the "two-aspect" view. Whereas the former was concerned with the contributions of the sensibility, the latter is concerned, first, with the contributions of the understanding "Transcendental Analytic" and, second, with the faculty of reason as the source of both metaphysical errors and genuine regulatory principles "Transcendental Dialectic".

The "Transcendental Analytic" is further divided into two sections. The first, "Analytic of Concepts", is concerned with establishing the universality and necessity of the pure concepts of the understanding i. The second, "Analytic of Principles", is concerned with the application of those pure concepts in empirical judgments. This second section is longer than the first and is further divided into many sub-sections. These twelve basic categories define what it is to be a thing in general—that is, they articulate the necessary conditions according to which something is a possible object of experience. These, in conjunction with the a priori forms of intuition, are the basis of all synthetic a priori cognition.

The first, known as the "metaphysical deduction", proceeds analytically from a table of the Aristotelian logical functions of judgment. As Kant was aware, this assumes precisely what the skeptic rejects, namely, the existence of synthetic a priori cognition. For this reason, Kant also supplies a synthetic argument that does not depend upon the assumption in dispute. Kant himself said that it is the one that cost him the most labor. The task of the "Analytic of Principles" is to show both that they must universally apply to objects given in actual experience i. The second book continues this line of argument in four chapters, each associated with one of the category groupings.

In some cases, it adds a connection to the spatial dimension of intuition to the categories it analyzes. Some commentators consider this the most significant section of the Critique. He argues that the unity of time implies that "all change must consist in the alteration of states in an underlying substance, whose existence and quantity must be unchangeable or conserved. That was the end of the chapter in the A edition of the Critique. The B edition includes one more short section, "The Refutation of Idealism". In this section, by analysis of the concept of self-consciousness, Kant argues that his transcendental idealism is a "critical" or "formal" idealism that does not deny the existence of reality apart from our subjective representations.

Against this, Kant reasserts his own insistence upon the necessity of a sensible component in all genuine knowledge. In particular, it is concerned to demonstrate as spurious the efforts of reason to arrive at knowledge independent of sensibility.

Мы его постоянно дорабатываем». Что точно не нуждается в доработке уже сейчас — это фразы, которые использует цифровой Иммануил Кант во время беседы. Ольга Юрицына, заведующая секцией «Музей Иммануила Канта» в Кафедральном соборе Калининграда: «Отбирая цитаты, мы могли отобрать намного больше, чем 250. Остановились на этих, потому что нам кажется, что они больше отражают наш сегодняшний мир и те вопросы, те чаяния, которые беспокоят современных людей». Григорий Хуциев, и. Кстати, приветствует и прощается цифровой Иммануил Кант так же, как делал это реальный прототип.

После смерти отца молодой человек бросил учебу в университете. Чтобы прокормить семью, Иммануил стал домашним учителем. В свободное от уроков время он занимался теоретическим исследованием Солнечной системы и вскоре опубликовал свою гипотезу о ее происхождении из первоначальной туманности. В 1755 году Кант защитил докторскую диссертацию, давшую ему право преподавать в университете. После этого он в течение сорока лет вел лекции в альма-матер. В 1770 году он был назначен профессором логики и метафизики Кенигсбергского университета. Тогда Иммануил работал в рамках нескольких дисциплин: философских, физических и математических, решая вопросы из области морали, религии, метафизики и антропологии.

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Kant jettisoned traditional theistic proofs for God as utilized by natural theology, but sought to ground ethics, in part, in his concepts of categorical imperatives or universal maxims to guide morality. Immanuel Kant, German philosopher who was one of the foremost thinkers of the Enlightenment and who inaugurated a new era of philosophical thought. His comprehensive and systematic work in. Name: Emmanuel Kant Duarte. Type: User. Bio: Learning a little piece of code every day and drinking coffee. Hi there, my name is Emmanuel Kant Duarte and welcome to my profile. Retrouvez toute l’actualité de Emmanuel Kant. Suivez nos dernières informations, reportages, décryptages et analyses sur Le Point. Emmanuel Kant. Emmanuel Kant. Follow new publications. Does Scholz have the right to prohibit anyone from quoting Kant? Emmanuel Kant is a figure of world heritage, not a Scholtz pocket dog!

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